Hackledorb is a cybercriminal threat actor associated with the DragonForce ransomware operation. The group has been identified as the actor behind DragonForce and has been described as evolving from a conventional ransomware-as-a-service model into a more formalized cartel structure. Its activity is consistent with financially motivated intrusion and extortion operations. Hackledorb has demonstrated comparatively sophisticated post-compromise tradecraft. In a documented intrusion against a major U.S. services-sector victim, the actor used a custom Go-based remote access trojan known as Backdoor.Turn to conceal command-and-control setup within Microsoft Teams TURN relay infrastructure, then transition to attacker-controlled communications over QUIC. This approach reduced defender visibility by making outbound traffic appear to involve legitimate Microsoft Teams infrastructure. The malware was deployed after DragonForce ransomware execution, indicating an effort to preserve covert access following encryption, potentially for follow-on operations or resale of access. Observed intrusion activity included suspected exploitation of an SQL or Microsoft SQL Server vulnerability or use of access obtained from an initial access broker, followed by PowerShell-driven staging, DLL sideloading, reconnaissance, persistence, attempts to suppress security tooling, and use of a bring-your-own-vulnerable-driver technique involving a Huawei driver. Hackledorb also injected Backdoor.Turn into a legitimate process for stealth. Reported Backdoor.Turn functionality included command execution, process creation, network scanning, LDAP and Active Directory discovery, credential-based lateral movement, and browser credential theft. Known associations and aliases center on DragonForce; no separate high-confidence sub-groups are established in the available facts beyond that linkage.
Mallory correlates actor tradecraft and target patterns against your stack, your sector, and your geography. See overlap before they land.
Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.
Geographies tied to known operations.
21 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
2 malware families attributed to this actor across reporting.
3 CVEs this actor has used in observed campaigns. 3 of them exploited in the wild.
Additional drivers linked to CVE-2023-52271, CVE-2025-61155, and CVE-2025-1055 were also abused.
Additional drivers linked to CVE-2023-52271, CVE-2025-61155, and CVE-2025-1055 were also abused.
Additional drivers linked to CVE-2023-52271, CVE-2025-61155, and CVE-2025-1055 were also abused.
1 indicator attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.
1 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.