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RedCurl is a Russian-speaking corporate cyber-espionage group active since at least 2018. Also tracked as Red Wolf, Earth Kapre, and Gold Blade, it conducts long-duration intrusions—often lasting two to six months—to exfiltrate internal corporate information rather than deploy ransomware or steal funds. Its victims span construction, finance, consulting, retail, insurance, and legal organizations in Canada, Germany, Norway, Russia, Ukraine, and the United Kingdom. RedCurl commonly conducts target research using public sources and gains initial access through spearphishing emails impersonating internal HR communications, often using employee-benefit or company-news themes. It has used malicious disk images and shortcut files to induce execution of DLL payloads, followed by deployment of the FSABIN backdoor. The group uses custom tooling alongside selected public utilities, avoids widely used post-exploitation frameworks, and employs PowerShell, scheduled-task persistence, system and domain-account reconnaissance, automated collection, and HTTP, HTTPS, WebDAV, DNS, and cloud-service communications. The group collects host, infrastructure, drive, account, and corporate data, targeting business emails, personnel records, legal-entity documentation, court records, and other sensitive internal materials. It has used LaZagne to obtain credentials from browser stores, files, and the Windows Registry. RedCurl also uses defense-evasion measures including hidden file attributes, encrypted strings, anti-virtualization checks, and scheduled tasks masquerading as legitimate browser-related components.
Mallory correlates actor tradecraft and target patterns against your stack, your sector, and your geography. See overlap before they land.
Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.
Geographies tied to known operations.
Attributed origin per open-source reporting.
47 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
12 malware families attributed to this actor across reporting.
7 additional families tracked in Mallory.
1 CVE this actor has used in observed campaigns. 1 of them exploited in the wild.
40 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.
20 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Listed in the detection's Annotations section.
Listed by Trend as a threat actor associated with the broader ZDI-CAN-25373 exploitation activity.
Mentioned only as one of many threat actors associated with the ATT&CK technique/detection annotation for automated collection using Windows dir piped to findstr.
Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.