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Malware4 associated actors

CraxsRAT

Tracked since Nov 25, 2025 · Updated 13 days ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 days2 mentions · peak 2 in a dayToday
Vulns0Associated
Actors4Associated
ATT&CK27Techniques
IOCs9Tracked
Type
RAT
Capabilities
Credential theftKeyloggingExfiltrationPersistenceDefense evasion
Delivery
PhishingLanding pageLureFake update
Platforms
Android

CraxsRAT is a commercially distributed Android remote access trojan associated with the Syria-based malware developer EVLF DEV. Sold through a malware-as-a-service model, it provides operators with customizable malicious applications for surveillance, credential theft, and remote device control. Its Android payloads should be distinguished from Windows-based builder software and unrelated malware embedded in backdoored copies of those builders.

CraxsRAT supports live screen viewing and recording, keylogging, camera and microphone surveillance, location tracking, file management, SMS management, and collection of contacts, messages, call logs, and credentials. It also provides a shell for remote command execution. The malware abuses Android Accessibility Services to access screen content and keystrokes. Its builder allows operators to customize application branding, requested permissions, and embedded WebView content so that malicious applications appear functional. Payload obfuscation hinders analysis, while permission-request staging and anti-uninstallation features help operators retain access. An anti-removal feature disrupts attempts to uninstall the application by crashing the relevant interface.

Distribution involves sideloaded Android packages promoted through deceptive websites, phishing lures, and fake application updates. Financially motivated campaigns have used CraxsRAT against users in Southeast Asia. In 2024, UNC5812 distributed CraxsRAT to potential Ukrainian military recruits through the Civil Defense persona and a decoy application claiming to map military recruiter locations; victims were instructed to disable Google Play Protect and grant extensive permissions. UNC5114 also delivered a CraxsRAT variant disguised as an update for Ukraine's Kropyva combat control application.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

4 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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EVLF

BTMob evolved from the SpySolr malware family and shares a common lineage with CraxsRAT and CypherRAT, mobile RATs associated with the Syria-based malware developer EVLF.

via flashpoint blogflashpoint.io
EVLF DEV

“As per our investigation and the official website of CraxsRAT, we can confirm that CraxsRAT only targets Android devices.”

via cyfirma blogcyfirma.com
UNC5812

For Android users, the malicious APK file attempts to install a variant of the commercially available Android backdoor CRAXSRAT.

via mandiant threat intelligencecloud.google.com
UNC5114

"UNC5114 ... delivered a variant of ... Android malware called CraxsRAT by masquerading it as an update for Kropyva..."

via the hacker newsthehackernews.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

27 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Resource Development

1 technique
T1583.001DomainsEvidence1

UNC5812’s malware delivery operations are conducted both via an actor-controlled Telegram channel @civildefense_com_ua and website hosted at civildefense[.]com.ua.

Initial Access

3 techniques
T1189Drive-by CompromiseEvidence1

The ultimate aim of the campaign is to have victims navigate to the UNC5812-controlled "Civil Defense" website, which advertises several different software programs for different operating systems. When installed, these programs result in the download of various commodity malware families.

T1566.002Spearphishing LinkEvidence1

The ultimate aim of the campaign is to have victims navigate to the UNC5812-controlled "Civil Defense" website, which advertises several different software programs for different operating systems.

T1566.003Spearphishing via ServiceEvidence2

UNC5812’s malware delivery operations are conducted both via an actor-controlled Telegram channel @civildefense_com_ua and website hosted at civildefense[.]com.ua. To drive potential victims towards these actor-controlled resources, we assess that UNC5812 is likely purchasing promoted posts in legitimate, established Ukrainian-language Telegram channels.

Execution

4 techniques
T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence1

Technical analysis confirmed: - Remote shell execution

T1106Native APIEvidence1

When opened, this version requests the Android REQUEST_INSTALL_PACKAGES permission from the user, which if granted, downloads the CRAXSRAT payload.

T1204User ExecutionEvidence2

If installed with Google Play Protect disabled, these programs deliver an operating system-specific commodity malware variant to the victim alongside a decoy mapping application we track as SUNSPINNER.

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence1

G700 RAT поднимает поддельную страницу Google Play Store ... с кнопкой «Установить». Это техника Malicious File (T1204.002, Execution).

Privilege Escalation

1 technique
T1548Abuse Elevation Control MechanismEvidence1

The website’s FAQ contains a strained justification for the Android application being hosted outside the App Store... directing them to a set of accompanying video instructions.

Stealth

5 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

CraxsRAT и производные используют Base64 для сокрытия C2-адресов и HTML-кода фишинговых страниц ... Base64/DNGuard обфускация — Obfuscated Files or Information (T1027).

T1027.002Software PackingEvidence1

Technical analysis confirmed: - DEX packers for AV evasion

T1027.009Embedded PayloadsEvidence1

dropper-APK с минимальным набором разрешений вытаскивает из assets/ скрытый payload и ставит его на устройство ... childapp.apk содержит основной RAT.

T1036MasqueradingEvidence4

"Civil Defense" claims to be a provider of free software programs designed to enable potential conscripts to view and share crowdsourced locations of Ukrainian military recruiters.

T1564.003Hidden WindowEvidence1

Technical analysis confirmed: - Hidden update/backdoor mechanisms

Defense Impairment

1 technique
T1685Disable or Modify ToolsEvidence2

The Ukrainian-language video instructions then guide victims on how to disable Google Play Protect, the service used to check applications for harmful functionality when they are installed on Android devices, as well as to manually enable all permissions once the malware is successfully installed.

Credential Access

3 techniques
T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence4

Кейлоггинг (T1056.001), скриншоты (T1113), запись камеры (T1125) и микрофона (T1123).

T1056.004Credential API HookingEvidence1

Technical analysis confirmed: - Banking phishing overlays

T1555Credentials from Password StoresEvidence1

Technical analysis confirmed: - Crypto wallet credential theft

Discovery

1 technique
T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence1

POST-запрос с device fingerprint: IMEI, номер SIM, модель, версия Android. Это System Information Discovery (T1082, Discovery).

Collection

5 techniques
T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence4

Кейлоггинг (T1056.001), скриншоты (T1113), запись камеры (T1125) и микрофона (T1123).

T1056.004Credential API HookingEvidence1

Technical analysis confirmed: - Banking phishing overlays

T1113Screen CaptureEvidence1

Оба семейства дают оператору: кейлоггинг, запись экрана и камеры ... Маппинг: запись экрана и скриншоты — Screen Capture (T1113).

T1123Audio CaptureEvidence4

Кейлоггинг (T1056.001), скриншоты (T1113), запись камеры (T1125) и микрофона (T1123).

T1125Video CaptureEvidence2

Кейлоггинг (T1056.001), скриншоты (T1113), запись камеры (T1125).

Command and Control

3 techniques
T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence1

Дальнейшая коммуникация через Web Protocols (T1071.001, Command and Control) — оператор шлёт команды, RAT возвращает результаты.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

Pronsis Loader is used to retrieve both the decoy SUNSPINNER binary and a second-stage downloader "civildefensestarter.exe" ... initiating a multi-stage delivery chain ... which ultimately executes PURESTEALER on the victim device.

T1219Remote Access ToolsEvidence3

Useful starting points are MITRE ATT&CK techniques for remote access software (T1219)

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1567Exfiltration Over Web ServiceEvidence1

Technical analysis confirmed: - Telegram bot exfiltration

Impact

1 technique
T1486Data Encrypted for ImpactEvidence1

Technical analysis confirmed: - Ransomware components

Indicators of compromise

Observables

9 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Activity feed

Recent activity

20 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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Mallory platform

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IOC matching9Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors4Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping27Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.