Fezbox
fezbox is a malicious npm package first observed on August 21, 2025. It used an unusual QR code steganography technique to deliver a base64-encoded JavaScript payload tagged "[FEZBOX]". The package was designed to steal browser cookies and related browser context, including document.cookie, window.location.origin, navigator.userAgent, and reported usernames and passwords from browser web cookies. The malware introduced a 120-second execution delay and performed environment checks before continuing, likely as sandbox evasion. It then retrieved a QR code image from the primary command-and-control server at 1[.]94[.]210[.]59, decoded the embedded payload, and exfiltrated collected data via HTTP POST requests to the /collect endpoint. A secondary exfiltration endpoint was also identified at my-nest-app-production[.]up[.]railway[.]app/users. The primary infrastructure was hosted on a Huawei Cloud ECS instance in Beijing, with exposed services on ports 80, 8080, and 9090, including dashboards labeled "C2 Monitor Panel - Educational Use" and "DARKNET C2 CONTROL PANEL." The package was published under the npm alias janedu using the email janedu0216@gmail.com. npm seized the package on September 22, 2025, suspended the janedu account, and replaced the malicious versions 1.0.0 through 1.3.0 with a 0.0.1-security holding package. The package remained live for 32 days and reached up to 476 downloads. As of April 3, 2026, the C2 server remained online. Investigation of an exposed exfiltration database at 1[.]94[.]210[.]59/data found five records, three of which were attributed to the operator’s own test runs; the available content states there were no confirmed victim records, likely because the payload relied on browser APIs that are not normally present in Node.js environments.
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Techniques & procedures
14 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Initial Access
2 techniques
Initial Access
Execution
1 technique
Execution
Stealth
3 techniques
Stealth
FEZBOX used QR code steganography -- an unusual choice for npm supply chain attacks... Fetches a QR code image from 1[.]94[.]210[.]59 Decodes the QR content: a base64-encoded JavaScript payload tagged [FEZBOX]
Credential Access
1 technique
Credential Access
Discovery
6 techniques
Discovery
Collects comprehensive system fingerprint... Network: all interface names, primary IP
MITRE ATT&CK Mapping... Discovery System Owner/User Discovery T1033 USER, HOME environment variables
MITRE ATT&CK Mapping... Discovery Process Discovery T1057 PID, CWD, execPath collection
The data includes: Hostname : hstx Username : asus CPU : 13th Gen Intel Core i7-13700H (20 cores) RAM : 16 GB OS : Windows 11... Node.js : v20.18.0 IP address : 183[.]210[.]123[.]88 Network interfaces...
Collection
1 technique
Collection
Command and Control
1 technique
Command and Control
IOCs tracked for this family
8 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.
IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.
File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.
Other indicator types observed in public reporting.
Recent activity
2 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Malicious npm package that used QR code steganography to retrieve a base64-encoded JavaScript payload, then attempted to steal browser cookies, origin, and user-agent data and exfiltrate them to attacker-controlled C2 infrastructure. It also performed environment checks and delayed execution for sandbox evasion.
A malicious NPM package designed to steal usernames and passwords from browser web cookies and embed malicious code into a QR code.
The version that knows your environment.
Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.