KimJongRAT
- Type
- Infostealer
- Capabilities
- Credential theftKeyloggingExfiltrationPersistencePost exploitationDefense evasionProcess injection
- Delivery
- PhishingSpearphishingLure
- Platforms
- Windows
KimJongRAT is a long-running Windows malware family associated with the North Korea-linked espionage actor Kimsuky. Active since at least the 2010s, it has evolved from a credential- and information-stealing tool into a modular intrusion set that can combine stealer, keylogging, clipboard capture, persistence, and remote-access functionality. Campaigns using KimJongRAT have primarily targeted South Korean users and organizations, often through socially engineered lures themed as public-sector notices, tax documents, or other trusted content, and have also aligned with broader Kimsuky espionage and financially motivated collection priorities, including cryptocurrency-related data theft.
Recent KimJongRAT activity has used multi-stage PE and PowerShell execution chains selected according to host security conditions such as Windows Defender status. Delivery commonly relies on spearphishing emails carrying malicious shortcut or document files that invoke script-based stages, including HTA, VBScript, and PowerShell components, while abusing legitimate cloud and developer platforms for staging and payload hosting. The malware performs anti-analysis checks, uses obfuscation and encrypted payload retrieval, and can establish persistence through user-run registry entries or equivalent startup mechanisms.
KimJongRAT’s core function is data theft. Documented variants collect system profiling data, process and software inventories, browser credentials, cookies, browser encryption material including Chromium master keys, email and mail-account artifacts, recent files, clipboard contents, keystrokes, and files of interest. Multiple variants also target messaging and collaboration artifacts such as Telegram and Discord, public-key certificate stores used in Korean environments, and cryptocurrency wallet data, including browser extension artifacts associated with numerous wallet platforms. Some variants package stolen data for later upload, while others rely on companion malware or later stages for exfiltration.
The family has also shown post-compromise expansion beyond pure stealing. Certain variants support command execution, file transfer, directory listing, malware updates, and installation of remote-management software or MeshCentral-based agents to secure ongoing access. Earlier reporting also showed KimJongRAT being delivered alongside other Kimsuky tooling such as BabyShark and PCRat, where it served primarily as a password extraction and information-stealing component within a broader intrusion workflow.
KimJongRAT is best characterized as a modular infostealer used in Kimsuky operations, with some variants incorporating backdoor-like remote access features. Its continued development, adaptive payload selection, abuse of legitimate services, and expanding collection scope reflect sustained operator investment in espionage-oriented credential theft and victim surveillance on Windows systems.
Associated threat actors
2 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
BabyShark Malware Part Two: Attacks Continue Using KimJongRat and PCRat
Tools BabyShark, KONNI, FastFire, FireViewer, FastSpy, ReconShark, KimJongRAT, Kimsuky ... Malware families such as Kimsuky RAT, KimJongRAT, KONNI, and BabyShark have been linked to NICKEL KIMBALL activity.
Techniques & procedures
32 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Resource Development
1 technique
Resource Development
"...using typosquatting or domains thematically aligned with their target."
Initial Access
3 techniques
Initial Access
"The threat actors conduct extensive spearphishing operations, using typosquatting or domains thematically aligned with their target."
"...often involves malicious Hangul Word Processing (HWP) documents as a delivery mechanism... evolved its capabilities to include... Microsoft Word and PDF documents."
We identified phishing emails impersonating South Korean public institutions... emphasizing imminent verification deadlines to prompt recipients to click the embedded links.
Execution
5 techniques
Execution
기존과 마찬가지로 방화벽 활성화 상태에 따라 PE 또는 스크립트를 실행하나
The obfuscated VBScript script invokes a Base64-encoded PowerShell script using the powershell -e option.
After opening "password.txt", the script runs the command "cmd /c sc query WinDefend"
When opened, the document prompts the user to enable macros. Upon consent, a VBScript script embedded within the document is executed via the ShellExecute macro.
The downloaded file is an ZIP archive containing a decoy document... and a malicious shortcut, “암호.txt.lnk”... Executing "password.txt.lnk" runs a command encoded in Base64.
Persistence
1 technique
Persistence
The malware then registers an autorun registry entry to ensure "sys.dll" executes after reboot. HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\NetService
Privilege Escalation
2 techniques
Privilege Escalation
The malware then downloads "app64.log" and "net64.log" in sequence, injecting each into chrome.exe and into itself, respectively.
The malware then registers an autorun registry entry to ensure "sys.dll" executes after reboot. HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\NetService
Stealth
7 techniques
Stealth
Executing "password.txt.lnk" runs a command encoded in Base64... The obfuscated VBScript script invokes a Base64-encoded PowerShell script
작년 5월 발간한 '세금 고지서로 위장한 악성코드'의 변종이 확인되었다.
The malware then downloads "app64.log" and "net64.log" in sequence, injecting each into chrome.exe and into itself, respectively.
After "sys.dll" starts, anti-VM checks run; if any condition is met, the malware deletes itself and terminates
Based on the service state, the flow branches to download and AES-decrypt either "v3.log" or "pipe.log"... The file "1.ps1" Base64-decodes the file specified via the FileName argument and executes the decoded content.
After "sys.dll" starts, anti-VM checks run; if any condition is met, the malware deletes itself and terminates
The attacker built this module on top of a publicly available tool... and uses reflective DLL injection to evade security products. After injection, the entry function ReflectiveLoader... manually loads the DLL into newly allocated memory
Credential Access
1 technique
Credential Access
The keylogging thread executes every 0.001 seconds, recording keystrokes in a global buffer.
Discovery
7 techniques
Discovery
The malware enumerates the full process list, then filters out processes owned by the SYSTEM account
During system information collection, the malware queries the Windows version... Finally, the GetCPUInfo function issues the cpuid instruction to collect the CPU name.
The file "netlist.log" contains a list of file extensions and file system information collected via hard-coded cmd commands. The commands traverse drives, enumerate files matching specific extensions or keywords.
The malware queries registry values for each mail client type to collect account and profile information.
It then extracts the encrypted master key from each browser’s Local State file... Browser Credential and Cookie Collection
After "sys.dll" starts, anti-VM checks run; if any condition is met, the malware deletes itself and terminates
The malware enumerates the "%Programs%" directories in both the Common and User Start Menu locations
Collection
3 techniques
Collection
해당 악성코드는 KimjongRAT으로 최신 변종은 기존 정보 탈취 기능을 유지하면서 Telegram 및 Discord 등 수집 대상을 확장하였으며
The keylogging thread executes every 0.001 seconds, recording keystrokes in a global buffer.
The clipboard collection thread runs every 0.05 seconds and captures the most recent clipboard contents.
Command and Control
5 techniques
Command and Control
For C&C communications, the malware uses specific endpoints... Requests are formatted as "[C&C domain]/[victim_id]/[endpoint]"
The attacker abused GitHub to distribute malware... Upon execution, "pw.hta" downloads "password.txt" from Google Drive
For file uploads, the malware XORs the entire file with 0xFE... As an exception, the "netkey" file is sent via a regular POST
"LOTSを活用して進化を続けるKimJongRAT" published by IIJSECT. #KimjongRAT, #Kimsuky, #LNK, #MeshAgent, #DPRK, #CTI
all response data is RC4-decrypted using the first 16 bytes as the key
Exfiltration
1 technique
Exfiltration
The C&C communication thread runs every 10 minutes to upload exfiltrated data... It sends a multipart POST request to the C&C root directory
Observables
58 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.
Recent activity
14 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.