IRGC
- Origin
- 🇮🇷 Iran
- Motivation
- Espionage
- Targets
- FRUSILGBSGAU
- Ransomware tactics
- Data theft extortion
- Capabilities
- Initial accessReconnaissanceScanningSpoofingExfiltrationPersistencePrivilege escalationPost exploitation
The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), also known as the Iranian Revolutionary Guards, is an Iranian state military organization that conducts and sponsors cyberespionage, destructive cyber operations, and covert influence campaigns. Its cyber activities involve military units, associated operators, and front organizations rather than a single intrusion group. Documented cyber targets include organizations in France, the United States, Israel, the United Kingdom, Singapore, and Australia, encompassing food distribution, water and energy utilities, aerospace and satellite technology, and government organizations. The IRGC’s Electronic and Cyber Center is affiliated with Shahid Kaveh, which uses the online identity CyberAveng3rs and conducts sabotage against industrial equipment. France attributed the October 11–12, 2026 attacks against approximately 700 French supermarket sites to this unit. Attackers remotely manipulated refrigeration equipment through web interfaces, initiated indefinite defrost cycles, and disabled temperature safety alerts, causing extensive food spoilage and approximately 20 fires. The unit has also targeted industrial control systems at French hydroelectric installations and compromised programmable logic controllers used in U.S. water systems. Its techniques include internet-facing industrial-device reconnaissance, Modbus-based discovery, FOFA-assisted scanning, and manipulation of operational settings. Similar refrigeration incidents elsewhere in Europe and at French blood banks were not established as the work of the same actor. IRGC-associated espionage operators have targeted aerospace, satellite technology, and government-related organizations since at least 2015. Their methods include open-source collection of employee information, identity impersonation, fraudulent social media accounts, and customized spear-phishing messages delivering malware. Operations have involved theft of sensitive business information, intellectual property, and vendor information, followed by additional backdoor deployment and privilege escalation. Identified tools include Metasploit, Mimikatz, NanoCore RAT, OCRA shell-code stagers, and a Python backdoor. The IRGC and its Qods Force also operate covert propaganda networks that impersonate independent news outlets and distribute pro-Iranian disinformation. Associated organizations include Bayan Rasaneh Gostar Institute, the Iranian Islamic Radio and Television Union, and the International Union of Virtual Media. These networks have targeted U.S. public opinion and the 2020 U.S. presidential election, alongside audiences in Western Europe, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia.
Targeting
Who, where, and from where this actor operates. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Who they target
Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.
- Transportation
- Government & Administration
- Consumer Staples Distribution & Retail
- Energy
- Software & Services
- Utilities
- Food, Beverage & Tobacco
- Health Care Equipment & Services
- Media & Entertainment
- Military
- Technology Hardware & Equipment
- Financial Services
Where they target
Geographies tied to known operations.
- France
- United States
- United Arab Emirates
- Bahrain
- United Kingdom
- Oman
- Saudi Arabia
- Bolivia
- Germany
- Ecuador
- Greece
- Israel
- India
- Kuwait
- Netherlands
- Qatar
Where they're from
Attributed origin per open-source reporting.
- Iran
Tradecraft
64 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt.
Associated vulnerabilities
9 CVEs Mallory has associated with this actor across public reporting. 9 of them are exploited in the wild (not necessarily by this actor).
3 more CVEs tied to this actor tracked in Mallory.
Observables
94 indicators attributed to this actor. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.
Frequently asked questions
- Who does IRGC target?
- IRGC targets Transportation, Government & Administration, Consumer Staples Distribution & Retail, Energy, Software & Services, Utilities, Food, Beverage & Tobacco, Health Care Equipment & Services, and 4 more in France, United States, United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, United Kingdom, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Bolivia, and 8 more.
- Where is IRGC from?
- Mallory's sources associate IRGC with Iran.
Recent activity
20 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.