Dante is a modular commercial Windows spyware platform developed by Memento Labs, the successor to the Italian surveillance vendor Hacking Team. It has been linked to espionage activity targeting organizations and individuals in Russia and Belarus, including government bodies, media outlets, universities, research centers, and financial institutions. Kaspersky linked Dante-related incidents to the ForumTroll threat cluster and reported that the LeetAgent implant was at times used to launch Dante. Dante was not directly observed in ForumTroll's March 2025 Chrome zero-day intrusion chain, but malware, loader, and persistence overlaps connected it to related activity.
Dante uses an orchestrator component to manage encrypted modules, command-and-control communications, and self-protection. Its reported surveillance functions include keystroke logging, screenshot capture, file theft, data exfiltration, and remote command execution. Modules can be loaded from disk or memory and are encrypted with host-specific keying material. Dante employs VMProtect-based code and string obfuscation, indirect Windows API invocation, anti-debugging, virtual-machine and sandbox detection, and can remove itself if it does not receive commands for a configured period. Code lineage and design similarities link Dante to Hacking Team's Remote Control System, also known as Da Vinci.
1 CVE Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.
2 distinct threat actors attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
While analyzing the malware used in these attacks, we discovered an unknown piece of malware that we identified as commercial spyware called “Dante” and developed by the Italian company Memento Labs (formerly Hacking Team).
Analyzing the old attacks, the researchers found "an unknown piece of malware that we identified as commercial spyware called “Dante” and developed by the Italian company Memento Labs."
20 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
“After a successful breach, the malicious link automatically redirected users to the genuine forum website, effectively erasing traces of the attack…”
No further action was required to initiate the infection; simply visiting the malicious website using Google Chrome or another Chromium-based web browser was enough.
Kaspersky said the malware infections occurred when victims clicked on personalized phishing links via email. It was disguised as an invitation from organizers of the scientific and expert forum for Primakov Readings, an international summit on global politics and economics.
“The campaign began with a precision spear-phishing operation… forging an official conference invitation… The fake invitations were distributed via email… The embedded link directed victims to a cloned website…”
In all known cases, infection occurred after the victim clicked a link in a spear phishing email that directed them to a malicious website.
Following the timeline of events and the infection logic, this next stage should have been a remote code execution (RCE) exploit for Google Chrome...
Kaspersky’s technologies successfully identified a sophisticated zero-day exploit that was used to escape Google Chrome’s sandbox... fixed it as CVE-2025-2783.
“This vulnerability enabled sandbox escape… The initial exploit was solely responsible for escaping the browser sandbox and gaining system privileges…”
First of all, the spyware is packed with VMProtect. It obfuscates control flow, hides imported functions, and adds anti-debugging checks. On top of that, almost every string is encrypted.
It also performs several anti-sandbox checks. It searches for “bad” libraries, measures the execution times of the sleep() function and the cpuid instruction, and checks the file system.
The orchestrator is decrypted from the resource section and poses as a font file.
Dante uses some common methods to detect debuggers. Specifically, it checks the debug registers (Dr0–Dr7) using NtGetContextThread... and uses NtQueryInformationProcess to detect debugging
“custom spyware trojan named “Dante”… functions—such as keylogging…”
It also performs several anti-sandbox checks. It searches for “bad” libraries, measures the execution times of the sleep() function and the cpuid instruction, and checks the file system.
Dante uses some common methods to detect debuggers. Specifically, it checks the debug registers (Dr0–Dr7) using NtGetContextThread... and uses NtQueryInformationProcess to detect debugging
“Dante… functions—such as… file theft…”
“custom spyware trojan named “Dante”… functions—such as keylogging…”
“Dante… functions—such as… screenshot capture…”
Notably, we saw several minor similarities between this attack and others involving Dante, such as similar file system paths, the same persistence mechanism, data hidden in font files, and other minor details.
The malware connects to one of its C2 servers specified in the configuration and uses HTTPS to receive and execute commands
Spent days trying to implement a multi-hop SOCKS5 proxy chain before I even had a working C2 ... What I tried: Dante proxies, 3proxy chains, multi-hop obfuscation, rotating IPs.
The Memento Labs' product additionally enables users to install any software on the computer unnoticed. One description, for instance, mentions the software Dante, which probably is referring to a monitoring tool from Memento Labs.
“the attackers employed short-lived domain techniques to conceal their real command-and-control (C&C) servers.”
3 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.
19 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.