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Mallory
🇮🇷 IR1 malware family

Black Shadow

Also known asblack_shadow

Black Shadow is an Iranian threat group assessed to operate on behalf of Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS). Supporting content links Black Shadow to multiple operations against Israeli and other regional targets, and later reporting ties infrastructure associated with the 2026 Ababil of Minab campaign to Black Shadow with high confidence, although Hunt.io stated it did not independently verify that attribution. ClearSky Cyber Security, researcher Simon Kenin, and prior attribution referenced by the Israeli National Cyber Directorate also linked related infrastructure to Black Shadow. The group is associated with destructive and extortion-linked activity as well as espionage-oriented intrusions and phishing. In October 2021, Black Shadow was identified as the group that breached and ransomed the Israeli hosting provider CyberServe and then publicly leaked substantial volumes of customer data. Affected organizations included the Atraf dating site and the Machon Mor medical institute, with leaked data including relationship information, medical data, email addresses, and plaintext passwords. Content also places Black Shadow among Iranian groups involved in large-scale phishing and social-engineering campaigns targeting Israel’s public and private sectors. INCD reported at least 15 campaigns from Iranian groups including Black Shadow and MuddyWater, using tailored lures such as fake Rafael job offers on LinkedIn, spoofed INCD security-update emails, cash-offer scams, and academic conference invitations with malicious links. INCD assessed these campaigns as initial-access operations intended to gain footholds in organizations and support damage, espionage, information gathering, and influence activity. In 2026, Gambit Security attributed the Ababil of Minab activity with high confidence to Black Shadow. That campaign involved destructive intrusions and data theft affecting organizations in the United States, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey, including the Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority, the South Florida Regional Transportation Authority, UNIMAC, Vyncs, Ruppin Academic Center, Ifat Media Group, courier.co.il, bac.org.il, and adabroker.com.tr. Reported tactics included SQL Server deletion, virtual machine deletion, partition wiping, backup destruction, file-system damage, and systematic exfiltration. Supporting reporting described use of a custom Flask-based encrypted upload receiver, a bespoke exfiltration tool called FileFiend, SCP and multi-part archive staging, and infrastructure overlap with nefeshhope[.]com, a fake trauma-support portal previously used to target IDF soldiers. Known alias in the provided content: black_shadow.

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Mallory correlates actor tradecraft and target patterns against your stack, your sector, and your geography. See overlap before they land.

OPERATIONAL PROFILE

Targeting

Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.

Who they target

Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.

  • Transportation
  • Consumer Services
  • Financial Services
  • Media & Entertainment
  • Academia & Research

Where they target

Geographies tied to known operations.

  • 🇺🇸 United States
  • 🇸🇦 Saudi Arabia
  • 🇮🇱 Israel
  • 🇹🇷 Türkiye

Where they're from

Attributed origin per open-source reporting.

  • IR
MITRE ATT&CK

Tradecraft

22 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.

11 of 15 tactics33 techniques×N= number of intelligence reports citing this technique
MITRE ATT&CK
TA0001
Initial Access
2 techniques
T1078×2
Valid Accounts
T1566×2
Phishing
T1566.001
Spearphishing Attachment
T1566.002×2
Spearphishing Link
TA0002
Execution
1 technique
T1059
Command and Scripting Interpreter
T1059.006×2
Python
TA0003
Persistence
1 technique
T1078×2
Valid Accounts
TA0004
Privilege Escalation
1 technique
T1078×2
Valid Accounts
TA0005
Stealth
2 techniques
T1036
Masquerading
T1036.005
Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location
T1078×2
Valid Accounts
TA0112
Defense Impairment
1 technique
T1578×2
Modify Cloud Compute Infrastructure
T1578.003
Delete Cloud Instance
TA0006
Credential Access
2 techniques
T1552
Unsecured Credentials
T1552.001
Credentials In Files
T1555
Credentials from Password Stores
T1555.003
Credentials from Web Browsers
TA0009
Collection
3 techniques
T1005
Data from Local System
T1119
Automated Collection
T1560
Archive Collected Data
T1560.001
Archive via Utility
TA0011
Command and Control
4 techniques
T1071
Application Layer Protocol
T1071.001
Web Protocols
T1090
Proxy
T1090.003
Multi-hop Proxy
T1102
Web Service
T1105
Ingress Tool Transfer
TA0010
Exfiltration
2 techniques
T1041×2
Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
T1048
Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol
TA0040
Impact
3 techniques
T1485×4
Data Destruction
T1490×2
Inhibit System Recovery
T1561
Disk Wipe
T1561.002
Disk Structure Wipe
IOCS

Observables

2 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.

IOC values are gated. View more in Mallory for domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.

What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: sector and geo overlap with your footprint, the IOCs they’re burning right now, detection coverage, and what to do next.
Target overlap

Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.

Tradecraft mapping22

Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.

Malware arsenal1

Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.

Exploited CVEs

CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

Observables2

Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.