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MalwareUsed by 1 actorExploits 5 CVEs

KrustyLoader

KrustyLoader is a Rust-based initial-stage malware loader used to retrieve and launch second-stage payloads, most commonly the Sliver backdoor/C2 implant. It was first documented in January 2024 in compromises of Ivanti Connect Secure systems exploiting CVE-2024-21887 and CVE-2023-46805, and has since been observed in additional exploitation chains involving Ivanti Endpoint Manager Mobile (EPMM), Ivanti Sentry, SAP NetWeaver, and Microsoft SharePoint/ToolShell intrusions. Reported delivery mechanisms include abuse of web shells and JSP loaders, direct retrieval from Amazon S3 infrastructure, and downloads via built-in utilities such as wget, curl, and fetch. On compromised Ivanti EPMM systems, KrustyLoader was reported to retrieve an AES-128-CFB encrypted Sliver payload, decrypt it using a hardcoded key and IV, and inject it into memory as shellcode. One report described an embedded staging URL that was hex-encoded, XOR-encrypted with key 0x49, and then AES-128-CFB encrypted; a decrypted example URL was http://abbeglasses.s3.amazonaws[.]com/dSn9tM. Public S3 infrastructure associated with payload delivery included openrbf.s3.amazonaws.com, tnegadge.s3.amazonaws.com, fconnect.s3.amazonaws.com, trkbucket.s3.amazonaws.com, the-mentor.s3.amazonaws.com, and tkshopqd.s3.amazonaws.com. KrustyLoader has been consistently associated with the China-nexus threat actor UNC5221, also tracked as UTA0178 and in some reporting as QuietCrabs, and has appeared in broader Chinese espionage activity alongside malware such as Zingdoor and ShadowPad. It has been observed targeting internet-exposed edge and enterprise systems across sectors including government, telecom, healthcare, finance, logistics, manufacturing, and universities. Although some vendors described it as Linux malware, reporting also documented Windows samples in incidents attributed to QuietCrabs. High-confidence related infrastructure and observables mentioned in the content include AWS S3-hosted payloads, attacker IPs 27.25.148[.]183, 64.52.80[.]21:4444, 103.244.88[.]125:8080, and connectivity to 146.70.87.67:45020.

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EXPLOITED CVES

Vulnerabilities exploited

5 CVEs Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each row links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

5 CVES
CVE-2025-53770ToolShell RCE in on-premises Microsoft SharePoint Server

On July 25, KrustyLoader was dropped by the attackers. KrustyLoader was first documented in January 2024. It is an initial-stage malware, written in Rust, which has the primary purpose of delivering a second-stage payload.

via symantec blogsecurity.com
CVE-2025-4428RCE in Ivanti Endpoint Manager Mobile APIExploited in the wild

“EclecticIQ analysts observed the execution of KrustyLoader malware within compromised Ivanti EPMM systems… Once installed, KrustyLoader retrieves a second-stage payload — an AES-128-CFB encrypted version of the Sliver backdoor.” | On Thursday, May 15, 2025, Ivanti disclosed two critical vulnerabilities - CVE-2025-4427 and CVE-2025-4428 - affecting Ivanti Endpoint Manager Mobile (EPMM) version 12.5.0.0 and earlier. These vulnerabilities can be chained to achieve unauthenticated remote code execution (RCE) on exposed systems.

via eclecticiq blogblog.eclecticiq.com
CVE-2025-4427Ivanti Endpoint Manager Mobile API Authentication BypassExploited in the wild

On Thursday, May 15, 2025, Ivanti disclosed two critical vulnerabilities - CVE-2025-4427 and CVE-2025-4428 - affecting Ivanti Endpoint Manager Mobile (EPMM) version 12.5.0.0 and earlier. These vulnerabilities can be chained to achieve unauthenticated remote code execution (RCE) on exposed systems. | “EclecticIQ analysts observed the execution of KrustyLoader malware within compromised Ivanti EPMM systems… Once installed, KrustyLoader retrieves a second-stage payload — an AES-128-CFB encrypted version of the Sliver backdoor.”

via eclecticiq blogblog.eclecticiq.com
CVE-2025-31324Unauthenticated Arbitrary File Upload in SAP NetWeaver Visual Composer Metadata Uploader

UNC5221 was seen abusing a webshell to execute remote commands and fetch from an AWS S3 infrastructure the Rust-based malware loader KrustyLoader, which is typically used for dropping Sliver backdoors.

via security weeksecurityweek.com
CVE-2025-42999Insecure Deserialization in SAP NetWeaver Visual Composer Metadata Uploader

UNC5221 was seen abusing a webshell to execute remote commands and fetch from an AWS S3 infrastructure the Rust-based malware loader KrustyLoader, which is typically used for dropping Sliver backdoors.

via security weeksecurityweek.com
THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

1 distinct threat actor attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

View more details
UNC5221

On July 25, KrustyLoader was dropped by the attackers. KrustyLoader was first documented in January 2024. It is an initial-stage malware, written in Rust, which has the primary purpose of delivering a second-stage payload.

via symantec blogsecurity.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

9 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

1 technique
T1190Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationEvidence2

China-based attackers used the ToolShell vulnerability (CVE-2025-53770) to compromise a telecoms company in the Middle East shortly after the vulnerability was publicly revealed and patched in July 2025... In these attacks, the attackers used other vulnerabilities for initial access and exploited SQL servers and Apache HTTP servers running the Adobe ColdFusion software to deliver their malware.

Execution

1 technique
T1059.004Unix ShellEvidence1

“Threat actors use HTTP GET requests, containing Java-based commands… designed to execute external malicious processes… spawning a reverse shell… using /bin/bash”

Privilege Escalation

1 technique
T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

“injects it directly into memory as shellcode… The resulting payload is loaded directly into memory and executed as shellcode”

Stealth

5 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

“Base64-encoded payload embedded in a GET request” and “Obfuscated Bash script downloading and executing a payload…”

T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

“injects it directly into memory as shellcode… The resulting payload is loaded directly into memory and executed as shellcode”

T1070Indicator RemovalEvidence1

KrustyLoader... can make a copy of itself and set itself up to self-delete when its activity is finished...

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence1

“embedded URL… hex string, then XOR encrypted (key: 0x49), and finally encrypted using AES-128 in CFB mode… decrypts… and injects it directly into memory”

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

KrustyLoader... can carry out various anti-sandbox and anti-analysis checks...

Discovery

1 technique
T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

KrustyLoader... can carry out various anti-sandbox and anti-analysis checks...

Command and Control

2 techniques
T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence1

“forming a reliable command-and-control (C2) mechanism using server-side Java injection” and repeated use of HTTP GET/curl/wget to retrieve payloads

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence2

KrustyLoader... can decrypt and download additional malware. Its previous activity has been linked to China-based threat actors, and in earlier campaigns it was also used to download the Sliver post-exploitation framework, which is also seen deployed against this target.

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

8 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

View more in app
Hashes
8 tracked

File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.

TypeValueLatest sighting
hash.sha256●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app8 months ago
hash.sha256●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app1 year ago
hash.sha256●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app1 year ago
hash.sha256●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app1 year ago
hash.sha256●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app1 year ago
hash.sha256●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app1 year ago
What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching8

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution1

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities5

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping9

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.