APT38 is a DPRK-linked, financially motivated threat cluster associated with North Korea's intelligence apparatus and widely known as Bluenoroff. It has conducted financially driven intrusions against banks, cryptocurrency businesses, and other financial targets, combining cyber-enabled theft with extensive reconnaissance, credential theft, malware deployment, and operational concealment. APT38 is implicated in the 2016 Bangladesh Bank SWIFT fraud, in which attackers used compromised SWIFT credentials, manipulated transaction-related records, and disrupted confirmation printing in an attempt to steal funds from the bank's correspondent account. The operation resulted in the theft and laundering of US$81 million through Philippine accounts and casinos. The cluster has also been associated with cryptocurrency-focused operations and macOS malware including RUSTBUCKET. Its known tradecraft includes social engineering and phishing-based initial access, use of valid accounts, host and payment-workflow reconnaissance, persistence, keylogging, screen capture, command execution, collection and exfiltration of victim information, and defense evasion through log or record manipulation and disruption of security or operational controls. APT38 is also associated with cryptocurrency theft and financial fraud against banking and Web3-related organizations. APT38 has been tracked under the names Bluenoroff, BlueNoroff, Sapphire Sleet, and UNC1069. Recent assessments characterize the former APT38 designation as having evolved or split into CryptoCore, which focuses on cryptocurrency targets, and Jade Sleet, which conducts financial operations. These clusters remain part of the broader DPRK ecosystem of cyber-enabled revenue generation and sanctions evasion.
Mallory correlates actor tradecraft and target patterns against your stack, your sector, and your geography. See overlap before they land.
Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.
Geographies tied to known operations.
Attributed origin per open-source reporting.
63 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
70 malware families attributed to this actor across reporting.
65 additional families tracked in Mallory.
7 CVEs this actor has used in observed campaigns. 7 of them exploited in the wild.
Kaspersky Lab confirms that sap.misapor[.]ch was compromised as well, and was spreading exploits for Adobe Flash Player and Microsoft Silverlight. Some of the known vulnerability CVEs observed in attacks originate from that website: 2. CVE-2015-8651
Some of the known vulnerability CVEs observed in attacks originate from that website: 4. CVE-2016-0034
Kaspersky Lab confirms that sap.misapor[.]ch was compromised as well, and was spreading exploits for Adobe Flash Player and Microsoft Silverlight. Some of the known vulnerability CVEs observed in attacks originate from that website: 3. CVE-2016-1019
Some of the known vulnerability CVEs observed in attacks originate from that website: 1. CVE-2016-4117
This detection identifies instances where Windows Explorer.exe spawns PowerShell or cmd.exe processes, particularly focusing on executions initiated by LNK files. This behavior is associated with the ZDI-CAN-25373 Windows shortcut zero-day vulnerability, where specially crafted LNK files are used to trigger malicious code execution through cmd.exe or powershell.exe. This technique has been actively exploited by multiple APT groups in targeted attacks through both HTTP and SMB delivery methods.
2 more CVEs tied to this actor tracked in Mallory.
1,062 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.
20 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
A Bluesky post links to “SEAL weekly stats: Sept. 22-29, 2026” and includes the hashtag #UNC1069.
A Bluesky post links to “SEAL weekly stats: Sept. 15-22, 2026” and includes the hashtag #UNC1069.
Assessed as likely operating near Sinuiju, North Korea; mentioned only as context for the article's discussion of DPRK operational return channels.
Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.