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Mallory
MalwareRansomware

CoinMiner

CoinMiner is a cryptocurrency-mining malware family. The provided reporting describes it primarily as a Windows-focused miner that typically uses Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to spread laterally across a network and often uses WMI Standard Event Consumer scripting for persistence. Multiple variants exist, and observed infection vectors include malspam, being dropped by other malware, PowerShell-based retrieval and execution, exploitation of vulnerable or weakly protected internet-exposed services, and follow-on deployment after other malware such as SocGholish. CoinMiner was observed in attacks against exposed MS-SQL servers, where attackers installed the miner after gaining access, and in broader opportunistic scanning of externally exposed systems with vulnerable services. It was also referenced in Linux SSH threat telemetry as one of the main malware threats observed against Linux SSH services. Reporting further identified an active campaign in which a CoinMiner payload was signed with a stolen AnyDesk Software GmbH certificate and delivered alongside numerous other payloads in an Amadey-linked operation assessed as consistent with an initial access broker or ransomware affiliate playbook. Another report identified an exposed HTTPS file server at 118.209.200.36:8443 in TPG Telecom Limited IP space as active staging infrastructure for a CoinMiner plus Android APK distribution campaign, with .apk, .lnk, and .scr payloads hosted there. Known detections and indicators mentioned in the content include detection names Win.Worm.Coinminer::1201 and Coinminer:MBT.26mw.in14.Talos, a prevalent sample with SHA-256 9f1f11a708d393e0a4109ae189bc64f1f3e312653dcf317a2bd406f18ffcc507 and MD5 2915b3f8b703eb744fc54c81f4a9c67f, and the staging server 118.209.200.36:8443.

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MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

4 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Stealth

1 technique
T1036.001Invalid Code SignatureEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping Tactic Technique ID Implementation Defense Evasion Masquerading: Invalid Code Signature T1036.001 Stolen/abused code signing certs

Defense Impairment

1 technique
T1553.002Code SigningEvidence2

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping Tactic Technique ID Implementation Defense Evasion Subvert Trust Controls: Code Signing T1553.002 AnyDesk, ConnectWise stolen certs

Credential Access

1 technique
T1110Brute ForceEvidence1

after scanning the SSH service, the threat actor attempted to log in to the honeypot Linux server

Impact

1 technique
T1496Resource HijackingEvidence2

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping Tactic Technique ID Application in This Campaign Impact Resource Hijacking T1496 CoinMiner deployment for cryptojacking

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

25 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

View more in app
Network
9 tracked

IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.

Hashes
12 tracked

File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.

Other
4 tracked

Other indicator types observed in public reporting.

TypeValueLatest sighting
hash.md5●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app1 month ago
hash.sha256●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app1 month ago
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app3 months ago
ip.v4●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app3 months ago
ip.v4●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app3 months ago
ip.v4●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app3 months ago
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IOC matching25

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping4

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.