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Mallory
Threat actor

Funky Mantis

Updated 4 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
CVEs0Associated
Malware2Families
ATT&CK15Techniques
IOCs0Tracked
Motivation
Financial
Targets
NOUSITFRMACNPHBRCL
Ransomware tactics
EncryptionRaas operator
Capabilities
ExfiltrationPersistenceLateral movementPost exploitationDefense evasion
Also known asfunky_mantis

DevMan, also known as Funky Mantis, is a centralized ransomware-as-a-service operation observed between November 2025 and January 2026. The operation managed affiliates through a dedicated portal that supported access distribution by country, payload generation, ransom negotiation, revenue tracking, and later victim lifecycle management, deadline tracking, team creation, and invitation-based collaboration. Internal coordination used Rocket.Chat, and the program operated with a structured revenue-sharing model characteristic of an organized RaaS enterprise. DevMan explicitly targeted hospitals, critical infrastructure, the public sector, and law enforcement. The operation also advertised a separate encryptor for SCADA environments, indicating interest in operational technology and disruptive attacks against critical services. Reported geographic targeting included Norway, the United States, Italy, France, Morocco, China, the Philippines, Brazil, and Chile. Its Windows ransomware payload, Devman Locker, was compiled in Rust and used ChaCha20-Poly1305 for file encryption. The malware supported full encryption of smaller files and partial encryption of larger files to accelerate impact. Observed behavior included disabling security controls, deleting shadow copies, inhibiting system recovery, terminating selected processes and services, clearing event logs, and discovering and mounting network shares to expand encryption scope across accessible systems. These behaviors align with defense evasion, post-compromise disruption, and broad-impact ransomware deployment. Known operator roles included LARVA-367 as the main administrator or owner, LARVA-546 as a co-curator or access coordinator, LARVA-547 as a curator or senior operator, LARVA-548 as a senior coordinator assigned to hospitals, and LARVA-550 as an affiliate or operator. The affiliate model offered high revenue shares to participants, reinforcing DevMan’s role as a structured criminal service rather than an opportunistic single-team campaign.

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Operational profile

Targeting

Who, where, and from where this actor operates. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.

Who they target

Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.

  • Government & Administration
  • Health Care Equipment & Services
  • Public Safety
  • Utilities

Where they target

Geographies tied to known operations.

  • Brazil
  • Chile
  • China
  • France
  • Italy
  • Morocco
  • Norway
  • Philippines
  • United States
MITRE ATT&CK

Tradecraft

15 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt.

9 of 15 tactics25 techniques
= intelligence reports citing the technique
TA0001Initial Access2 techniques
T1078×2Valid Accounts
T1133External Remote Services
TA0002Execution1 technique
T1059Command and Scripting Interpreter
T1059.003Windows Command Shell
TA0003Persistence2 techniques
T1078×2Valid Accounts
T1133External Remote Services
TA0004Privilege Escalation2 techniques
T1078×2Valid Accounts
T1484Domain or Tenant Policy Modification
T1484.001Group Policy Modification
TA0005Stealth2 techniques
T1070Indicator Removal
T1070.004×2File Deletion
T1078×2Valid Accounts
TA0112Defense Impairment2 techniques
T1484Domain or Tenant Policy Modification
T1484.001Group Policy Modification
T1685×2Disable or Modify Tools
T1685.005Clear Windows Event Logs
TA0007Discovery3 techniques
T1057Process Discovery
T1083×2File and Directory Discovery
T1135×2Network Share Discovery
TA0008Lateral Movement2 techniques
T1021Remote Services
T1021.002SMB/Windows Admin Shares
T1570Lateral Tool Transfer
TA0040Impact3 techniques
T1486×2Data Encrypted for Impact
T1489×2Service Stop
T1490×2Inhibit System Recovery
FAQ

Frequently asked questions

Who does Funky Mantis target?
Funky Mantis targets Government & Administration, Health Care Equipment & Services, Public Safety, and Utilities in Brazil, Chile, China, France, Italy, Morocco, Norway, Philippines, and 1 more.
What malware does Funky Mantis use?
Funky Mantis is associated with Devman and Devman Locker.
Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what's public. Mallory adds the parts that aren't: whether this actor's tooling has touched your footprint, the IOCs they're burning right now, and the detections to deploy next.
Target overlapMatch sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Tradecraft mapping15MITRE ATT&CK techniques reported for this actor, grouped by tactic.
Associated malware2Families linked to this actor, with IOCs and behavior.
Associated CVEsCVEs linked to this actor, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
ObservablesDomains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.