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Threat actor

BO

Updated today
Trending this week#51of 10,535 threat actors
Mention activity · 30 days12 mentions · peak 7 in a dayToday
CVEs0Associated
Malware0Families
ATT&CK0Techniques
IOCs0Tracked
Origin
🇺🇦 Ukraine
Motivation
Hacktivism
Targets
RU
Ransomware tactics
Encryption
Capabilities
Initial accessReconnaissanceScanningCredential theftBrute forcePrivilege escalationLateral movementPersistencePost exploitationDefense evasionExfiltrationSpoofing
Also known asbo

BO Team, also known as Black Owl, Hoody Hyena, and Lifting Zmiy, is a Ukraine-linked threat group active since at least 2023. It conducts cyberespionage, hacktivism, and destructive operations against Russian organizations, including software developers, telecommunications providers, manufacturing companies, and oil and gas businesses. The group has collaborated with Ukrainian military intelligence on operations against Russian targets, although this does not establish that it is a state-controlled unit. BO Team obtains initial access through exposed SSH services and targeted phishing, including malicious attachments. Its intrusions involve internal network scanning, compromise of virtualization infrastructure, credential and private-key theft, password brute-forcing, and lateral movement through SSH, RDP, and administrative orchestration systems. It has extracted Active Directory authentication material, used Golden Ticket attacks, and exploited administrator password reuse to expand access across Windows domains. Persistence mechanisms include scheduled execution and backdoors on Linux systems and hypervisors. Its tooling includes Mythic, Cobalt Strike, BrockenDoor, ZeronetKit, and Global Socket. The group relies heavily on legitimate administration utilities and trusted management channels, supplemented by log deletion, timestomping, obfuscation, and backdoors disguised as system components. In a months-long intrusion into a Russian software developer, it stole confidential information and compromised source repositories, build infrastructure, and code-signing systems. Distribution of malicious software updates to customers was not confirmed. It also used a stolen corporate DKIM private key to authenticate credential-phishing emails. BO Team has used ransomware and destructive malware in other operations, while maintaining comparatively covert access during espionage-focused intrusions.

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Operational profile

Targeting

Who, where, and from where this actor operates. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.

Who they target

Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.

  • Software & Services
  • Capital Goods
  • Government & Administration
  • Military
  • Education & Research
  • Energy
  • Telecommunication Services

Where they target

Geographies tied to known operations.

  • Russia

Where they're from

Attributed origin per open-source reporting.

  • Ukraine
FAQ

Frequently asked questions

Who does BO target?
BO targets Software & Services, Capital Goods, Government & Administration, Military, Education & Research, Energy, and Telecommunication Services in Russia.
Where is BO from?
Mallory's sources associate BO with Ukraine.
Activity feed

Recent activity

14 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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sh3llc0d3 blogNews · Nov 16, 2026BO Team Breaches Industrial Code-Signing | ShellcodeUkraine-nexus espionage and sabotage group responsible for a months-long compromise of a Russian industrial software developer. Operators exploited an internal vCenter appliance, expanded into virtualization, identity, development, backup, and code-signing infrastructure, and pursued the ability to inject signed software updates. Investigators found no confirmation that malicious signed builds reached customers or that signing keys were permanently exfiltrated. The group also abused stolen email-signing keys for staff phishing; earlier operations reportedly involved destructive wipers.Read more ↗the hacker newsNews · Nov 16, 2026BO Team Exploits Log4Shell in VMware vCenter, Compromises Russian Firm's Code-Signing ServerAssessed to be of Ukrainian origin, BO Team conducts espionage, hacktivism, and ransomware operations against Russian entities, with a stated focus on degrading Russia's military-industrial capabilities. In this incident, it maintained months-long access to a Russian software developer, stole confidential information, and compromised virtualization infrastructure, source-code repositories, domain administration, and a software code-signing server. Investigators assessed that the intended objective was likely a software supply-chain attack, but containment apparently prevented completion. Unlike its publicized operations, this intrusion involved no observed data destruction or public claim of responsibility.Read more ↗xakepNews · Nov 10, 2026Хакеры несколько месяцев контролировали инфраструктуру российского разработчика ПО - ХакерCompromised an unnamed Russian software developer and maintained access for several months, gaining extensive control over Linux and Windows infrastructure, source-code repositories, and systems used to sign software builds. Researchers assess that the operation may have been preparation for a software supply-chain attack against customers and partners; successful distribution of compromised software was not established. Unlike the group's usual operations, this intrusion did not involve data encryption or infrastructure destruction. After eviction, the group attempted to regain access through phishing emails signed using a stolen DKIM private key.Read more ↗risky biz rssNews · Nov 9, 2026Pro-Kremlin hacktivists dox EU politicians, law enforcementReportedly attempted a supply-chain attack against an unnamed Russian IT provider. The newsletter attributes the finding to Kaspersky but provides no malware, exploitation, or operational details.Read more ↗
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Target overlapMatch sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Tradecraft mappingMITRE ATT&CK techniques reported for this actor, grouped by tactic.
Associated malwareFamilies linked to this actor, with IOCs and behavior.
Associated CVEsCVEs linked to this actor, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
ObservablesDomains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.