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2 malware families

0APT

Also known as0APT

0APT is a ransomware and purported ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) operation that emerged in late January 2026. It is commonly referred to as 0APT and is also associated with the name "0apt Team" and the branding "0APT_SYNDICATE." Reporting consistently describes it as a newly emerged cybercrime operation rather than a nation-state actor. 0APT rapidly claimed more than 150-200 victims within days of launch via a Tor-based data leak site, but multiple firms and researchers cited in the content — including GuidePoint Security/GRIT, Kela, Intel 471, SOCRadar, and Halcyon — found those victim claims to be largely fabricated, inflated, or otherwise unverified. Reported indicators of deception included fake or unverifiable victim names, implausible file trees and file sizes, throttled or meaningless downloads, and at least two named organizations that reportedly found no evidence of intrusion after review. Several sources assessed that 0APT may have been attempting to defraud would-be affiliates or extort organizations through fear rather than through demonstrated compromises. At the same time, Halcyon assessed that 0APT poses a legitimate threat and shows credible technical depth despite the questionable victim claims. The content states that 0APT maintained operational leak-site and affiliate infrastructure, including a negotiation/chat capability and a RaaS panel, and that Windows and Linux ransomware samples attributed to the group were fully operational. Researchers reported the panel could generate ransomware for Windows, Linux, and macOS. A ransomware family associated with the group, 0APT Locker, is described as Rust-based and using AES-256 with RSA-2048; other reporting on generated samples also references AES256 and Salsa20/ChaCha. The malware appends the .0apt extension and drops the ransom note README0apt.txt. The note claims network compromise and prior data theft, directs victims to a Tor negotiation portal, and threatens data leakage, regulator notification, and outreach to clients and partners. Reported possible delivery vectors include exposed RDP, phishing emails, malicious attachments, deceptive downloads, botnets, exploits, malvertising, web injects, fake updates, and trojanized installers. 0APT also engaged in criminal-on-criminal activity. It threatened rival ransomware group Krybit, leaked selected data it claimed was stolen from Krybit, and warned it would expose Krybit affiliates if payment was not made. Reporting cited analysis of leaked Krybit files that allegedly contained plaintext credentials for Krybit operators and affiliates and five cryptocurrency wallet addresses. Separately, KryBit reportedly compromised 0APT and leaked 0APT operational data, including access logs, system files, and PHP source code; reporting based on those logs said 0APT had fabricated claims of breaching more than 190 victims. 0APT was also reported to have exposed hashed and encoded publication and user information from Everest Group. The group’s targeting claims were broad, with reported emphasis in its claimed victim lists on healthcare, professional services, technology, transportation and logistics, energy, manufacturing, and other data-rich or critical-infrastructure sectors, with many claimed victims in the United States. CYFIRMA reporting cited in the content also noted 0APT among ransomware groups showing relatively high focus on the energy and utilities sector. However, because multiple sources state the victim lists were largely fabricated or unverified, these sector observations should be treated as reflecting claimed rather than confirmed victimization. Overall, the content supports describing 0APT as an emergent ransomware/RaaS brand with deceptive or fraudulent victim claims, but with at least some technically functional ransomware capability and supporting infrastructure. No reliable attribution to a state sponsor or specific geographic origin is provided in the content.

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MITRE ATT&CK

Tradecraft

14 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.

11 of 15 tactics21 techniques×N= number of intelligence reports citing this technique
MITRE ATT&CK
TA0001
Initial Access
1 technique
T1078×2
Valid Accounts
TA0002
Execution
2 techniques
T1047
Windows Management Instrumentation
T1059
Command and Scripting Interpreter
T1059.001
PowerShell
TA0003
Persistence
1 technique
T1078×2
Valid Accounts
TA0004
Privilege Escalation
1 technique
T1078×2
Valid Accounts
TA0005
Stealth
1 technique
T1078×2
Valid Accounts
TA0007
Discovery
1 technique
T1082
System Information Discovery
TA0008
Lateral Movement
1 technique
T1021
Remote Services
T1021.002
SMB/Windows Admin Shares
TA0009
Collection
1 technique
T1560
Archive Collected Data
T1560.001
Archive via Utility
TA0011
Command and Control
1 technique
T1090
Proxy
T1090.003
Multi-hop Proxy
TA0010
Exfiltration
3 techniques
T1041
Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
T1537
Transfer Data to Cloud Account
T1567
Exfiltration Over Web Service
T1567.002
Exfiltration to Cloud Storage
TA0040
Impact
3 techniques
T1486×6
Data Encrypted for Impact
T1490
Inhibit System Recovery
T1657×2
Financial Theft
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Target overlap

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Tradecraft mapping14

Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.

Malware arsenal2

Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.

Exploited CVEs

CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

Observables

Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.