Storm-2755
Storm-2755 is a financially motivated criminal threat actor tracked by Microsoft. The group is associated with "payroll pirate" attacks targeting Canadian users and employees, with reported impacts across multiple sectors including healthcare, manufacturing, and food services. Its objective is direct financial theft by redirecting employee salary payments to attacker-controlled bank accounts. Microsoft reported that Storm-2755 commonly gains initial access through SEO poisoning and malvertising on generic search terms such as "Office 365" and misspellings such as "Office 265," leading victims to actor-controlled infrastructure including bluegraintours[.]com. The group uses adversary-in-the-middle phishing against fake Microsoft 365 sign-in pages to steal credentials, session cookies, and OAuth access tokens, then replays those tokens to bypass non-phishing-resistant or legacy MFA protections. After account compromise, Storm-2755 searches compromised mailboxes and directories for payroll-, HR-, finance-, and direct-deposit-related content, including use of Microsoft Graph API reconnaissance to identify payroll and HR personnel. The actor sends emails from victim accounts, including messages with the subject line "Question about direct deposit," to socially engineer HR or finance staff into changing payroll instructions. When this fails, Microsoft observed the group directly accessing HR SaaS platforms such as Workday using stolen sessions and manually changing banking details. To maintain access and reduce detection, Storm-2755 has been observed renewing stolen sessions, creating malicious inbox rules to hide HR responses containing terms such as "bank" or "direct deposit," and in some cases changing passwords and MFA settings. Microsoft also observed recurring non-interactive OfficeHome sign-ins associated with the Axios 1.7.9 user-agent during token replay activity. Known alias in the provided content: storm_2755.
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Targeting
Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Who they target
Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.
- Financial Services
Where they target
Geographies tied to known operations.
- 🇨🇦 Canada
Tradecraft
20 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
Associated vulnerabilities
1 CVE this actor has used in observed campaigns. 1 of them exploited in the wild.
Observables
2 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.
Recent activity
6 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Associated with the Payroll Pirate campaign targeting corporate finance, HR, payroll, and administrative personnel to steal employee salary payments through account manipulation.
Conducting payroll diversion attacks against Canadian users by stealing Microsoft 365 credentials and session tokens, then socially engineering HR or finance staff to change direct deposit information to attacker-controlled bank accounts.
Conducting financially motivated 'payroll pirate' attacks that hijack Microsoft 365 sessions via adversary-in-the-middle phishing, then abuse compromised email and HR platform access to redirect employee salary payments to attacker-controlled bank accounts.
Conducting payroll pirate attacks against Canadian employees by hijacking Microsoft 365 accounts, stealing session cookies and authentication tokens via adversary-in-the-middle phishing, hiding HR emails with inbox rules, and changing direct deposit information to divert salary payments.
The version that knows your environment.
Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.