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GrayBravo, formerly tracked as TAG-150, is a Russian-speaking cybercriminal threat actor active since at least March 2025. It develops and operates a malware-as-a-service ecosystem centered on CastleLoader, CastleBot, and CastleRAT. The group is characterized by rapid development cycles, adaptation following public exposure, and extensive, multi-tiered infrastructure. Its malware has been deployed against financial institutions, U.S. government agencies, information technology firms, and logistics companies. GrayBravo-associated operations use Cloudflare-themed ClickFix lures and fraudulent GitHub repositories impersonating legitimate applications to induce victims to execute malicious commands. CastleLoader delivers remote-access tools and information stealers, including SectopRAT, WarmCookie, NetSupport RAT, Lumma Stealer, Stealc, RedLine, and Rhadamanthys. Its delivery chains employ obfuscated scripts, legitimate runtimes, encrypted payloads, in-memory execution, environment checks, and persistence mechanisms. CastleRAT exists in Python and C variants and supports host reconnaissance, command execution, and additional payload deployment; the C variant also supports keylogging and screen capture. CastleRAT uses Steam Community profiles as dead-drop resolvers to conceal command-and-control infrastructure. Additional TAG-150-attributed intrusions have deployed DinDoor, DenoRAT, and NightshadeC2 for remote control, credential and browser-data theft, session-cookie collection, and exfiltration. Associated tooling supports browser-process injection to bypass Chromium App-Bound Encryption. GrayBravo supplies a shared criminal platform rather than exclusively conducting every intrusion involving its malware. Distinct customer activity clusters include TAG-160 and TAG-161. The Iranian state-sponsored actor MuddyWater has also used its CastleRAT platform against Israeli targets; this customer relationship does not establish Iranian state affiliation for GrayBravo.
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Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.
Geographies tied to known operations.
Attributed origin per open-source reporting.
45 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
13 malware families attributed to this actor across reporting.
8 additional families tracked in Mallory.
3 CVEs this actor has used in observed campaigns. 3 of them exploited in the wild.
Israeli-Focused Targeting Set Targets include Israeli IP ranges, Laravel web applications, and FortiOS systems. ... MITRE ATT&CK ID Technique ... T1190 CVE-2024-55591, CVE-2024-23113, CVE-2026-1281
Israeli-Focused Targeting Set Targets include Israeli IP ranges, Laravel web applications, and FortiOS systems. ... MITRE ATT&CK ID Technique ... T1190 CVE-2024-55591, CVE-2024-23113, CVE-2026-1281
Israeli-Focused Targeting Set Targets include Israeli IP ranges, Laravel web applications, and FortiOS systems. ... MITRE ATT&CK ID Technique ... T1190 CVE-2024-55591, CVE-2024-23113, CVE-2026-1281
93 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.
20 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Conducting financially targeted intrusions using ClickFix social engineering to trick users into executing malicious commands, leading to deployment of DinDoor, DenoRAT, and NightshadeC2 for persistence, credential theft, browser data theft, and host reconnaissance.
Abusing Deno in a multi-stage malware delivery chain beginning with a ClickFix-style social engineering lure and MSI installer, leading to DinDoor, DenoRAT, and in-memory execution of NightshadeC2 for RAT, stealer, remote control, and browser/crypto-wallet theft operations.
Threat activity cluster attributed with CastleLoader and associated distribution of CastleStealer in lure-based malware campaigns.
A Russian-speaking criminal ecosystem/developer associated with the CastleRAT malware-as-a-service platform that is operationally linked to MuddyWater in this reporting.
Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.