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Mallory
Threat actor

MOIS

Updated 12 days ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 days1 mention · peak 1 in a dayToday
CVEs0Associated
Malware10Families
ATT&CK43Techniques
IOCs41Tracked
Origin
🇮🇷 Iran
Motivation
Espionage
Capabilities
Initial accessCredential theftSession hijackingExfiltrationPersistencePost exploitationDefense evasionReconnaissance
Also known asmois

Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) directs cyberespionage activity against Iranian dissidents, journalists opposed to the Iranian government, opposition organizations, and other individuals perceived as threats worldwide. Its cyber operations support intelligence collection, data leaks, and reputational harm against these targets. MOIS-linked cyber actors have used the modular Windows malware family HEAVYGRAM since at least fall 2023. They approach victims through Telegram, WhatsApp, and Instagram, impersonating IT-service providers and persuading targets to install AnyDesk or execute malicious installers masquerading as legitimate applications, including Pictory Premium, Telegram Authenticator, and KeePass. HEAVYGRAM implants use the Telegram Bot API for command-and-control and exfiltration, alongside Vultr S3-compatible object storage for payload and data transfers. Persistence is established through Windows registry autorun entries, while defense evasion includes Microsoft Defender exclusions and deletion of staged collection artifacts. HEAVYGRAM supports arbitrary command execution, host reconnaissance, screenshots, browser password and session-data theft, and collection from Telegram, WhatsApp, Outlook, Gmail, removable drives, and connected mobile devices. Additional surveillance components capture screen activity and audio, including during Zoom calls. Gmail collection includes acquisition and exfiltration of OAuth tokens.

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Operational profile

Targeting

Who, where, and from where this actor operates. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.

Who they target

Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.

  • Independent Media
  • Non-Governmental Organizations

Where they're from

Attributed origin per open-source reporting.

  • Iran
MITRE ATT&CK

Tradecraft

43 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt.

13 of 15 tactics52 techniques
= intelligence reports citing the technique
TA0043Reconnaissance2 techniques
T1589Gather Victim Identity Information
T1592Gather Victim Host Information
TA0001Initial Access1 technique
T1566Phishing
T1566.001Spearphishing Attachment
T1566.003Spearphishing via Service
TA0002Execution2 techniques
T1059Command and Scripting Interpreter
T1059.001PowerShell
T1059.003Windows Command Shell
T1204User Execution
T1204.002×2Malicious File
TA0003Persistence1 technique
T1547Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
T1547.001×2Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
TA0004Privilege Escalation1 technique
T1547Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
T1547.001×2Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
TA0005Stealth2 techniques
T1036×3Masquerading
T1070Indicator Removal
T1070.004×2File Deletion
TA0112Defense Impairment1 technique
T1685×2Disable or Modify Tools
TA0006Credential Access3 techniques
T1528Steal Application Access Token
T1539Steal Web Session Cookie
T1555Credentials from Password Stores
T1555.003×2Credentials from Web Browsers
TA0007Discovery4 techniques
T1057Process Discovery
T1082System Information Discovery
T1083File and Directory Discovery
T1518×2Software Discovery
TA0009Collection7 techniques
T1005Data from Local System
T1025Data from Removable Media
T1113×2Screen Capture
T1114Email Collection
T1114.001Local Email Collection
T1123×2Audio Capture
T1213Data from Information Repositories
T1560Archive Collected Data
TA0011Command and Control5 techniques
T1071Application Layer Protocol
T1071.001×2Web Protocols
T1090Proxy
T1102Web Service
T1102.002Bidirectional Communication
T1105×2Ingress Tool Transfer
T1219Remote Access Tools
TA0010Exfiltration4 techniques
T1020Automated Exfiltration
T1041×2Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
T1048Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol
T1567×2Exfiltration Over Web Service
T1567.002Exfiltration to Cloud Storage
T1567.003Exfiltration to Text Storage Sites
TA0040Impact4 techniques
T1485×2Data Destruction
T1486×2Data Encrypted for Impact
T1490Inhibit System Recovery
T1561Disk Wipe
T1561.002Disk Structure Wipe
Indicators of compromise

Observables

41 indicators attributed to this actor. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
FAQ

Frequently asked questions

Who does MOIS target?
MOIS targets Independent Media and Non-Governmental Organizations.
What malware does MOIS use?
MOIS is associated with HEAVYGRAM, KeePass.exe, MicDriver, MsCache.exe, Pictory_premium_ver9.0.4.exe, and 5 more.
Where is MOIS from?
Mallory's sources associate MOIS with Iran.
Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what's public. Mallory adds the parts that aren't: whether this actor's tooling has touched your footprint, the IOCs they're burning right now, and the detections to deploy next.
Target overlapMatch sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Tradecraft mapping43MITRE ATT&CK techniques reported for this actor, grouped by tactic.
Associated malware10Families linked to this actor, with IOCs and behavior.
Associated CVEsCVEs linked to this actor, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Observables41Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.