Dust Specter
Dust Specter is a suspected Iran-nexus APT cluster identified by Zscaler ThreatLabz and publicly reported in March 2026. The group was observed conducting a targeted campaign against Iraqi government officials in January 2026, impersonating Iraq’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Reporting describes the activity as targeted espionage against Iraqi government personnel and diplomats. The campaign used phishing and social-engineering lures, including Ministry of Foreign Affairs-themed messages, a fake Google Form survey, and a ClickFix-style lure disguised as a Cisco Webex meeting page. Zscaler assessed with medium-to-high confidence that the operation was conducted by an Iran-nexus threat actor based on overlap in TTPs and victimology. Dust Specter used four newly identified malware families: SPLITDROP, TWINTASK, TWINTALK, and GHOSTFORM. SPLITDROP was a .NET dropper disguised as a WinRAR application and delivered TWINTASK and TWINTALK. TWINTASK executed PowerShell commands from a local file, while TWINTALK acted as the command-and-control orchestrator. GHOSTFORM consolidated similar functionality into a single binary, executed commands directly in memory, displayed a fake Google Form lure, used invisible Windows forms for delayed execution, and used mutex checks to avoid multiple instances. Observed tradecraft included password-protected RAR delivery, registry-key persistence, DLL sideloading using legitimate software including VLC and WingetUI, randomized beacon delays, custom URI paths, JWT-based C2 communications, script execution, file upload/download capability, and in-memory execution to reduce filesystem traces. ThreatLabz also reported code artifacts in TWINTALK and GHOSTFORM, including emojis and Unicode text, that it said may indicate generative-AI-assisted malware development. The TWINTALK C2 domain meetingapp[.]site was also linked to Dust Specter activity observed in July 2025.
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Targeting
Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Who they target
Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.
- Government & Administration
Where they target
Geographies tied to known operations.
- 🇮🇶 Iraq
Where they're from
Attributed origin per open-source reporting.
- IR
Tradecraft
28 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
Associated malware families
4 malware families attributed to this actor across reporting.
Observables
8 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.
Recent activity
10 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Iran-nexus espionage actor targeting Iraqi government officials with impersonation lures and novel malware families delivered through DLL sideloading and in-memory execution.
APT activity reported targeting government officials in Iraq.
Targeting Iraqi government officials using newly reported malware (espionage-oriented activity implied by victimology).
Suspected Iran-nexus campaign targeting Iraqi government officials; uses compromised Iraq-related infrastructure for hosting payloads; employs C2 request validation (checksums), geofencing and User-Agent verification; tooling includes .NET droppers/RAT with in-memory PowerShell execution and evasion via delayed execution/invisible forms; report notes possible generative-AI-assisted development.
The version that knows your environment.
Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.