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Mallory
1 malware familyExploits CVEs in the wild

Nexus Team

Also known asNexus Team

Nexus Team is a relatively unknown threat actor identified by Fortinet FortiGuard Labs in connection with a Mirai-related botnet campaign targeting TBK DVR devices, specifically TBK DVR-4104 and DVR-4216, via CVE-2024-3721, an OS command injection vulnerability. The attribution is based on exploit traffic containing the custom HTTP header "X-Hacked-By: Nexus Team – Exploited By Erratic," and the actor is not described as widely known. The campaign distributes a Mirai-like malware variant named Nexcorium using a downloader shell script named "dvr," which retrieves multi-architecture Linux payloads including ARM, MIPS/MIPS R3000, and x86-64 samples with filenames beginning with "nexuscorp." Nexcorium contains Mirai-style watchdog, scanner, and attacker modules; uses XOR-decoded embedded configuration data; connects to a command-and-control server to receive commands; and is assessed to be used primarily for botnet expansion and DDoS activity. Observed propagation and post-compromise behavior include exploitation of CVE-2024-3721, brute-force Telnet attempts using hard-coded default credentials, and embedded exploitation support for CVE-2017-17215 against Huawei HG532 devices. Nexcorium establishes persistence through multiple mechanisms, including modifying /etc/inittab, updating or creating /etc/rc.local, creating a systemd service, and adding cron jobs. It also performs self-integrity checks, can replicate itself if tampering is detected, and deletes its original binary after setup to hinder analysis. The malware supports multiple DDoS attack methods, including UDP flood, TCP SYN flood, TCP ACK flood, SMTP flood, TCP PSH flood, TCP URG flood, UDP blast flood, VSE query flood, and TCP generic flood. Known associated malware and campaign identifiers directly mentioned in the reporting include Nexcorium, the downloader script "dvr," and payload names beginning with "nexuscorp."

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MITRE ATT&CK

Tradecraft

11 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.

7 of 15 tactics21 techniques×N= number of intelligence reports citing this technique
MITRE ATT&CK
TA0001
Initial Access
1 technique
T1190×2
Exploit Public-Facing Application
TA0002
Execution
3 techniques
T1053
Scheduled Task/Job
T1053.003
Cron
T1059×3
Command and Scripting Interpreter
T1059.004
Unix Shell
T1203
Exploitation for Client Execution
TA0003
Persistence
3 techniques
T1037
Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts
T1053
Scheduled Task/Job
T1053.003
Cron
T1543
Create or Modify System Process
T1543.002
Systemd Service
TA0004
Privilege Escalation
3 techniques
T1037
Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts
T1053
Scheduled Task/Job
T1053.003
Cron
T1543
Create or Modify System Process
T1543.002
Systemd Service
TA0005
Stealth
1 technique
T1070
Indicator Removal
T1070.004
File Deletion
TA0011
Command and Control
2 techniques
T1071
Application Layer Protocol
T1105×3
Ingress Tool Transfer
TA0040
Impact
1 technique
T1498×4
Network Denial of Service
IOCS

Observables

16 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.

IOC values are gated. View more in Mallory for domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.

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Target overlap

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Tradecraft mapping11

Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.

Malware arsenal1

Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.

Exploited CVEs1

CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

Observables16

Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.