UAC-0255 is a threat actor tracked for a March 2026 phishing campaign that impersonated Ukraine’s national computer emergency response team, CERT-UA, to distribute the AGEWHEEZE remote access trojan. The operation used spoofed emails and a cloned CERT-UA-themed website to trick recipients into downloading a password-protected archive presented as a defensive security tool. Reporting links the activity to the alias Cyber Serp, including references embedded in the fraudulent website and public claims of responsibility through a related Telegram channel, although direct attribution to the channel operators has not been conclusively established in all reporting. The campaign primarily targeted organizations and personnel in Ukraine across government, healthcare, education, finance, security, and software development. Despite broad targeting and claims of mass distribution, observed impact was assessed as limited, with only a small number of infections confirmed, particularly on personal devices associated with educational staff. AGEWHEEZE is a Go-based RAT used by UAC-0255 for post-compromise control. Documented capabilities include remote command execution, file and directory management, screenshot capture, clipboard access, process and service control, input emulation, and system control actions. The malware communicates with command infrastructure over WebSockets and establishes persistence through common Windows autorun mechanisms including registry-based startup and scheduled tasks; some reporting also notes Startup-folder persistence. The actor’s tradecraft in this campaign centered on social engineering, spoofing, malware delivery, and persistence rather than destructive or ransomware behavior. Attribution clues noted in reporting include Russian-language elements found in associated infrastructure and management-panel artifacts. These clues suggest possible Russian ties, but the available information does not support stronger attribution than that at high confidence.
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Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.
Geographies tied to known operations.
Attributed origin per open-source reporting.
14 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
1 malware family attributed to this actor across reporting.
21 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.
6 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Conducting a phishing campaign impersonating CERT-UA to distribute the AGEWHEEZE remote access tool to about 1 million users across government, healthcare, education, and finance sectors.
Conducted a phishing campaign impersonating CERT-UA by using spoofed emails, a cloned CERT-UA website, and malicious archives to deliver the AGEWHEEZE remote access trojan to targets in Ukraine.
Conducted a phishing campaign impersonating CERT-UA to trick victims into downloading a fake security tool that deployed the AGEWHEEZE remote access tool.
Conducting a phishing campaign impersonating CERT-UA to deliver the AGEWHEEZE remote access trojan against Ukrainian organizations; also publicly claimed responsibility for a breach of Ukrainian cybersecurity company Cipher.
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Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.