OPERA1ER
- Motivation
- Financial
- Targets
- CIMLBFCMBDGANENGPYSNSLUGTGAR
- Capabilities
- Initial accessCredential theftKeyloggingExfiltrationPersistencePrivilege escalationLateral movementPost exploitationDefense evasionReconnaissanceScanningBrute forceProcess injection
OPERA1ER, also known as DESKTOP-GROUP, Common Raven, and NXSMS, is a French-speaking, financially motivated cybercriminal group whose activity has been traced to 2016. It primarily targets African banks, financial services providers, mobile banking services, and telecommunications companies, with additional victims in Asia and South America. At least 30 successful attacks were identified during 2019–2021, affecting at least 15 distinct organizations and resulting in at least $11 million in confirmed theft. Some victims were compromised repeatedly. The group gains initial access through tailored French- and English-language spear phishing using malicious attachments and download links. It relies on publicly available tools and commercial or open-source malware rather than a unique malware arsenal. Its tools include NanoCore, H-Worm, Remcos, Adwind, Agent Tesla, NetWire, BitRAT, Venom RAT, Metasploit, and Cobalt Strike. Post-compromise operations include Active Directory reconnaissance, network scanning, credential harvesting, keylogging, password spraying, privilege escalation, and lateral movement through RDP, PsExec, PowerShell Remoting, WinRM, and SMB Beacons. It has exploited known vulnerabilities, including EternalBlue and CVE-2019-1405 and CVE-2019-1322. Persistence mechanisms include scheduled tasks, registry autoruns, privileged accounts, AnyDesk, and tunneled RDP access. Defense evasion includes antivirus removal, executable masquerading, payload packing, and process injection. The group also exfiltrates internal documentation to support subsequent spear-phishing operations. OPERA1ER commonly maintains access for three to twelve months before cashing out, frequently acting during weekends and public holidays. It targets payment gateways and internet banking systems, harvesting credentials for transaction initiation and multiple approval roles to bypass segregation-of-duties controls. Funds are transferred through attacker-controlled accounts and mule networks, followed by coordinated ATM withdrawals. Operations have used bulk transaction APIs, automated USSD transfers, and hundreds of mule accounts. The group has also accessed SWIFT messaging interfaces and repurposed compromised infrastructure as staging and pivot points for attacks against other organizations.
Targeting
Who, where, and from where this actor operates. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Who they target
Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.
- Banks
- Financial Services
- Telecommunication Services
Where they target
Geographies tied to known operations.
- Argentina
- Bangladesh
- Burkina Faso
- Côte d’Ivoire
- Cameroon
- Gabon
- Mali
- Niger
- Nigeria
- Paraguay
- Sierra Leone
- Senegal
- Togo
- Uganda
Tradecraft
2 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt.
Associated malware families
30 malware families Mallory has associated with this actor across public reporting.
25 additional families tracked in Mallory.
Associated vulnerabilities
3 CVEs Mallory has associated with this actor across public reporting. 3 of them are exploited in the wild (not necessarily by this actor).
Observables
308 indicators attributed to this actor. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.
Frequently asked questions
- Who does OPERA1ER target?
- OPERA1ER targets Banks, Financial Services, and Telecommunication Services in Argentina, Bangladesh, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Cameroon, Gabon, Mali, Niger, and 6 more.
- What malware does OPERA1ER use?
- OPERA1ER is associated with 888 RAT, Agent Tesla, AsyncRAT, BitRAT, BlackNet, and 25 more.
Recent activity
2 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.