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Mallory
Threat actor

stegan0gram

Updated 2 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
CVEs0Associated
Malware0Families
ATT&CK4Techniques
IOCs0Tracked
Motivation
—
Targets
US
Capabilities
Initial accessExfiltrationReconnaissance
Also known asstegan0gram

stegan0gram is a hacker collective known for physically removing and reverse engineering Flock Safety automated license-plate-reader camera hardware in the United States. The group accessed the Android-based device operating system, copied locally retained data, and extracted device software. Its examination identified unencrypted storage and locally accessible encryption material that enabled access to stored images and video, without compromising Flock’s central infrastructure. The recovered material included operational logs and substantial roadside vehicle imagery. The activity demonstrates physical-device compromise, data collection, and hardware/software reverse engineering against unattended surveillance edge devices. Flock Safety stated that unauthorized removal or tampering with its equipment is illegal and that it had not received sufficient technical details through its vulnerability-disclosure program to assess the reported findings.

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Operational profile

Targeting

Who, where, and from where this actor operates. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.

Who they target

Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.

  • Software & Services
  • Government & Administration

Where they target

Geographies tied to known operations.

  • United States
MITRE ATT&CK

Tradecraft

4 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt.

3 of 15 tactics5 techniques
= intelligence reports citing the technique
TA0001Initial Access1 technique
T1200Hardware Additions
TA0006Credential Access1 technique
T1552Unsecured Credentials
T1552.001Credentials In Files
T1552.004×2Private Keys
TA0009Collection1 technique
T1005×4Data from Local System
FAQ

Frequently asked questions

Who does stegan0gram target?
stegan0gram targets Software & Services and Government & Administration in United States.
Activity feed

Recent activity

4 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

View more in app →
xakepNews · Sep 21, 2026Хакеры разобрали камеру Flock и обнаружили функцию детектирования людей - ХакерPhysically removed and stole a Flock Safety road camera, accessed its Android system and unencrypted partitions, recovered an encryption key from the media partition, and used it to decrypt stored photographs and video and extract device software.Read more ↗techrepublic com securityNews · Sep 18, 2026Hackers Crack Flock Camera, Expose 1.6M Images in 21 DaysPhysically removed a Flock roadside camera and extracted locally stored footage, images, vehicle logs, and an encryption key from unencrypted device partitions. The content does not allege a remote compromise of Flock's central servers.Read more ↗toms hardwareNews · Sep 17, 2026Hackers find encryption keys stored on stolen Flock camera despite company's denials - group extracts more than 27,000 clips, 1.6 million images captured in a span of 21 days from the device | Tom's HardwarePhysically acquired and analyzed a Flock traffic-surveillance camera, accessed its Android operating system, and recovered an encryption key from the media partition that unlocked a partition containing retained camera images and video clips.Read more ↗arstechnica securityNews · Sep 17, 2026Hackers reveal how Flock cameras really track cars and people - Ars TechnicaA hacker collective that physically obtained Flock automatic license-plate-reader camera hardware and reverse engineered it. The group reported accessing the camera's Android system, identifying unencrypted vendor and media partitions, and recovering an encryption key that unlocked stored camera videos and still images.Read more ↗
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Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what's public. Mallory adds the parts that aren't: whether this actor's tooling has touched your footprint, the IOCs they're burning right now, and the detections to deploy next.
Target overlapMatch sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Tradecraft mapping4MITRE ATT&CK techniques reported for this actor, grouped by tactic.
Associated malwareFamilies linked to this actor, with IOCs and behavior.
Associated CVEsCVEs linked to this actor, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
ObservablesDomains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.