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Mallory
Threat actor

UNC6671

Updated 2 days ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 days19 mentions · peak 4 in a dayToday
CVEs0Associated
Malware0Families
ATT&CK56Techniques
IOCs176Tracked
Motivation
Financial
Targets
USAUGBCA
Ransomware tactics
Data theft extortionLeak site
Capabilities
Initial accessCredential theftSession hijackingSpoofingPersistenceReconnaissancePost exploitationExfiltrationDefense evasionExtortion
Also known asunc6671

UNC6671 is a financially motivated cybercriminal threat cluster conducting cloud-data theft and extortion campaigns documented in 2026. Associated extortion brands include BlackFile, Redact, Pink, Helix, and Falcon. The cluster is assessed to operate independently of ShinyHunters; shared branding or tradecraft does not establish a common actor identity. Arctic Wolf's PREY-0058 activity has substantial behavioral overlap with UNC6671 but is not a confirmed equivalent designation. UNC6671 targets enterprises across financial services, private equity, insurance, professional services, manufacturing, real estate, healthcare, technology, transportation, and hospitality. Operators impersonate internal IT or helpdesk personnel through telephone calls, Microsoft Teams messages, and other communications, frequently claiming that urgent passkey, MFA, or single-sign-on updates are mandatory. They contact employees on personal phones and sometimes spoof legitimate helpdesk numbers. Organization-branded adversary-in-the-middle phishing portals capture passwords and authenticated session material, enabling access to Microsoft 365 and Okta-connected corporate resources. After compromise, UNC6671 maintains authenticated access, discovers accessible cloud resources, and uses automated scripts to collect and exfiltrate corporate documents and email. Operators also use compromised mailboxes to reset passwords for applications outside single sign-on. Residential proxies disguise malicious access, while deletion of password-reset confirmations and security notifications conceals account changes and continued collection. Associated extortion operations threaten public disclosure of stolen information and use data-leak sites to pressure victims, rather than relying on encryption.

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Operational profile

Targeting

Who, where, and from where this actor operates. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.

Who they target

Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.

  • Financial Services
  • Health Care Equipment & Services
  • Software & Services
  • Commercial & Professional Services
  • Consumer Services
  • Insurance
  • Transportation
  • Capital Goods
  • Real Estate Management & Development
  • Banks
  • Equity Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs)
  • Consumer Durables & Apparel

Where they target

Geographies tied to known operations.

  • United States
  • Australia
  • United Kingdom
  • Canada
MITRE ATT&CK

Tradecraft

56 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt.

14 of 15 tactics77 techniques
= intelligence reports citing the technique
TA0043Reconnaissance3 techniques
T1589×2Gather Victim Identity Information
T1593Search Open Websites/Domains
T1598×11Phishing for Information
T1598.003Spearphishing Link
T1598.004×19Spearphishing Voice
TA0042Resource Development2 techniques
T1583Acquire Infrastructure
T1583.001×3Domains
T1586×2Compromise Accounts
T1586.002×2Email Accounts
TA0001Initial Access4 techniques
T1078×22Valid Accounts
T1078.004×3Cloud Accounts
T1133×2External Remote Services
T1199Trusted Relationship
T1566×8Phishing
T1566.002×8Spearphishing Link
T1566.003Spearphishing via Service
T1566.004×14Spearphishing Voice
TA0002Execution1 technique
T1059Command and Scripting Interpreter
T1059.001×4PowerShell
T1059.006Python
TA0003Persistence4 techniques
T1078×22Valid Accounts
T1078.004×3Cloud Accounts
T1098×2Account Manipulation
T1098.005Device Registration
T1133×2External Remote Services
T1556×5Modify Authentication Process
T1556.006Multi-Factor Authentication
TA0004Privilege Escalation2 techniques
T1078×22Valid Accounts
T1078.004×3Cloud Accounts
T1098×2Account Manipulation
T1098.005Device Registration
TA0005Stealth4 techniques
T1036×6Masquerading
T1036.005Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location
T1070×3Indicator Removal
T1070.004×3File Deletion
T1070.008Clear Mailbox Data
T1078×22Valid Accounts
T1078.004×3Cloud Accounts
T1684Social Engineering
T1684.001×6Impersonation
TA0112Defense Impairment1 technique
T1556×5Modify Authentication Process
T1556.006Multi-Factor Authentication
TA0006Credential Access9 techniques
T1056Input Capture
T1056.003Web Portal Capture
T1110Brute Force
T1111×3Multi-Factor Authentication Interception
T1528Steal Application Access Token
T1539×8Steal Web Session Cookie
T1556×5Modify Authentication Process
T1556.006Multi-Factor Authentication
T1557×16Adversary-in-the-Middle
T1557.002ARP Cache Poisoning
T1557.003DHCP Spoofing
T1621×3Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation
T1649×4Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates
TA0007Discovery3 techniques
T1087×4Account Discovery
T1526Cloud Service Discovery
T1654Log Enumeration
TA0009Collection6 techniques
T1056Input Capture
T1056.003Web Portal Capture
T1114×3Email Collection
T1114.003×4Email Forwarding Rule
T1119×2Automated Collection
T1213×7Data from Information Repositories
T1530×10Data from Cloud Storage
T1557×16Adversary-in-the-Middle
T1557.002ARP Cache Poisoning
T1557.003DHCP Spoofing
TA0011Command and Control1 technique
T1090Proxy
T1090.002External Proxy
T1090.003Multi-hop Proxy
TA0010Exfiltration3 techniques
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
T1537×3Transfer Data to Cloud Account
T1567×9Exfiltration Over Web Service
T1567.002×4Exfiltration to Cloud Storage
TA0040Impact2 techniques
T1486×4Data Encrypted for Impact
T1657×3Financial Theft
Indicators of compromise

Observables

176 indicators attributed to this actor. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
FAQ

Frequently asked questions

Who does UNC6671 target?
UNC6671 targets Financial Services, Health Care Equipment & Services, Software & Services, Commercial & Professional Services, Consumer Services, Insurance, Transportation, Capital Goods, and 4 more in United States, Australia, United Kingdom, and Canada.
Activity feed

Recent activity

20 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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embee researchNews · Nov 15, 2026Notes on Finding Threat Infrastructure with Local ModelsUNC6671-associated infrastructure serves as a test case for model-assisted infrastructure discovery using URLScan. Starting from myssosetup[.]com, the researcher identified related infrastructure by pivoting on a shared loaded file's name and hash. The article does not describe the actor's objectives, malware, victims, or exploitation methods.Read more ↗cyberveilleNews · Nov 4, 2026ShinyHunters : bataille pour le contrôle du nom après les arrestations de septembre 2026 | CyberVeilleA separate activity cluster discussed to distinguish it from ShinyHunters. The reference assesses it as independent and provides no specific operational techniques, malware, or victim attribution.Read more ↗flareio blogNews · Nov 4, 2026ShinyHunters Arrests: The Fight Over the Brand Name - FlareVoice-phishing and extortion cluster discussed to prevent erroneous attribution to ShinyHunters. BlackFile launched a leak site in February 2026, announced a shutdown in May, and returned as Redact eight days later. Google associates several operational brands with UNC6671, while Microsoft separately describes a Helix-running splinter as Storm-3032. The researcher found no positive infrastructure linkage between UNC6671 and the examined ShinyHunters download servers.Read more ↗trellix otherNews · Nov 4, 2026The CyberThreat Report: November 2026 | TrellixActivity cluster using IT-support impersonation to compromise SSO and Microsoft 365 environments. The report says it rotated through extortion brands named Redact, Pink, and Trellix Helix; it does not establish those brands as distinct operational subgroups.Read more ↗
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Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what's public. Mallory adds the parts that aren't: whether this actor's tooling has touched your footprint, the IOCs they're burning right now, and the detections to deploy next.
Target overlapMatch sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Tradecraft mapping56MITRE ATT&CK techniques reported for this actor, grouped by tactic.
Associated malwareFamilies linked to this actor, with IOCs and behavior.
Associated CVEsCVEs linked to this actor, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Observables176Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.