ToSpy is an Android spyware family, detected by ESET as Android/Spy.ToSpy, that impersonates the ToTok messaging application and has been used in a long-running campaign primarily targeting users in the United Arab Emirates. The malware is distributed via deceptive third-party websites rather than official app stores, including fake ToTok download pages and at least one site mimicking the Samsung Galaxy Store. Available reporting indicates the campaign was first detected in June 2025, but samples, certificate metadata, domain registrations, and VirusTotal uploads trace activity back to mid-2022, and parts of the infrastructure remained active at the time of reporting.
Once installed, ToSpy requests access to contacts and device storage, establishes persistence using a foreground service, AlarmManager restarts, and a BOOT_COMPLETED receiver, and then waits for command-and-control instructions before exfiltrating data. Reported collection includes contacts, basic device information, and files such as documents, spreadsheets, presentations, text files, audio, images, videos, CSV/VCF data, and ToTok backup files with the .ttkmbackup extension, indicating interest in ToTok chat history or app data. Some reporting also states it can steal chats, files, media, SMS messages, contacts, and app backups in broader campaign context. ToSpy checks for updates via spiralkey[.]co/totok_update/totokversion.php and may download an APK from spiralkey[.]co/totok_update/totok_pro.apk. Exfiltrated data is reported as encrypted with AES-CBC using the hardcoded key p2j8w9savbny75xg and sent via HTTPS POST requests.
The malware uses social engineering to appear legitimate: if the real ToTok app is present, it may show fake update screens and launch the legitimate app; if not present, it may redirect the user to Huawei AppGallery, a browser page, or the official ToTok download source. ESET reported six samples sharing the same malicious codebase and developer certificate DE90F6899EEC315F4ED05C2AA052D4FE8B71125A. Active or referenced infrastructure includes store.appupdate[.]ai and spiralkey[.]co. ToSpy is frequently discussed alongside the related Android spyware family ProSpy, but ESET tracks them separately due to different infrastructure and delivery methods. Attribution to a specific threat actor is not established in the source content, although some broader reporting links the surrounding espionage campaign involving ProSpy and ToSpy to BITTER; this linkage is not conclusively established for ToSpy alone.
18 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
The spyware is installed through fake websites and app stores... The apps containing the spyware can only be installed manually via third-party websites, according to ESET researcher Lukáš Štefanko.
Neither app appears in official app stores; victims have to manually install APK files from cloned websites or third-party pages designed to look like legitimate services.
The operator of the spyware campaign distributed the malicious APK files through web pages that impersonated the official Signal website ... and the Samsung Galaxy Store.
Researchers found that some targets were sent messages on LinkedIn or through iMessage, and some pretended to be from Apple Support.
Both spyware families use three persistence mechanisms on infected devices: Abuse of the ‘AlarmManager’ Android system API to restart automatically if killed.
Victims are prompted to manually download and install APK files, often bypassing Google Play safeguards.
The fake websites distributing ProSpy use malicious Android Application Packages (APK) “posing as improvements,” ESET said.
Both spyware families use three persistence mechanisms on infected devices: Abuse of the ‘AlarmManager’ Android system API to restart automatically if killed.
Registers to receive BOOT_COMPLETED broadcast events so it can restart the spyware upon device reboot without user interaction.
To achieve persistence, both the spyware families run a foreground service that displays a persistent notification, use Android's AlarmManager to repeatedly restart the foreground service if it gets terminated, and automatically launch the necessary background services upon a device reboot.
Both spyware families use three persistence mechanisms on infected devices: Abuse of the ‘AlarmManager’ Android system API to restart automatically if killed.
Registers to receive BOOT_COMPLETED broadcast events so it can restart the spyware upon device reboot without user interaction.
To achieve persistence, both the spyware families run a foreground service that displays a persistent notification, use Android's AlarmManager to repeatedly restart the foreground service if it gets terminated, and automatically launch the necessary background services upon a device reboot.
Both campaigns trick users into side loading malicious apps by appearing to be a Signal or ToTok upgrade or by outright impersonating the ToTok app.
If granted, the spyware collects device details, SMS messages, contact lists, installed app lists, and files, including chat backups.
It's also capable of exfiltrating device information.
If granted, the spyware collects device details, SMS messages, contact lists, installed app lists, and files, including chat backups.
The rogue ProSpy apps are designed to request permissions to access contacts, SMS messages, and files stored on the device.
ToSpy specifically looks for .ttkmbackup files, the extension used to store ToTok backups, suggesting a targeted interest in extracting chat histories.
All collected data is encrypted with a hardcoded AES key, then sent to command and control servers.
Once installed, they continually exfiltrate sensitive data.
ESET's report notes that all exfiltrated data is first encrypted using the AES symmetric encryption algorithm in CBC mode.
3 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.
18 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.