Loading threat actor…
Diesel Vortex is a financially motivated, Russian-linked cybercrime group with an Armenian-speaking operational component. Active from at least September 2025 to February 2026, it operated a phishing-as-a-service platform internally known as GlobalProfit and marketed as MC Profit Always. The group targeted freight and logistics organizations in the United States and Europe, including load boards, fleet-management portals, fuel-card systems, freight exchanges, and related business services. Diesel Vortex used tailored credential-phishing templates, email phishing, voice phishing, typosquatting, Cyrillic-homoglyph evasion, and impersonation of legitimate logistics platforms. Its phishing infrastructure used cloaking and iframe-based delivery to filter security researchers and dynamically guide victims through credential and multi-factor authentication collection. Operators used Telegram bots for real-time control of phishing sessions, including prompting for passwords, authentication codes, PINs, security tokens, and other financial data. The operation stole more than 1,600 unique credentials and included attempted EFS check fraud. The group maintained an organized service model with roles covering call-center activity, mail support, development, reselling, and acquisition of logistics-sector contacts. Recovered operational material indicates that stolen access was intended to enable follow-on fraud including carrier and broker impersonation, mailbox compromise, double-brokering, freight diversion, cargo theft, and theft of funds. Russian-language development artifacts and sales activity on Russian-language cybercrime forums support Russian links, while Armenian-language Telegram coordination supports the presence of Armenian-speaking operators.
Mallory correlates actor tradecraft and target patterns against your stack, your sector, and your geography. See overlap before they land.
Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.
Geographies tied to known operations.
Attributed origin per open-source reporting.
21 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
51 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.
7 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Targeted freight and logistics organizations in the United States and Europe.
Previously reported cybercrime group using phishing to facilitate cargo theft against the logistics sector; mentioned only as an unconfirmed comparison to the Corp MDM campaign.
Financially motivated threat group conducting phishing campaigns against freight and logistics operators to steal credentials, supporting cyber-enabled cargo theft activity.
Credential-phishing against freight/logistics platforms to enable fraud and cargo diversion, disrupting supply chain operations across multiple countries.
Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.