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Mallory
Malware

Stealit

Tracked since Nov 25, 2025 · Updated 3 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors0Associated
ATT&CK27Techniques
IOCs29Tracked
Type
Infostealer
Capabilities
Credential theftExfiltrationPersistenceDefense evasionPost exploitation
Delivery
Landing pageLure
Platforms
WindowsAndroid

Stealit is a malware-as-a-service information-stealing malware family targeting Microsoft Windows, with advertised support for Android in its criminal offering. It has been distributed through fake installers for games and VPN software shared via file-hosting and chat platforms. Recent campaigns have used Node.js Single Executable Application packaging, and some variants have also used Electron, to embed heavily obfuscated JavaScript-based payloads inside standalone executables.

Stealit employs layered in-memory execution and extensive anti-analysis checks, including virtual environment detection, timing checks, process and parent-process inspection, and other environment validation intended to frustrate sandboxing and reverse engineering. After execution, it downloads additional components, stores them in user-local application data directories, attempts to weaken endpoint protections by adding Microsoft Defender exclusions, and establishes persistence through a startup script executed at logon.

Its modular payloads are designed primarily for data theft. Observed components extract information from Chromium-based browsers and target browser data, credentials, and cryptocurrency-wallet-related data, as well as data from gaming and desktop applications. Stealit has also been associated with functionality to terminate selected processes before collection, likely to unlock files or improve theft success.

Beyond infostealing, Stealit includes remote-access capabilities commonly associated with RATs, including live screen viewing, webcam access, command execution, file grabbing, payload execution, and victim interaction features. Reported operator-controlled functionality also includes ransomware deployment, making the family broader than a simple stealer. The malware has been marketed through a web panel and Telegram presence as a subscription service for criminal customers.

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MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

27 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Execution

3 techniques
T1059.001PowerShellEvidence1

To prevent Windows Defender from scanning the downloaded files, all the created directories are added to the exemption list by executing the following PowerShell command: powershell -Command "Add-MpPreference -ExclusionPath {directory}'

T1059.005Visual BasicEvidence1

Once “game_cache.exe” is downloaded and executed, it creates a Visual Basic script, startup.vbs, which launches it. That script is then placed in the Windows startup folder

T1106Native APIEvidence1

At the end of the script, this blob is decoded and executed directly in memory using Node.js’ require function

Persistence

2 techniques
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence1

Registry Analysis – Checks if any of the following registry locations contain data related to debugger applications

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

That script is then placed in the Windows startup folder (i.e., %APPDATA%\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\startup.vbs) to ensure that the file is automatically executed upon system startup.

Privilege Escalation

1 technique
T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

That script is then placed in the Windows startup folder (i.e., %APPDATA%\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\startup.vbs) to ensure that the file is automatically executed upon system startup.

Stealth

4 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

All of Node.js’s scripts bundled in the executables are heavily obfuscated to complicate analysis.

T1218.003CMSTPEvidence1

the intention is to run the wmic process command... It retrieves the parent process information by running the following command: wmic process where ProcessId={malware process ID} get Name,CommandLine,ExecutablePath /format:csv

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

If enabled, it performs various checks to detect if it’s running in an analysis environment... Virtual Environment – checks if it’s running under a virtual machine

T1622Debugger EvasionEvidence1

Registry Analysis – Checks if any of the following registry locations contain data related to debugger applications... DLL Injection... Parent Process – Checks if the process information of its parent process contains one of the blacklisted keywords related to analysis applications

Defense Impairment

2 techniques
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence1

Registry Analysis – Checks if any of the following registry locations contain data related to debugger applications

T1685Disable or Modify ToolsEvidence1

To prevent Windows Defender from scanning the downloaded files, all the created directories are added to the exemption list

Credential Access

1 technique
T1555Credentials from Password StoresEvidence1

it also extracts information from various browsers, including Google Chrome and Microsoft Edge

Discovery

7 techniques
T1033System Owner/User DiscoveryEvidence1

It initially connects to the C2 by sending the following victim information via an HTTP POST request... {"pcName":"[ username ]","hwid":"[ UUID ]","key":"[ 12-character key ]"}

T1049System Network Connections DiscoveryEvidence1

Network Ports - Runs netstat –an to list all active and listening ports in the system.

T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence1

the intention is to run the wmic process command with the get Name, ProcessId, ExecutablePath, CommandLine /format:csv option to list all running processes

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence1

It initially connects to the C2 by sending the following victim information... Username - HWID (Hardware ID) - Key

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence1

File Grabber Collect files from Desktop, Documents, Downloads, and other critical paths

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

If enabled, it performs various checks to detect if it’s running in an analysis environment... Virtual Environment – checks if it’s running under a virtual machine

T1622Debugger EvasionEvidence1

Registry Analysis – Checks if any of the following registry locations contain data related to debugger applications... DLL Injection... Parent Process – Checks if the process information of its parent process contains one of the blacklisted keywords related to analysis applications

Collection

6 techniques
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence1

it also extracts information from a variety of applications, including: Game-related Steam Minecraft... Cryptocurrency wallets

T1113Screen CaptureEvidence1

ScreenCapture_1.3.2.bat , app.manifest: These files are used to build a VB.NET application screenCapture_1.3.2.exe inside the victim system. It can be used to remotely view the victim’s screen.

T1123Audio CaptureEvidence1

Remote Audio Player Play any sound or music on victim's device

T1125Video CaptureEvidence1

Live Webcam Access View camera feed from victim's device

T1185Browser Session HijackingEvidence1

cache.exe is a tool developed from the open-source project ChromElevator... It claims to bypass security features implemented by these browsers

T1560Archive Collected DataEvidence1

The downloaded data are decompressed using the Brotli algorithm and saved in the same directory

Command and Control

3 techniques
T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence1

It initially connects to the C2 by sending the following victim information via an HTTP POST request to https[:]//root[.]iloveanimals[.]shop/panelping in JSON format

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

This Stealit’s campaign begins with the installer component that downloads additional components from its C2 server... It then proceeds to download the initial components from the following URLs

T1219Remote Access ToolsEvidence1

highlighting typical remote access trojan (RAT) functionalities such as file extraction, webcam control, live screen monitoring, and ransomware deployment

Impact

2 techniques
T1486Data Encrypted for ImpactEvidence1

Encrypted_files.txt: This is likely related to the ransomware module of the malware

T1489Service StopEvidence1

Before it begins gathering information from target applications, it tries to terminate related processes.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

29 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Activity feed

Recent activity

4 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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Is this in your environment?See whether this family's indicators match your telemetry and which of your assets are exposed to the CVEs associated with it.
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Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching29Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actorsGroups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping27Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.