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Malware1 associated actor

SORVEPOTEL

Tracked since Nov 25, 2025 · Updated 1 month ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK35Techniques
IOCs33Tracked
Type
Worm
Capabilities
Session hijackingExfiltrationPersistenceDefense evasionReconnaissancePost exploitation
Delivery
PhishingMalspamLure
Platforms
Windows

SORVEPOTEL is a self-propagating Windows worm associated with the Water Saci campaign, active primarily in Brazil since September 2025. It abuses authenticated WhatsApp Web sessions to distribute malicious attachments through compromised users’ accounts. Affected organizations include government and public services, manufacturing, technology, education, and construction.

Infection typically begins with Portuguese-language phishing messages from compromised contacts or phishing emails carrying malicious archives. Observed execution chains use Windows shortcuts, Visual Basic scripts, HTML applications, and PowerShell. The propagation component uses Selenium, ChromeDriver, and WhatsApp automation libraries to control browser sessions. It copies browser profile data, including cookies and authentication tokens, to reuse existing WhatsApp authentication without a new QR-code scan. It harvests contacts, sends personalized lure messages and malicious attachments, and reports contact data and delivery results to attacker infrastructure. Operators can remotely pause and resume propagation. Implementations have evolved from .NET and PowerShell components to Python variants with broader browser support.

Script-based variants include a backdoor supporting reconnaissance, command execution, screenshots, process management, and file operations. They establish persistence through registry modifications and scheduled tasks, perform language and analysis-tool checks, and retrieve command-and-control locations through IMAP before polling HTTP servers for commands.

SORVEPOTEL also serves as a distribution conduit for banking malware, including Maverick, whose payloads monitor financial websites and capture credentials through deceptive banking interfaces. These downstream banking capabilities are distinct from the worm’s propagation functionality and are not present in every variant.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Water Saci

As observed in our previously published research on the SORVEPOTEL malware and the broader Water Saci campaign, this popular platform has been used to launch sophisticated campaigns.

via trendai security blogtrendaisecurity.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

35 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

3 techniques
T1566PhishingEvidence2

SORVEPOTEL has been observed to spread across Windows systems through convincing phishing messages with malicious ZIP file attachments.

T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence2

The infection begins when a user receives a phishing message via WhatsApp from a compromised contact... The message has a ZIP archive attachment... Upon extracting the ZIP file, the victim discovers a Windows shortcut (.LNK) file.

T1566.003Spearphishing via ServiceEvidence1

a WhatsApp Web worm that hijacks authenticated browser sessions ... to automate the sending of messages to other users

Execution

8 techniques
T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence1

When the LNK file is executed, this shortcut covertly launches a command-line or PowerShell script that downloads the primary malware payload from attacker-controlled domains.

T1059.001PowerShellEvidence1

The decrypted command retrieves a malicious script from a specified URL and executes it in memory using the Invoke-Expression (IEX) function.

T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence1

The script drops a .bat script which downloads and installs Python.zip, ChromeDriver.exe and PIP

T1059.005Visual BasicEvidence1

It starts with a Phishing email with a ZIP archived malicious VBS script file.

T1059.006PythonEvidence1

This variant uses a Python script for malware distribution along with a Banking Trojan.

T1059.007JavaScriptEvidence1

The Selenium Chrome driver is used to inject a malicious JS code in WhatsApp Web.

T1106Native APIEvidence1

The loader then calls VirtualAlloc to reserve and commit a region of memory ... After copying sections, applying relocations, and resolving imports, the loader calls VirtualProtect

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence1

When the LNK file is executed, this shortcut covertly launches a command-line or PowerShell script that downloads the primary malware payload from attacker-controlled domains.

Persistence

2 techniques
T1547Boot or Logon Autostart ExecutionEvidence1

This is achieved by copying itself into the Windows Startup folder, ensuring that the malware runs automatically every time the computer boots.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

The script registers dropped VBS under run entry in registry for persistence.

Privilege Escalation

4 techniques
T1055Process InjectionEvidence2

the .NET DLL decrypts and subsequently injects into separate instances of suspended powershell_ise.exe processes it creates

T1055.012Process HollowingEvidence1

the .NET DLL decrypts and subsequently injects into separate instances of suspended powershell_ise.exe processes it creates

T1547Boot or Logon Autostart ExecutionEvidence1

This is achieved by copying itself into the Windows Startup folder, ensuring that the malware runs automatically every time the computer boots.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

The script registers dropped VBS under run entry in registry for persistence.

Stealth

7 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence2

It runs in hidden mode (- w hidden ) to evade user notice and leverages the encoded command (- enc ) feature for additional payload obfuscation.

T1036MasqueradingEvidence1

The message has a ZIP archive attachment, bearing the name "RES-20250930_112057.zip,” or "ORCAMENTO_114418.zip," or something similarly disguised as a benign document, such as a receipt, budget, or health app-related file.

T1055Process InjectionEvidence2

the .NET DLL decrypts and subsequently injects into separate instances of suspended powershell_ise.exe processes it creates

T1055.012Process HollowingEvidence1

the .NET DLL decrypts and subsequently injects into separate instances of suspended powershell_ise.exe processes it creates

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

it implements anti-analysis measures by scanning for specific process names commonly associated with debugging or reverse engineering tools. If any of the following processes are detected, the DLL will terminate itself to evade analysis.

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

If any of the following processes are detected, the DLL will terminate itself to evade analysis. apimonitor burp fiddler ghidra ida immunity ollydebug windbg wireshark x64debug

T1620Reflective Code LoadingEvidence2

The batch file obtains a PowerShell script that is executed directly in memory, subsequently initiating the reflective loading of a .NET DLL.

Credential Access

1 technique
T1539Steal Web Session CookieEvidence1

whats.py enumerates common browser locations (Chrome, Firefox, Edge) and inspects standard profile folders ... for session artifacts – Cookies file, Local Storage entries and IndexedDB files.

Discovery

7 techniques
T1010Application Window DiscoveryEvidence1

AutoIt Script contains an infinite loop that monitors the active windows and decides when to execute the malicious payload by scanning all visible window title strings

T1012Query RegistryEvidence1

If it still finds nothing, It looks for program display names that contain keywords of AV program names in the Windows “Uninstall” registry keys.

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence1

System information like Computer name, OS info, Username, Local IP, External IP, Current Timestamp, AntiVirus Products, Windows Edition/Version, Processor Name, Total RAM, Logon Domain

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence1

It then looks for common security apps used by Brazilian banks by checking if certain folders exist on the C: drive

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

it implements anti-analysis measures by scanning for specific process names commonly associated with debugging or reverse engineering tools. If any of the following processes are detected, the DLL will terminate itself to evade analysis.

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

If any of the following processes are detected, the DLL will terminate itself to evade analysis. apimonitor burp fiddler ghidra ida immunity ollydebug windbg wireshark x64debug

T1518Software DiscoveryEvidence1

The AutoIt script attempts to identify antivirus, firewall, and antispyware software installed on the system

Collection

3 techniques
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence1

System information like Computer name, OS info, Username, Local IP, External IP, Current Timestamp, AntiVirus Products, Windows Edition/Version, Processor Name, Total RAM, Logon Domain, Brazilian banking sites visited are sent to the attacker’s server.

T1185Browser Session HijackingEvidence3

a key feature of this malware is its ability to detect whether WhatsApp Web is active on the infected machine. When detected, the malware leverages this session to automatically distribute the same malicious ZIP file

T1560Archive Collected DataEvidence1

All the harvested contacts and successful payload send-result logs are typically POSTed back to the attacker’s PHP server. The outgoing POSTs include JSON containing contact batches, timestamps, and success/failure flags.

Command and Control

4 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence2

it establishes a C&C communication channel ... and subsequently instantiates a WatsonClient that connects to the malicious server " adoblesecuryt[.]com " over port 443 (HTTPS).

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence2

it establishes a C&C communication channel ... and subsequently instantiates a WatsonClient that connects to the malicious server " adoblesecuryt[.]com " over port 443 (HTTPS).

T1071.003Mail ProtocolsEvidence1

The loaded PE then injects itself into SVCHOST and sends info to the attacker’s server using IMAP over TCP connection

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence2

Using Net.WebClient, the script downloads content from this address, which is then immediately executed in memory via Invoke-Expression.

Exfiltration

2 techniques
T1029Scheduled TransferEvidence1

This section defines the configuration for delivering the payload to contacts, including ... the batch size for sending to multiple contacts at once.

T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence1

All the harvested contacts and successful payload send-result logs are typically POSTed back to the attacker’s PHP server.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

33 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Activity feed

Recent activity

22 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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IOC matching33Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping35Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.