SORVEPOTEL
- Type
- Worm
- Capabilities
- Session hijackingExfiltrationPersistenceDefense evasionReconnaissancePost exploitation
- Delivery
- PhishingMalspamLure
- Platforms
- Windows
SORVEPOTEL is a self-propagating Windows worm associated with the Water Saci campaign, active primarily in Brazil since September 2025. It abuses authenticated WhatsApp Web sessions to distribute malicious attachments through compromised users’ accounts. Affected organizations include government and public services, manufacturing, technology, education, and construction.
Infection typically begins with Portuguese-language phishing messages from compromised contacts or phishing emails carrying malicious archives. Observed execution chains use Windows shortcuts, Visual Basic scripts, HTML applications, and PowerShell. The propagation component uses Selenium, ChromeDriver, and WhatsApp automation libraries to control browser sessions. It copies browser profile data, including cookies and authentication tokens, to reuse existing WhatsApp authentication without a new QR-code scan. It harvests contacts, sends personalized lure messages and malicious attachments, and reports contact data and delivery results to attacker infrastructure. Operators can remotely pause and resume propagation. Implementations have evolved from .NET and PowerShell components to Python variants with broader browser support.
Script-based variants include a backdoor supporting reconnaissance, command execution, screenshots, process management, and file operations. They establish persistence through registry modifications and scheduled tasks, perform language and analysis-tool checks, and retrieve command-and-control locations through IMAP before polling HTTP servers for commands.
SORVEPOTEL also serves as a distribution conduit for banking malware, including Maverick, whose payloads monitor financial websites and capture credentials through deceptive banking interfaces. These downstream banking capabilities are distinct from the worm’s propagation functionality and are not present in every variant.
Associated threat actors
1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
As observed in our previously published research on the SORVEPOTEL malware and the broader Water Saci campaign, this popular platform has been used to launch sophisticated campaigns.
Techniques & procedures
35 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Initial Access
3 techniques
Initial Access
SORVEPOTEL has been observed to spread across Windows systems through convincing phishing messages with malicious ZIP file attachments.
The infection begins when a user receives a phishing message via WhatsApp from a compromised contact... The message has a ZIP archive attachment... Upon extracting the ZIP file, the victim discovers a Windows shortcut (.LNK) file.
a WhatsApp Web worm that hijacks authenticated browser sessions ... to automate the sending of messages to other users
Execution
8 techniques
Execution
When the LNK file is executed, this shortcut covertly launches a command-line or PowerShell script that downloads the primary malware payload from attacker-controlled domains.
The decrypted command retrieves a malicious script from a specified URL and executes it in memory using the Invoke-Expression (IEX) function.
The script drops a .bat script which downloads and installs Python.zip, ChromeDriver.exe and PIP
It starts with a Phishing email with a ZIP archived malicious VBS script file.
This variant uses a Python script for malware distribution along with a Banking Trojan.
The Selenium Chrome driver is used to inject a malicious JS code in WhatsApp Web.
The loader then calls VirtualAlloc to reserve and commit a region of memory ... After copying sections, applying relocations, and resolving imports, the loader calls VirtualProtect
When the LNK file is executed, this shortcut covertly launches a command-line or PowerShell script that downloads the primary malware payload from attacker-controlled domains.
Persistence
2 techniques
Persistence
This is achieved by copying itself into the Windows Startup folder, ensuring that the malware runs automatically every time the computer boots.
The script registers dropped VBS under run entry in registry for persistence.
Privilege Escalation
4 techniques
Privilege Escalation
the .NET DLL decrypts and subsequently injects into separate instances of suspended powershell_ise.exe processes it creates
the .NET DLL decrypts and subsequently injects into separate instances of suspended powershell_ise.exe processes it creates
This is achieved by copying itself into the Windows Startup folder, ensuring that the malware runs automatically every time the computer boots.
The script registers dropped VBS under run entry in registry for persistence.
Stealth
7 techniques
Stealth
It runs in hidden mode (- w hidden ) to evade user notice and leverages the encoded command (- enc ) feature for additional payload obfuscation.
The message has a ZIP archive attachment, bearing the name "RES-20250930_112057.zip,” or "ORCAMENTO_114418.zip," or something similarly disguised as a benign document, such as a receipt, budget, or health app-related file.
the .NET DLL decrypts and subsequently injects into separate instances of suspended powershell_ise.exe processes it creates
the .NET DLL decrypts and subsequently injects into separate instances of suspended powershell_ise.exe processes it creates
it implements anti-analysis measures by scanning for specific process names commonly associated with debugging or reverse engineering tools. If any of the following processes are detected, the DLL will terminate itself to evade analysis.
If any of the following processes are detected, the DLL will terminate itself to evade analysis. apimonitor burp fiddler ghidra ida immunity ollydebug windbg wireshark x64debug
The batch file obtains a PowerShell script that is executed directly in memory, subsequently initiating the reflective loading of a .NET DLL.
Credential Access
1 technique
Credential Access
whats.py enumerates common browser locations (Chrome, Firefox, Edge) and inspects standard profile folders ... for session artifacts – Cookies file, Local Storage entries and IndexedDB files.
Discovery
7 techniques
Discovery
AutoIt Script contains an infinite loop that monitors the active windows and decides when to execute the malicious payload by scanning all visible window title strings
If it still finds nothing, It looks for program display names that contain keywords of AV program names in the Windows “Uninstall” registry keys.
System information like Computer name, OS info, Username, Local IP, External IP, Current Timestamp, AntiVirus Products, Windows Edition/Version, Processor Name, Total RAM, Logon Domain
It then looks for common security apps used by Brazilian banks by checking if certain folders exist on the C: drive
it implements anti-analysis measures by scanning for specific process names commonly associated with debugging or reverse engineering tools. If any of the following processes are detected, the DLL will terminate itself to evade analysis.
If any of the following processes are detected, the DLL will terminate itself to evade analysis. apimonitor burp fiddler ghidra ida immunity ollydebug windbg wireshark x64debug
The AutoIt script attempts to identify antivirus, firewall, and antispyware software installed on the system
Collection
3 techniques
Collection
System information like Computer name, OS info, Username, Local IP, External IP, Current Timestamp, AntiVirus Products, Windows Edition/Version, Processor Name, Total RAM, Logon Domain, Brazilian banking sites visited are sent to the attacker’s server.
a key feature of this malware is its ability to detect whether WhatsApp Web is active on the infected machine. When detected, the malware leverages this session to automatically distribute the same malicious ZIP file
All the harvested contacts and successful payload send-result logs are typically POSTed back to the attacker’s PHP server. The outgoing POSTs include JSON containing contact batches, timestamps, and success/failure flags.
Command and Control
4 techniques
Command and Control
it establishes a C&C communication channel ... and subsequently instantiates a WatsonClient that connects to the malicious server " adoblesecuryt[.]com " over port 443 (HTTPS).
it establishes a C&C communication channel ... and subsequently instantiates a WatsonClient that connects to the malicious server " adoblesecuryt[.]com " over port 443 (HTTPS).
The loaded PE then injects itself into SVCHOST and sends info to the attacker’s server using IMAP over TCP connection
Using Net.WebClient, the script downloads content from this address, which is then immediately executed in memory via Invoke-Expression.
Exfiltration
2 techniques
Exfiltration
This section defines the configuration for delivering the payload to contacts, including ... the batch size for sending to multiple contacts at once.
All the harvested contacts and successful payload send-result logs are typically POSTed back to the attacker’s PHP server.
Observables
33 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.
Recent activity
22 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.