Storm-2949
Storm-2949 is a threat actor tracked by Microsoft Threat Intelligence that conducts methodical, multi-layered intrusions focused on Microsoft 365, Microsoft Entra ID, and Azure cloud control planes, with the apparent objective of exfiltrating sensitive data from high-value assets. The content describes the actor targeting privileged users, including IT personnel and senior leadership, using social engineering such as fake help-desk interactions and a technical interview pretext to drive MFA-fatigue and abuse Microsoft Self-Service Password Reset (SSPR). After account takeover, the actor removes existing authentication methods, re-registers MFA on attacker-controlled Microsoft Authenticator devices, and uses Microsoft Graph API and custom Python scripts to enumerate users, roles, applications, and privileged custom Azure RBAC roles. Post-compromise, Storm-2949 is described abusing legitimate administrative features across SaaS, PaaS, and IaaS environments rather than relying primarily on custom malware. Reported activity includes exfiltration of files from OneDrive and SharePoint, especially VPN and remote access documentation; retrieval of Azure App Service publishing profiles via microsoft.Web/sites/publishxml/action to gain FTP, Web Deploy, and Kudu access; rapid manipulation of Azure Key Vault access to obtain secrets such as database connection strings and identity credentials; modification of Azure SQL firewall rules for direct database access followed by deletion of those rules; abuse of storage account write and listkeys permissions to enable blob exfiltration and generate SAS-related access; and use of Azure VMAccess and Run Command to create rogue local administrator accounts, execute PowerShell, attempt to disable Microsoft Defender protections, and deploy ScreenConnect. The content also states that Storm-2949 used legitimate remote management tools including ConnectWise ScreenConnect and Syncro/Servably for persistence and remote access, and that Microsoft identified attacker infrastructure including 176.123.4[.]44, 91.208.197[.]87, and a ScreenConnect instance at 185.241.208[.]243:9090. No additional aliases or sub-groups beyond Storm-2949 are directly supported in the provided content.
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Tradecraft
42 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
Associated malware families
3 malware families attributed to this actor across reporting.
Observables
11 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.
Recent activity
6 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Conducted a cloud control-plane intrusion campaign centered on identity compromise, targeting enterprise administrative infrastructure across SaaS, PaaS, and IaaS. The group used social engineering and abuse of Microsoft Self-Service Password Reset to hijack accounts, establish persistence through attacker-controlled Microsoft Authenticator enrollment, enumerate Azure RBAC roles, access OneDrive and SharePoint data, compromise Azure App Service and Key Vault, manipulate Azure SQL and Storage firewall/access settings for exfiltration, and use VM management features to add backdoor admin access and disable defenses.
Targets Microsoft 365 and Azure environments to exfiltrate sensitive data from high-value assets by abusing legitimate cloud applications, identity workflows, and administrative features.
Associated in the content with a supply chain attack involving a compromised Nx Console VS Code extension that stole developer credentials, cloud tokens, and CI/CD secrets, and established persistence via a Python backdoor and sudoers modification.
Associated with a cloud-focused intrusion in which a compromised identity was leveraged to enable a broader cloud-wide breach.
The version that knows your environment.
Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.