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12 malware families

UAC-0247

Also known asUAC-0247

UAC-0247 is a threat cluster tracked by CERT-UA, previously tracked as UAC-0244. CERT-UA reported active campaigns by this cluster since early 2026, with activity observed during March and April 2026. The actor has targeted Ukraine, including local governments, municipal authorities, government entities, municipal healthcare institutions, clinical hospitals, emergency medical services, emergency hospitals, representatives of Ukraine’s Defense Forces, and FPV drone operators. CERT-UA stated that the origin of UAC-0247 remains unclear. The cluster has used phishing emails themed around humanitarian aid proposals or offers, as well as trojanized software delivery, to lure victims. In reported campaigns, links in phishing messages redirected victims to compromised legitimate websites, websites with embedded malicious scripts, or AI-generated fake websites, which then delivered archives containing malicious LNK files or ZIP archives. Execution chains included LNK-triggered HTA execution via mshta.exe, decoy HTA forms, scheduled-task persistence, EXE payloads that injected shellcode into legitimate processes such as RuntimeBroker.exe, DLL side-loading, and in some cases a backdoor capable of establishing a reverse shell to attacker-controlled infrastructure. CERT-UA also reported Signal-delivered archives masquerading as updated FPV drone operator software such as “BACHU.” UAC-0247 has been associated with malware and tooling including AGINGFLY, SILENTLOOP, RAVENSHELL, CHROMELEVATOR, ZAPIXDESK, SilentLoop, ChromeElevator, ZapixDesk, and in one case XMRIG. AGINGFLY is described as a C# remote access tool or backdoor that supports remote command execution, file download, screenshot capture, keylogging, arbitrary code execution, and theft of data from Chromium-based browsers and WhatsApp for Windows. CERT-UA reported that AGINGFLY communicates over WebSockets, encrypts traffic with AES-CBC using a static key, and dynamically retrieves command handlers from its C2 server as source code and compiles them at runtime. SILENTLOOP is a PowerShell persistence script that can execute commands, update configuration, and retrieve current C2 information from Telegram. RAVENSHELL or a TCP reverse shell has been used as a stager. The actor also used CHROMELEVATOR to steal browser credentials and other sensitive browser data, ZAPIXDESK to extract WhatsApp data, RustScan and basic subnet scanners for reconnaissance, and LIGOLO-NG and CHISEL for covert tunneling. CERT-UA reported that the cluster’s operations were primarily espionage-focused, involving theft of sensitive data, credential theft, reconnaissance, and lateral movement inside victim networks. In at least one case, compromised systems were also used for cryptocurrency mining via XMRIG.

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OPERATIONAL PROFILE

Targeting

Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.

Who they target

Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.

  • Government & Administration
  • Health Care Equipment & Services

Where they target

Geographies tied to known operations.

  • 🇺🇦 Ukraine
MITRE ATT&CK

Tradecraft

42 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.

11 of 15 tactics55 techniques×N= number of intelligence reports citing this technique
MITRE ATT&CK
TA0001
Initial Access
2 techniques
T1189×3
Drive-by Compromise
T1566×3
Phishing
T1566.002×4
Spearphishing Link
TA0002
Execution
6 techniques
T1053
Scheduled Task/Job
T1053.005×5
Scheduled Task
T1059×5
Command and Scripting Interpreter
T1059.001×4
PowerShell
T1059.003×4
Windows Command Shell
T1059.005
Visual Basic
T1059.007
JavaScript
T1106
Native API
T1203
Exploitation for Client Execution
T1204
User Execution
T1204.002×5
Malicious File
T1574
Hijack Execution Flow
TA0003
Persistence
1 technique
T1053
Scheduled Task/Job
T1053.005×5
Scheduled Task
TA0004
Privilege Escalation
2 techniques
T1053
Scheduled Task/Job
T1053.005×5
Scheduled Task
T1055×3
Process Injection
TA0005
Stealth
7 techniques
T1027
Obfuscated Files or Information
T1027.004
Compile After Delivery
T1027.015
Compression
T1036
Masquerading
T1055×3
Process Injection
T1140
Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information
T1218
System Binary Proxy Execution
T1218.005×3
Mshta
T1218.011
Rundll32
T1574
Hijack Execution Flow
T1620
Reflective Code Loading
TA0006
Credential Access
4 techniques
T1056
Input Capture
T1056.001×4
Keylogging
T1528×2
Steal Application Access Token
T1539
Steal Web Session Cookie
T1555×5
Credentials from Password Stores
TA0007
Discovery
2 techniques
T1016
System Network Configuration Discovery
T1046×2
Network Service Discovery
TA0008
Lateral Movement
1 technique
T1021
Remote Services
T1021.002
SMB/Windows Admin Shares
TA0009
Collection
4 techniques
T1005×2
Data from Local System
T1056
Input Capture
T1056.001×4
Keylogging
T1113×4
Screen Capture
T1213
Data from Information Repositories
TA0011
Command and Control
7 techniques
T1071
Application Layer Protocol
T1071.001×2
Web Protocols
T1090×2
Proxy
T1090.002
External Proxy
T1095×3
Non-Application Layer Protocol
T1105×5
Ingress Tool Transfer
T1219×2
Remote Access Tools
T1568×2
Dynamic Resolution
T1573×3
Encrypted Channel
TA0040
Impact
1 technique
T1496×5
Resource Hijacking
IOCS

Observables

296 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.

IOC values are gated. View more in Mallory for domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.

ACTIVITY FEED

Recent activity

9 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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Target overlap

Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.

Tradecraft mapping42

Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.

Malware arsenal12

Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.

Exploited CVEs

CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

Observables296

Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.