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Malware1 associated actor

TamperedChef

Tracked since Nov 25, 2025 · Updated today
Trending this week#51of 30,235 malware families
Mention activity · 30 days13 mentions · peak 8 in a dayToday
Vulns0Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK33Techniques
IOCs138Tracked
Type
Infostealer
Capabilities
Credential theftSession hijackingExfiltrationPersistenceDefense evasionReconnaissance
Delivery
MalvertisingLanding pageLure
Platforms
Windows

TamperedChef is a Windows information-stealing malware family distributed through trojanized utility applications, particularly PDF editors and manual readers. Malicious advertisements and sponsored search results direct users to legitimate-looking download sites. The applications may perform their advertised functions while concealing malicious components. Valid code-signing certificates and delayed activation, sometimes lasting weeks, help the malware appear trustworthy and evade early detection.

TamperedChef uses Node.js to execute obfuscated JavaScript and establishes persistence through scheduled tasks. It enumerates browsers and installed security products, targets saved browser credentials, session cookies, autofill information, and locally accessible password-manager credentials, and accesses Windows DPAPI-protected secrets. It can terminate browser processes and copy browser databases to facilitate extraction. Collected information is exfiltrated to attacker-controlled command-and-control infrastructure, which can also provide additional instructions or updated payloads.

The TamperedChef name is also used more broadly for an ecosystem of trojanized productivity-software campaigns, frequently described as EvilAI. Within that broader grouping, the name is most closely associated with the CL-UNK-1110 activity cluster. The ecosystem encompasses multiple distinct clusters and payload families rather than a single established operator. BaoLoader is tracked separately and should not be treated as a confirmed synonym. Victimization is geographically broad, without a consistently established industry-specific focus.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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CL-CRI-1089

Operations attributed to CL-CRI-1089 also include Recipe Lister and Calendaromatic, both of which fall under a broader designation known as TamperedChef (aka EvilAI), an ongoing series of campaigns that involve using trojanized versions of productivity software to deliver potentially unwanted programs (PUPs) and adware.

via the hacker newsthehackernews.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

33 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Resource Development

3 techniques
T1583Acquire InfrastructureEvidence1

These campaigns typically employ malicious ads that direct users to sites hosting the applications.

T1583.008MalvertisingEvidence2

"GPUGate Malware Uses Google Ads"; "TamperedChef ... malvertising tricks"; "Fake ... extensions ... malvertising campaign"; "bypass ... X's malvertising protections"

T1608.006SEO PoisoningEvidence1

"Silver Fox... search engine optimization (SEO) poisoning campaign... Teams lures... download a malicious setup file"; "TamperedChef... bogus installers... malvertising"

Execution

6 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

TamperedChef creates a scheduled task to remain active across reboots... /TN “sys_component_health_{UID}” ... /SC DAILY /ST 10:51 /RI 240 /DU 24:00 /F

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence3

Persistence is established via a Windows Scheduled Task named \PDF.

T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence2

Once executed, it silently triggers Node.js (node.exe) via the Windows command line. Node.js executes a JavaScript payload dropped in the user’s temporary folder.

T1059.001PowerShellEvidence1

The explicit command line executed is: powershell.exe -NoProfile -WindowStyle Minimized -Command \ "Start-Process 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\PDFInstaller\node.exe' \ -ArgumentList '.' \ -WorkingDirectory 'C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\PDFInstaller\' \ -WindowStyle Hidden"

T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence1

The initial execution chain begins with a minimized command prompt: cmd.exe /C start "" /min \ "C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Programs\OpenMyManual\node\node.exe" \ "C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Programs\OpenMyManual\helper.js"

T1059.007JavaScriptEvidence1

The decrypted string is then passed directly into an eval() function, allowing the C2 server to execute arbitrary JavaScript dynamically on the infected host.

Persistence

4 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

TamperedChef creates a scheduled task to remain active across reboots... /TN “sys_component_health_{UID}” ... /SC DAILY /ST 10:51 /RI 240 /DU 24:00 /F

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence3

Persistence is established via a Windows Scheduled Task named \PDF.

T1112Modify RegistryEvidence2

Module 693 provides full Create, Read, Update, and Delete (CRUD) operations for the Windows Registry, primarily utilized to retrieve the MachineGuid.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

Implementing a robust persistence mechanism, almost always through scheduled tasks or registry Run keys

Privilege Escalation

3 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

TamperedChef creates a scheduled task to remain active across reboots... /TN “sys_component_health_{UID}” ... /SC DAILY /ST 10:51 /RI 240 /DU 24:00 /F

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence3

Persistence is established via a Windows Scheduled Task named \PDF.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

Implementing a robust persistence mechanism, almost always through scheduled tasks or registry Run keys

Stealth

6 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

Most of the campaigns we observed used some form of obfuscation or defense evasion techniques for their loader or stealer components.

T1036MasqueradingEvidence3

TamperedChef is delivered via user-initiated downloads. It comes bundled with seemingly legitimate software like PDF editors or manual readers.

T1218System Binary Proxy ExecutionEvidence2

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping ... Defense Evasion: T1218 — Signed Binary Proxy Execution

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

To hinder forensic analysis and automated sandboxing, helper.js incorporates several defensive mechanisms before initiating any malicious network activity.

T1497.003Time Based ChecksEvidence1

Employing a delayed activation technique to evade detection Initially, the samples mimic legitimate applications, remaining dormant for days or even weeks.

T1622Debugger EvasionEvidence1

Anti-Debugging Loops: It employs recursive functions that trigger debugger; statements and infinite loops if it detects an active debugging session or code tracing.

Defense Impairment

2 techniques
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence2

Module 693 provides full Create, Read, Update, and Delete (CRUD) operations for the Windows Registry, primarily utilized to retrieve the MachineGuid.

T1553.002Code SigningEvidence2

The loaders are often signed with valid Extended Validation (EV) certificates acquired through shell companies.

Credential Access

3 techniques
T1003OS Credential DumpingEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping Execution: T1059 — Command & Scripting Interpreter Credential Access: T1555 — Credentials from Password Stores, T1003 — OS Credential Dumping

T1555Credentials from Password StoresEvidence1

Targets include: Browser SQLite databases — Login Data and Web Data from Chrome and Edge. Windows DPAPI secrets — Local system-level encrypted data. Local password managers — Any stored credentials accessible to the user context.

T1555.003Credentials from Web BrowsersEvidence1

“TamperedChef… activating its payload to harvest browser credentials…”

Discovery

7 techniques
T1012Query RegistryEvidence1

It queries the registry to enumerate installed security and antivirus software, often searching for uninstall strings or configuration keys.

T1033System Owner/User DiscoveryEvidence1

It then spawns a command shell to fingerprint the host by executing reg.exe QUERY "HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Cryptography" /v MachineGuid

T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence1

The malware uses Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to check if browsers like Chrome or Edge are running: ... Get-WmiObject Win32_Process | Where-Object { $_.Name -eq ‘chrome.exe’ }

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence2

TamperedChef actively surveys the system to identify browsers and security software.

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

To hinder forensic analysis and automated sandboxing, helper.js incorporates several defensive mechanisms before initiating any malicious network activity.

T1497.003Time Based ChecksEvidence1

Employing a delayed activation technique to evade detection Initially, the samples mimic legitimate applications, remaining dormant for days or even weeks.

T1622Debugger EvasionEvidence1

Anti-Debugging Loops: It employs recursive functions that trigger debugger; statements and infinite loops if it detects an active debugging session or code tracing.

Collection

2 techniques
T1115Clipboard DataEvidence1

Its primary objective is clipboard hijacking. The Node.js engine spawns subsequent cmd.exe processes to interact with a bundled tool named clipboard.exe . Telemetry captures the execution of clipboard.exe -paste to read stored clipboard data, followed by clipboard.exe -copy to manipulate or inject new content.

T1185Browser Session HijackingEvidence1

Both these methods enable adversaries to control the content searched, ads displayed to victims and, in the case of the browser installation, full control over user cookies and credentials.

Command and Control

5 techniques
T1001Data ObfuscationEvidence1

To evade network-level detection, all traffic utilizes a symmetric XOR cipher.

T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

This includes continuous command and control (C2) methods enabling adversaries to retrieve additional payloads, such as information stealers, proxy tooling or remote access Trojans (RATs).

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence1

Communications are handled by Module 159, which implements a custom bi-directional encrypted protocol over HTTPS.

T1090ProxyEvidence1

This diversification includes deploying infostealers, establishing residential proxies and exhibiting behavior that resembles access brokers.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

Upon activation, they trigger the next stage, which typically involves downloading and executing an additional payload delivered via an upstream API.

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence1

However, TamperedChef-style programs execute commands remotely, exfiltrate users' credentials and deploy malware without consent.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

138 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Activity feed

Recent activity

37 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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security magic blogNews · Nov 11, 2026DragonsGate Loader: The Evolving Download Mechanism Behind TamperedChef / EvilAINamed ecosystem associated with the application installers investigated in this report, with TamperedChef and EvilAI referenced together throughout. The installers can deliver functional-looking PDF, recipe, and utility applications while a separate installer-stage mechanism contacts remote infrastructure and conditionally progresses toward additional downloads. This reference does not establish the final payload, malicious behavior in the installed applications’ ordinary interfaces, or the full post-installation impact.Read more ↗rogueauthority blogNews · Nov 11, 2026CookUp follow-up: nine signing companies and 25 C2 domains behind the “useful app” installers - rogueauthority.orgMalicious installers masquerading as useful applications, often installing a working application alongside a hidden loader. The investigation links installers signed by nine companies to 25 C2 domains through shared payload-unpacking code and an identical 32-byte constant. Packaging includes Go, .NET, NSIS and Inno Setup builds, sometimes concealing the loader in a fake 7z.dll. Certificate padding obscures signatures from some analysis tools while Windows still accepts them. Servers selectively deliver the final payload, which researchers could not obtain.Read more ↗help net securityNews · Nov 10, 2026Over 575 malicious OpenClaw skills delivered malware to Windows and macOS - Help Net SecurityDescribed through a campaign distributing malicious applications with functioning PDF-editing and manual-viewing features. The applications used valid Extended Validation code-signing certificates obtained through rotating U.S.-registered shell companies; revoked certificates were replaced using another company.Read more ↗rogueauthority blogNews · Nov 4, 2026A signed “CookUp” recipe-app installer that lets its server pick the victims - rogueauthority.orgMentioned only as a tentative comparison for functional applications concealing malicious capabilities. The article does not establish that the investigated installers belong to TamperedChef or deliver it.Read more ↗
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IOC matching138Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping33Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.