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Malware2 associated actors

KimJongRAT

Tracked since Nov 25, 2025 · Updated 3 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors2Associated
ATT&CK32Techniques
IOCs58Tracked
Type
Infostealer
Capabilities
Credential theftKeyloggingExfiltrationPersistencePost exploitationDefense evasionProcess injection
Delivery
PhishingSpearphishingLure
Platforms
Windows

KimJongRAT is a long-running Windows malware family associated with the North Korea-linked espionage actor Kimsuky. Active since at least the 2010s, it has evolved from a credential- and information-stealing tool into a modular intrusion set that can combine stealer, keylogging, clipboard capture, persistence, and remote-access functionality. Campaigns using KimJongRAT have primarily targeted South Korean users and organizations, often through socially engineered lures themed as public-sector notices, tax documents, or other trusted content, and have also aligned with broader Kimsuky espionage and financially motivated collection priorities, including cryptocurrency-related data theft.

Recent KimJongRAT activity has used multi-stage PE and PowerShell execution chains selected according to host security conditions such as Windows Defender status. Delivery commonly relies on spearphishing emails carrying malicious shortcut or document files that invoke script-based stages, including HTA, VBScript, and PowerShell components, while abusing legitimate cloud and developer platforms for staging and payload hosting. The malware performs anti-analysis checks, uses obfuscation and encrypted payload retrieval, and can establish persistence through user-run registry entries or equivalent startup mechanisms.

KimJongRAT’s core function is data theft. Documented variants collect system profiling data, process and software inventories, browser credentials, cookies, browser encryption material including Chromium master keys, email and mail-account artifacts, recent files, clipboard contents, keystrokes, and files of interest. Multiple variants also target messaging and collaboration artifacts such as Telegram and Discord, public-key certificate stores used in Korean environments, and cryptocurrency wallet data, including browser extension artifacts associated with numerous wallet platforms. Some variants package stolen data for later upload, while others rely on companion malware or later stages for exfiltration.

The family has also shown post-compromise expansion beyond pure stealing. Certain variants support command execution, file transfer, directory listing, malware updates, and installation of remote-management software or MeshCentral-based agents to secure ongoing access. Earlier reporting also showed KimJongRAT being delivered alongside other Kimsuky tooling such as BabyShark and PCRat, where it served primarily as a password extraction and information-stealing component within a broader intrusion workflow.

KimJongRAT is best characterized as a modular infostealer used in Kimsuky operations, with some variants incorporating backdoor-like remote access features. Its continued development, adaptive payload selection, abuse of legitimate services, and expanding collection scope reflect sustained operator investment in espionage-oriented credential theft and victim surveillance on Windows systems.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

2 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Kimsuky

BabyShark Malware Part Two: Attacks Continue Using KimJongRat and PCRat

via vb2020 vblocalhostvb2020.vblocalhost.com
Nickel Kimball

Tools BabyShark, KONNI, FastFire, FireViewer, FastSpy, ReconShark, KimJongRAT, Kimsuky ... Malware families such as Kimsuky RAT, KimJongRAT, KONNI, and BabyShark have been linked to NICKEL KIMBALL activity.

via secureworks threat profilessecureworks.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

32 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Resource Development

1 technique
T1583.001DomainsEvidence1

"...using typosquatting or domains thematically aligned with their target."

Initial Access

3 techniques
T1566PhishingEvidence1

"The threat actors conduct extensive spearphishing operations, using typosquatting or domains thematically aligned with their target."

T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence1

"...often involves malicious Hangul Word Processing (HWP) documents as a delivery mechanism... evolved its capabilities to include... Microsoft Word and PDF documents."

T1566.002Spearphishing LinkEvidence1

We identified phishing emails impersonating South Korean public institutions... emphasizing imminent verification deadlines to prompt recipients to click the embedded links.

Execution

5 techniques
T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence1

기존과 마찬가지로 방화벽 활성화 상태에 따라 PE 또는 스크립트를 실행하나

T1059.001PowerShellEvidence1

The obfuscated VBScript script invokes a Base64-encoded PowerShell script using the powershell -e option.

T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence1

After opening "password.txt", the script runs the command "cmd /c sc query WinDefend"

T1059.005Visual BasicEvidence1

When opened, the document prompts the user to enable macros. Upon consent, a VBScript script embedded within the document is executed via the ShellExecute macro.

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence2

The downloaded file is an ZIP archive containing a decoy document... and a malicious shortcut, “암호.txt.lnk”... Executing "password.txt.lnk" runs a command encoded in Base64.

Persistence

1 technique
T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

The malware then registers an autorun registry entry to ensure "sys.dll" executes after reboot. HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\NetService

Privilege Escalation

2 techniques
T1055.001Dynamic-link Library InjectionEvidence1

The malware then downloads "app64.log" and "net64.log" in sequence, injecting each into chrome.exe and into itself, respectively.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

The malware then registers an autorun registry entry to ensure "sys.dll" executes after reboot. HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\NetService

Stealth

7 techniques
T1027.010Command ObfuscationEvidence1

Executing "password.txt.lnk" runs a command encoded in Base64... The obfuscated VBScript script invokes a Base64-encoded PowerShell script

T1036MasqueradingEvidence1

작년 5월 발간한 '세금 고지서로 위장한 악성코드'의 변종이 확인되었다.

T1055.001Dynamic-link Library InjectionEvidence1

The malware then downloads "app64.log" and "net64.log" in sequence, injecting each into chrome.exe and into itself, respectively.

T1070.004File DeletionEvidence1

After "sys.dll" starts, anti-VM checks run; if any condition is met, the malware deletes itself and terminates

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence1

Based on the service state, the flow branches to download and AES-decrypt either "v3.log" or "pipe.log"... The file "1.ps1" Base64-decodes the file specified via the FileName argument and executes the decoded content.

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

After "sys.dll" starts, anti-VM checks run; if any condition is met, the malware deletes itself and terminates

T1620Reflective Code LoadingEvidence1

The attacker built this module on top of a publicly available tool... and uses reflective DLL injection to evade security products. After injection, the entry function ReflectiveLoader... manually loads the DLL into newly allocated memory

Credential Access

1 technique
T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence1

The keylogging thread executes every 0.001 seconds, recording keystrokes in a global buffer.

Discovery

7 techniques
T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence1

The malware enumerates the full process list, then filters out processes owned by the SYSTEM account

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence1

During system information collection, the malware queries the Windows version... Finally, the GetCPUInfo function issues the cpuid instruction to collect the CPU name.

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence1

The file "netlist.log" contains a list of file extensions and file system information collected via hard-coded cmd commands. The commands traverse drives, enumerate files matching specific extensions or keywords.

T1087Account DiscoveryEvidence1

The malware queries registry values for each mail client type to collect account and profile information.

T1217Browser Information DiscoveryEvidence1

It then extracts the encrypted master key from each browser’s Local State file... Browser Credential and Cookie Collection

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

After "sys.dll" starts, anti-VM checks run; if any condition is met, the malware deletes itself and terminates

T1518Software DiscoveryEvidence1

The malware enumerates the "%Programs%" directories in both the Common and User Start Menu locations

Collection

3 techniques
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence1

해당 악성코드는 KimjongRAT으로 최신 변종은 기존 정보 탈취 기능을 유지하면서 Telegram 및 Discord 등 수집 대상을 확장하였으며

T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence1

The keylogging thread executes every 0.001 seconds, recording keystrokes in a global buffer.

T1115Clipboard DataEvidence1

The clipboard collection thread runs every 0.05 seconds and captures the most recent clipboard contents.

Command and Control

5 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

For C&C communications, the malware uses specific endpoints... Requests are formatted as "[C&C domain]/[victim_id]/[endpoint]"

T1102Web ServiceEvidence1

The attacker abused GitHub to distribute malware... Upon execution, "pw.hta" downloads "password.txt" from Google Drive

T1132.002Non-Standard EncodingEvidence1

For file uploads, the malware XORs the entire file with 0xFE... As an exception, the "netkey" file is sent via a regular POST

T1219Remote Access ToolsEvidence2

"LOTSを活用して進化を続けるKimJongRAT" published by IIJSECT. #KimjongRAT, #Kimsuky, #LNK, #MeshAgent, #DPRK, #CTI

T1573.001Symmetric CryptographyEvidence1

all response data is RC4-decrypted using the first 16 bytes as the key

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence1

The C&C communication thread runs every 10 minutes to upload exfiltrated data... It sends a multipart POST request to the C&C root directory

Indicators of compromise

Observables

58 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Activity feed

Recent activity

14 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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Mallory platform

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IOC matching58Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors2Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping32Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.