mini Shai-Hulud
Mini Shai-Hulud is a software supply-chain threat actor/campaign lineage linked in the provided reporting to TeamPCP and also referred to alongside the Miasma lineage. The activity targets open-source software developers, package maintainers, CI/CD environments, and downstream users through compromised npm and PyPI packages, malicious updates, and hijacked publishing credentials. Reported targeting includes SAP’s JavaScript and cloud application development ecosystem, Microsoft’s durabletask Python SDK for Azure Durable Functions, and bioinformatics, multi-omics, and computational genomics PyPI packages managed by a single maintainer. Across the cited incidents, Mini Shai-Hulud used package-manager execution hooks including npm preinstall scripts, Python import-time execution, and Python .pth startup hooks to launch malware. The malware downloaded and executed additional payloads, including Bun-based JavaScript payloads and Python zipapps, and stole developer credentials, GitHub and npm tokens, CI/CD secrets, browser-stored credentials, cloud secrets from AWS, Azure, GCP, Kubernetes, and HashiCorp Vault, as well as local credential files, shell histories, and environment variables. Exfiltration was conducted through attacker-controlled infrastructure and through public GitHub repositories created with stolen victim tokens; reported repository descriptions included "A Mini Shai-Hulud has Appeared." and, for the Hades variant, "Hades - The End for the Damned." The reporting describes self-propagation via GitHub Actions workflow injection, npm publishing workflow abuse, VS Code folder-open tasks, and Claude Code SessionStart hooks, making it notable as an early supply-chain campaign using AI coding-agent configuration for persistence and propagation. Additional reported behaviors include encrypted exfiltration using AES-256-GCM with an embedded RSA-4096 public key, persistence via systemd user services and LaunchAgents, lateral movement through AWS SSM and Kubernetes kubectl exec, and evasion checks including exiting on Russian-locale systems. One report links the infrastructure and tradecraft to TeamPCP through the secondary C2 domain t.m-kosche[.]com, overlapping indicators, Russian folklore-themed naming, and a shared RSA public key. A newly identified PyPI variant is named Hades.
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Targeting
Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Who they target
Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.
- Academia & Research
- Software & Services
Tradecraft
32 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
Observables
1 indicator attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.
Recent activity
4 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Open-source supply chain threat lineage conducting malicious package campaigns across npm, Packagist, and now PyPI. In this wave it distributed malicious Python wheel artifacts that abuse .pth startup hooks, bootstrap the Bun JavaScript runtime, execute an obfuscated payload, harvest cloud and developer secrets, and exfiltrate them to attacker-controlled GitHub repositories.
A supply-chain campaign that compromised several open-source projects and pushed malicious updates; the group also compromised an OpenAI developer.
A named campaign operated by TeamPCP associated with worm-like propagation, supply chain compromises, cloud credential theft, exfiltration, and destructive payload deployment.
Supply chain attack campaign targeting SAP-related npm packages with credential-stealing malware, harvesting developer, cloud, GitHub, npm, and browser secrets, then self-propagating through GitHub Actions workflows and poisoned npm package publication.
The version that knows your environment.
Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.