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Malware3 associated actors1 associated CVE

BEARDSHELL

Tracked since Nov 25, 2025 · Updated 1 month ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns1Associated
Actors3Associated
ATT&CK41Techniques
IOCs5Tracked
Type
Backdoor
Capabilities
Post exploitationPersistenceDefense evasionExfiltration
Delivery
Spearphishing
Platforms
Windows

BeardShell is a custom C++ backdoor for Windows used by the Russian state-sponsored cyberespionage group APT28, also known as Sednit, Fancy Bear, and Forest Blizzard. Observed in operations since April 2024, it supports long-term access to Ukrainian governmental and military systems. Targets have also included drone manufacturers and organizations involved in drone research and development.

BeardShell downloads and decrypts PowerShell scripts, executes them within a .NET runtime environment, and returns execution results through the legitimate Icedrive cloud storage service. It replicates communications used by the official Icedrive client to implement cloud-based command and control. Its tasking uses ChaCha20-Poly1305 encryption, and system-derived identifiers distinguish infected hosts. BeardShell employs rare opaque-predicate obfuscation also found in APT28’s older Xtunnel tool, providing a technical link to the group’s established custom arsenal.

APT28 commonly deploys BeardShell alongside a heavily modified Covenant implant, using separate cloud providers to improve operational resilience. Covenant serves as the primary espionage implant, while BeardShell provides fallback access and can redeploy Covenant. Associated infection chains use malicious Office documents delivered through spearphishing and messaging applications, staged loaders, and image-concealed payloads. Deployments have used COM hijacking for persistence. BeardShell’s cloud-based communications and code obfuscation help conceal malicious activity within legitimate service traffic and complicate detection and infrastructure disruption.

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Associated CVEs

Associated vulnerabilities

1 CVE Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

CVE-2026-21509via trellix blogExploited in the wildMicrosoft Office COM/OLE Security Feature BypassThe attackers weaponized a newly disclosed Microsoft Office 1-day (CVE-2026-21509) within 24 hours of its public revelation... CVE-2026-21509, a Microsoft Office security feature bypass vulnerability... allows embedded OLE objects to execute by leveraging the WebDAV protocol to fetch external payloads from attacker-controlled infrastructure.View vulnerability →Source ↗
Threat actors

Associated threat actors

3 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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APT28

Zebrocy, PythocyDbg, BeardShell, PocoDown, MASEPIE

via cyfirma blogcyfirma.com
GRU Unit 26165

a new backdoor called BeardShell ... written in C++, establishes persistence, executes PowerShell commands, and hides files under fake image headers.

via scworldscworld.com
APT29

Researchers at cybersecurity company ESET noticed that since April 2024, the Russian group has started using in attacks two implants named BeardShell and Covenant.

via bleeping computerbleepingcomputer.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

41 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Resource Development

4 techniques
T1583.006Web ServicesEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK techniques ... T1583.006 Acquire Infrastructure: Web Services BeardShell relies on Icedrive cloud storage. Covenant relies on Filen cloud storage.

T1583.007ServerlessEvidence2

Instead of standard HTTP, APT28 built a custom bridge that uses the legitimate Koofr cloud service, with tasks and results travelling as encrypted files inside the operator's Koofr account.

T1587.001MalwareEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK techniques ... T1587.001 Develop Capabilities: Malware BeardShell and SlimAgent are custom malware.

T1608.006SEO PoisoningEvidence1

"APT28 (aka Fancy Bear) managed to reverse-engineer Microsoft's urgent Office patch for CVE-2026-21509 and had working exploits hitting targets within 48 hours of release."

Initial Access

3 techniques
T1566PhishingEvidence3

Spear phishing campaigns or the SedKit exploit kit delivered the Seduploader first stage.

T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence6

APT28’s attack begins with spear-phishing emails containing weaponized documents that exploit CVE-2026-21509... They noted that the APT28 adversary orchestrated a concentrated 72-hour spear-phishing campaign... delivering at least 29 distinct emails across nine Eastern European nations.

T1566.003Spearphishing via ServiceEvidence1

"APT28 Uses Signal Chat to Deploy BEARDSHELL Malware and COVENANT in Ukraine"

Execution

6 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence2

The researchers detailed that the malware establishes persistence by hijacking a COM object and briefly creating a scheduled task, ‘OneDriveHealth,’ to restart explorer[dot]exe and trigger the malicious load before deleting itself.

T1059.001PowerShellEvidence9

BeardShell is a sophisticated implant capable of executing PowerShell commands within a .NET runtime environment...

T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence1

“cmd.exe for orchestration” / “cmd.exe /c (taskkill… & start explorer…)”

T1129Shared ModulesEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK techniques ... T1129 Shared Modules BeardShell and SlimAgent are full-fledged DLL files.

T1203Exploitation for Client ExecutionEvidence4

The attackers moved quickly, weaponizing a newly disclosed Microsoft Office one-day vulnerability, CVE-2026-21509, within 24 hours of its public disclosure... When victims open these malicious documents, the exploit triggers automatically without requiring macros or user interaction.

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence2

When victims open these malicious documents, the exploit triggers automatically without requiring macros or user interaction.

Persistence

2 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence2

The researchers detailed that the malware establishes persistence by hijacking a COM object and briefly creating a scheduled task, ‘OneDriveHealth,’ to restart explorer[dot]exe and trigger the malicious load before deleting itself.

T1546.015Component Object Model HijackingEvidence2

MITRE ATT&CK techniques ... T1546.015 Event Triggered Execution: Component Object Model Hijacking BeardShell and SlimAgent are made persistent by hijacking COM objects.

Privilege Escalation

3 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence2

The researchers detailed that the malware establishes persistence by hijacking a COM object and briefly creating a scheduled task, ‘OneDriveHealth,’ to restart explorer[dot]exe and trigger the malicious load before deleting itself.

T1055Process InjectionEvidence3

The entire chain is designed for resilience and evasion, utilizing encrypted payloads, legitimate cloud services for C2, in-memory execution, and process injection to minimize forensic artifacts.

T1546.015Component Object Model HijackingEvidence2

MITRE ATT&CK techniques ... T1546.015 Event Triggered Execution: Component Object Model Hijacking BeardShell and SlimAgent are made persistent by hijacking COM objects.

Stealth

11 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence10

MITRE ATT&CK techniques ... T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information BeardShell Icedrive token decryption is obfuscated.

T1027.003SteganographyEvidence2

Стеганография (T1027.003) прячет payload от файлового анализа: PNG с шеллкодом - не исполняемый файл...

T1027.007Dynamic API ResolutionEvidence1

BeardShell uses lightweight anti-analysis checks to evade sandboxes, decrypts embedded strings, and dynamically resolves Windows APIs.

T1055Process InjectionEvidence3

The entire chain is designed for resilience and evasion, utilizing encrypted payloads, legitimate cloud services for C2, in-memory execution, and process injection to minimize forensic artifacts.

T1070.004File DeletionEvidence1

“self-deletes the scheduled task” / “Deletes scheduled task after persistence established” (MITRE table)

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence2

MITRE ATT&CK techniques ... T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information BeardShell decrypts its strings.

T1218.011Rundll32Evidence1

“DLL execution via rundll32.exe” (MITRE table) / process indicators include “rundll32.exe tables(1).dll”

T1480Execution GuardrailsEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK techniques ... T1480 Execution Guardrails BeardShell only executes in taskhost.exe or taskhostw.exe. SlimAgent only executes in explorer.exe.

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

BeardShell uses lightweight anti-analysis checks to evade sandboxes...

T1497.003Time Based ChecksEvidence1

“three-second sleep with timing validation (≥2.9s threshold) to detect sandbox time acceleration”

T1620Reflective Code LoadingEvidence3

The loader either extracts an encrypted PNG image file containing shellcode, which it decrypts and executes BeardShell in memory... The campaign’s modular infection chain – from initial phish to in-memory backdoor to secondary implants...

Discovery

4 techniques
T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence1

“process name verification to ensure execution within explorer.exe” / “Checks for explorer.exe” (MITRE table)

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence2

MITRE ATT&CK techniques ... T1082 System Information Discovery BeardShell sends a fingerprint of the compromised machine.

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

BeardShell uses lightweight anti-analysis checks to evade sandboxes...

T1497.003Time Based ChecksEvidence1

“three-second sleep with timing validation (≥2.9s threshold) to detect sandbox time acceleration”

Collection

1 technique
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK techniques ... T1005 Data from Local System BeardShell, Covenant, and SlimAgent collect data from a compromised machine.

Command and Control

10 techniques
T1001Data ObfuscationEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK techniques ... T1001 Data Obfuscation BeardShell exfiltrates data in fake images.

T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence3

The extracted shellcode, ultimately, is used to load an embedded .NET assembly, which is nothing but a Grunt implant associated with the open source .NET COVENANT command-and-control (C2) framework.

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence9

在"Operation Phantom Net Voxel"行动中,该组织部署了一个名为BeardShell的定制C++后门,使用云存储API作为其命令通道。

T1090.002External ProxyEvidence1

Since July 2025, the threat actor has used the Filen cloud provider with Covenant. Previously, the attacker used Koofr and pCloud services.

T1102Web ServiceEvidence5

BeardShell ... leverages the legitimate cloud storage service Icedrive as its C&C channel... Previously, in 2023, Sednit’s Covenant abused the legitimate cloud service pCloud, and in 2024–2025, Koofr ... Figure 11 shows the classes introduced by Sednit developers to communicate with the Filen cloud provider, used since July 2025.

T1102.001Dead Drop ResolverEvidence1

“BeardShell … allows the attacker to execute PowerShell commands on compromised systems while using the legitimate cloud service Icedrive for command-and-control (C2) communications.”

T1102.002Bidirectional CommunicationEvidence2

Облачный C2 (Web Service, T1102.002) прячет сетевой трафик... Command and Control - Bidirectional Communication (T1102.002): BEARDSHELL работает через Icedrive API ... COVENANT - через Filen, pCloud, Koofr.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence7

该组织从稳定的恶意软件框架转向部署短效、单一用途的工具,一旦暴露立即弃用。

T1573.001Symmetric CryptographyEvidence1

“AES-256-GCM… AES-256-CBC plus HMAC-SHA256… encrypts it with… RSA… session key”

T1573.002Asymmetric CryptographyEvidence2

MITRE ATT&CK techniques ... T1573.002 Encrypted Channel: Asymmetric Cryptography BeardShell communications with Icedrive are encrypted using HTTPS. Covenant communications with its controller uses RSA-encrypted session keys.

Exfiltration

3 techniques
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence1

X-Tunnel for exfiltration

T1567Exfiltration Over Web ServiceEvidence3

在"Operation Phantom Net Voxel"行动中,该组织部署了一个名为BeardShell的定制C++后门,使用云存储API作为其命令通道。对监控流量者而言,这看起来像是与可信云服务的连接。

T1567.002Exfiltration to Cloud StorageEvidence3

...эксфильтрация документов через тот же облачный канал (Exfiltration to Cloud Storage, T1567.002).

Indicators of compromise

Observables

5 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

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IOC matching5Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors3Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilities1CVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping41Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.