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Threat actor

Dust Specter

Updated 19 days ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 days2 mentions · peak 1 in a dayToday
CVEs0Associated
Malware4Families
ATT&CK28Techniques
IOCs9Tracked
Origin
🇮🇷 Iran
Motivation
Espionage
Targets
IQ
Capabilities
Initial accessSpoofingDLL sideloadingPersistenceDefense evasionPost exploitationExfiltration
Also known asdust_specter

Dust Specter is an Iran-nexus cyberespionage threat actor tracked by Zscaler ThreatLabz and publicly documented in March 2026. It targets Iraqi government officials through phishing and social engineering that impersonate Iraq’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Its documented activity includes a January 2026 campaign deploying four custom malware families: SPLITDROP, TWINTASK, TWINTALK, and GHOSTFORM. Attribution to an Iranian nexus is assessed with medium-to-high confidence; a specific government sponsor has not been established. One infection chain delivers a password-protected archive containing SPLITDROP, a .NET dropper masquerading as WinRAR. The dropper decrypts and deploys TWINTASK and TWINTALK, using legitimate VLC and WingetUI applications for DLL sideloading. TWINTASK executes PowerShell commands, while TWINTALK orchestrates command-and-control communications and supports script execution, file uploads, and additional payload delivery. The malware establishes persistence through Windows Registry Run keys and uses randomized communication intervals and request-validation mechanisms to reduce detection. A separate chain uses GHOSTFORM to display a fake government-themed Google Forms survey while executing commands in memory. Its stealth techniques include invisible Windows forms and delayed execution. Dust Specter has also used a ClickFix-style lure impersonating a Cisco Webex Government meeting invitation to persuade victims to execute malicious PowerShell commands, download malware, and establish scheduled-task persistence. The actor has used compromised Iraqi government-related infrastructure to host payloads.

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Operational profile

Targeting

Who, where, and from where this actor operates. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.

Who they target

Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.

  • Government & Administration

Where they target

Geographies tied to known operations.

  • Iraq

Where they're from

Attributed origin per open-source reporting.

  • Iran
MITRE ATT&CK

Tradecraft

28 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt.

10 of 15 tactics43 techniques
= intelligence reports citing the technique
TA0001Initial Access1 technique
T1566×3Phishing
T1566.001×2Spearphishing Attachment
T1566.002Spearphishing Link
TA0002Execution4 techniques
T1053×3Scheduled Task/Job
T1053.005×2Scheduled Task
T1059×3Command and Scripting Interpreter
T1059.001×7PowerShell
T1059.003Windows Command Shell
T1204×4User Execution
T1574Hijack Execution Flow
T1574.001×2DLL
TA0003Persistence3 techniques
T1053×3Scheduled Task/Job
T1053.005×2Scheduled Task
T1112Modify Registry
T1547Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
T1547.001×5Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
TA0004Privilege Escalation2 techniques
T1053×3Scheduled Task/Job
T1053.005×2Scheduled Task
T1547Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
T1547.001×5Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
TA0005Stealth9 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or Information
T1036×5Masquerading
T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information
T1480Execution Guardrails
T1497Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion
T1497.003Time Based Checks
T1564Hide Artifacts
T1564.003Hidden Window
T1574Hijack Execution Flow
T1574.001×2DLL
T1612Build Image on Host
T1620×5Reflective Code Loading
TA0112Defense Impairment1 technique
T1112Modify Registry
TA0007Discovery2 techniques
T1083File and Directory Discovery
T1497Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion
T1497.003Time Based Checks
TA0009Collection1 technique
T1074Data Staged
T1074.001Local Data Staging
TA0011Command and Control2 techniques
T1071Application Layer Protocol
T1071.001×3Web Protocols
T1105×3Ingress Tool Transfer
TA0010Exfiltration2 techniques
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
T1567Exfiltration Over Web Service
Indicators of compromise

Observables

9 indicators attributed to this actor. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
FAQ

Frequently asked questions

Who does Dust Specter target?
Dust Specter targets Government & Administration in Iraq.
What malware does Dust Specter use?
Dust Specter is associated with GHOSTFORM, TWINTALK, TWINTASK, and SPLITDROP.
Where is Dust Specter from?
Mallory's sources associate Dust Specter with Iran.
Activity feed

Recent activity

14 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what's public. Mallory adds the parts that aren't: whether this actor's tooling has touched your footprint, the IOCs they're burning right now, and the detections to deploy next.
Target overlapMatch sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Tradecraft mapping28MITRE ATT&CK techniques reported for this actor, grouped by tactic.
Associated malware4Families linked to this actor, with IOCs and behavior.
Associated CVEsCVEs linked to this actor, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Observables9Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.