EdgeStepper
EdgeStepper is a previously undocumented Go-based network implant/backdoor used by the China-aligned espionage group PlushDaemon to conduct adversary-in-the-middle attacks by hijacking DNS traffic on compromised network devices, especially routers and other edge devices. It is compiled as an ELF binary for MIPS32 systems and has also been referred to internally by its developers as dns_cheat_v2 based on symbols found in the binary. Once installed, EdgeStepper redirects all DNS queries, including via iptables redirection of UDP/53 traffic, to attacker-controlled malicious DNS or hijacking nodes, rerouting legitimate software-update traffic to PlushDaemon infrastructure. It monitors for requests associated with popular Chinese software products, including Sogou Pinyin, and if matching update traffic is observed, it causes victims to download trojanized updates.
EdgeStepper is used as part of a multi-stage intrusion chain. Hijacked update traffic is used to deliver the LittleDaemon and DaemonicLogistics downloaders, which in turn deploy the custom Windows backdoor SlowStepper. Reported behavior includes use of AES-CBC with a hardcoded key and IV to decrypt configuration data. Malware components in the broader chain are obfuscated and encrypted, sometimes masquerading as ZIP or GIF files, and DaemonicLogistics may store files in directories named after legitimate software vendors. Some LittleDaemon variants can remove themselves to reduce detection.
PlushDaemon has been active since at least 2018 and has targeted victims in China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Cambodia, South Korea, New Zealand, and the United States, including universities and manufacturing companies. Reported victim access commonly begins with compromise of routers or network devices through known vulnerabilities or weak/default administrative passwords; PlushDaemon has also been reported exploiting web server vulnerabilities. The campaign is associated with cyberespionage and software-update hijacking, including a reported supply-chain attack against a South Korean VPN software provider. Mentioned attacker infrastructure includes Alibaba Cloud-hosted domains such as ds20221202.dsc.wcsset[.]com and test.dsc.wcsset[.]com. Reported detections include Linux/Agent.AEP, Win32/Rozena.BXX, Win32/Agent.AGXK, and Win32/Agent.AFDT.
Associated threat actors
1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
ESET said the PlushDaemon APT group is behind the “EdgeStepper” network implant that hijacks DNS traffic and sends it to malicious nodes controlled by the threat actors.
Techniques & procedures
8 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Resource Development
1 technique
Resource Development
The attack essentially commences with the threat actor compromising an edge network device (e.g., a router) that its target is likely to connect to.
Initial Access
3 techniques
Initial Access
This is accomplished by either exploiting a security flaw in the software or through weak credentials, allowing them to deploy caEdgeStepper.
The attackers gain access to routers by exploiting known vulnerabilities or weak admin passwords, install the EdgeStepper implant, and then redirect software-update traffic to their own infrastructure.
Telemetry data from cybersecurity firm ESET indicates that since 2019, the threat actor has relied on malicious updates to breach target networks.
Execution
1 technique
Execution
The attack specifically checks for several Chinese software, including Sogou Pinyin, to have their update channels hijacked by means of EdgeStepper to deliver a malicious DLL ("popup_4.2.0.2246.dll" aka LittleDaemon) from a threat actor-controlled server.
Persistence
1 technique
Persistence
This is accomplished by either exploiting a security flaw in the software or through weak credentials, allowing them to deploy caEdgeStepper.
Privilege Escalation
1 technique
Privilege Escalation
This is accomplished by either exploiting a security flaw in the software or through weak credentials, allowing them to deploy caEdgeStepper.
Stealth
2 techniques
Stealth
This is accomplished by either exploiting a security flaw in the software or through weak credentials, allowing them to deploy caEdgeStepper.
The attack specifically checks for several Chinese software, including Sogou Pinyin, to have their update channels hijacked by means of EdgeStepper to deliver a malicious DLL ("popup_4.2.0.2246.dll" aka LittleDaemon) from a threat actor-controlled server.
Credential Access
1 technique
Credential Access
The Adversary-in-the-Middle (AitM) attack proceeds with the proxy detecting a DNS query for a domain associated with software updates. When such queries come, it responds with the IP of the attacker-controlled server instead of the legitimate one.
Collection
1 technique
Collection
The Adversary-in-the-Middle (AitM) attack proceeds with the proxy detecting a DNS query for a domain associated with software updates. When such queries come, it responds with the IP of the attacker-controlled server instead of the legitimate one.
Command and Control
1 technique
Command and Control
Once installed, EdgeStepper configures “iptables” rules on the device to redirect all UDP traffic on port 53 (DNS) to a local proxy (port 1090 by default), which forwards the queries to a malicious DNS node.
Impact
1 technique
Impact
A router implant is redirecting DNS traffic to attacker-controlled infrastructure, turning trusted update channels into delivery paths for the espionage backdoor.
Recent activity
14 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.