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Mallory
Malware3 associated actors

Hydra

Tracked since Nov 25, 2025 · Updated 21 days ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors3Associated
ATT&CK45Techniques
IOCs88Tracked
Type
Banking trojan
Capabilities
Credential theftSession hijackingKeyloggingExfiltrationPersistenceDefense evasion
Delivery
PhishingSmishingFake updateLure
Platforms
Android

Hydra is an Android banking trojan that steals financial credentials, authentication data, and other sensitive information from compromised mobile devices. It uses fraudulent overlays and webinjects to impersonate legitimate applications, including banking and cryptocurrency applications. Its capabilities include accessibility-based keylogging, SMS and notification interception, contact collection, cookie theft through WebView, and theft of one-time passwords and device-lock PINs. Hydra can also manipulate call forwarding, execute USSD requests, and send bulk SMS messages to stolen contacts for smishing.

Hydra abuses Android Accessibility Services to capture user input and hinder removal. Analyzed variants use packing, dynamically loaded DEX payloads, encrypted strings, and emulator checks to obstruct analysis. Some early droppers concealed executable code within image data and restricted payload execution using time and country checks. Variants have also used Tor-based communication to retrieve command-and-control information and maintained fallback infrastructure.

Hydra has been distributed through phishing websites and malicious Google Play applications masquerading as legitimate utilities. These applications can retrieve the banking payload separately and present installation as a required update. Distribution has involved DawDropper and Brunhilda-operated dropper campaigns. Activity has targeted banking users in Turkey, Colombia, Europe, and the United States. Separately, the Russia-linked cluster UNC5125, also known as FlyingYeti or UAC-0149, has used GREYBATTLE, a customized Hydra derivative, to steal credentials and data while targeting Ukrainian military users.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

3 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Brunhilda

In the first case, we observed Brunhilda posing as a QR code creator app, Brunhilda dropped samples from established families, like Hydra, as well as novel ones, like Ermac.

via threatfabric blogthreatfabric.com
UAC-0149

"...GREYBATTLE, a bespoke version of the Hydra banking trojan..."

via the hacker newsthehackernews.com
UNC5125

"...GREYBATTLE, a bespoke version of the Hydra banking trojan..."

via the hacker newsthehackernews.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

45 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Resource Development

1 technique
T1588.002ToolEvidence1

T1588.002 — Obtain Capabilities: Tool (Resource Development)

Initial Access

3 techniques
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence4

Using the discovered wordlist with Hydra, valid credentials are obtained through a brute-force attack. With authenticated WordPress access...

T1078.001Default AccountsEvidence1

BRAND Generates a (d)efault (p)assword (l)ist from the local file ... limiting the output to BRAND systems, using the format username:password

T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence1

Email attachments continue to be the most common delivery mechanism. These typically contain macros or embedded scripts that execute malware under the guise of legitimate business communication.

Execution

3 techniques
T1129Shared ModulesEvidence1

After these breakpoints, app will create dex file and load it. You will see Accessibility page pop-pup if you do it correctly.

T1204User ExecutionEvidence1

the user is forced to update the app in order to continue using the app... the user will be prompted to download and install it.

T1574Hijack Execution FlowEvidence1

"It uses the process hijacking technique I described at SyScan presentation. Instead of injecting a library it leaves the process in a suspended state and makes its PID available for the userland daemon."

Persistence

2 techniques
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence4

Using the discovered wordlist with Hydra, valid credentials are obtained through a brute-force attack. With authenticated WordPress access...

T1078.001Default AccountsEvidence1

BRAND Generates a (d)efault (p)assword (l)ist from the local file ... limiting the output to BRAND systems, using the format username:password

Privilege Escalation

4 techniques
T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

"Hydra is sample code of a kernel extension that will intercept process creation, suspend, and communicate it to a userland daemon that will be in charge of patching the application. It uses the process hijacking technique... Instead of injecting a library it leaves the process in a suspended state and makes its PID available for the userland daemon. This daemon will be responsible for patching and resuming the process after."

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence4

Using the discovered wordlist with Hydra, valid credentials are obtained through a brute-force attack. With authenticated WordPress access...

T1078.001Default AccountsEvidence1

BRAND Generates a (d)efault (p)assword (l)ist from the local file ... limiting the output to BRAND systems, using the format username:password

T1548Abuse Elevation Control MechanismEvidence1

After successfully downloading the “update”, the user will be asked for the permission to install apps from unknown sources.

Stealth

10 techniques
T1014RootkitEvidence2

OS X Kernel Rootkits (duh!). ... Zombie rootkits! ... Install rootkit code. Fix mem permissions and offsets. Redirect execution to zombie. Create kernel memory leak. Return KERN_FAILURE.

T1027.003SteganographyEvidence1

Dropper apps extract dex file from png file with kinda stenography and downloads malicious app from command and control server with dropped dex.

T1036MasqueradingEvidence1

These apps posed as QR code scanners, PDF scanners, and cryptocurrency apps.

T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

"Hydra is sample code of a kernel extension that will intercept process creation, suspend, and communicate it to a userland daemon that will be in charge of patching the application. It uses the process hijacking technique... Instead of injecting a library it leaves the process in a suspended state and makes its PID available for the userland daemon. This daemon will be responsible for patching and resuming the process after."

T1070Indicator RemovalEvidence2

If you look for dropped file in filesystem, you won’t see anything. File is removed with remove .

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence4

Using the discovered wordlist with Hydra, valid credentials are obtained through a brute-force attack. With authenticated WordPress access...

T1078.001Default AccountsEvidence1

BRAND Generates a (d)efault (p)assword (l)ist from the local file ... limiting the output to BRAND systems, using the format username:password

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

As you can see there are functions : getSimCountryISO , getNetworkCountryIso , getCountry and one suspicious string : tr . Without running we can assume code will check if these function’s return values are equals to tr . I know this app targets Turkish people so this is reasonable to avoid sandbox and even manual analyze.

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence2

First, it checks the time and if the condition holds, the app will load the native library and call fyndmmn(Hdvhepuwy.j());

T1574Hijack Execution FlowEvidence1

"It uses the process hijacking technique I described at SyScan presentation. Instead of injecting a library it leaves the process in a suspended state and makes its PID available for the userland daemon."

Defense Impairment

1 technique
T1553Subvert Trust ControlsEvidence1

"Using this technique there is no need to resign a codesign protected application because it acts after those checks are done."

Credential Access

11 techniques
T1003OS Credential DumpingEvidence2

the threat actor was observed dropping and executing open source and free tools such as Hydra, SecretsDump, and CrackMapExec.

T1056Input CaptureEvidence2

Hydra is another android bankbot variant. It uses overlay to steal information like Anubis.

T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence2

Keylogging: Hydra abuses the Accessibility permissions to set up an Accessibility service that receives every Accessibility event happening on the infected device. This way the malware receives change events for TextFields (to steal usernames and passwords) and button clicks.

T1056.003Web Portal CaptureEvidence2

Overlays/Injections: At the beginning of the infection, it sends a few requests to the C2 server, and receives a list of targeted applications and a URL that points to a ZIP file which contains the corresponding injections... Hydra saves these injections locally and shows them as soon as it detects a user opening a banking application.

T1110Brute ForceEvidence39

Credentials : credential-attack (Hydra, hashcat, john) ; Imagicle CTI brute-force

T1110.001Password GuessingEvidence5

“The question pointed directly at SSH user alice with a weak password, so I brute-forced it with Hydra.”

T1110.002Password CrackingEvidence5

The threat actors then likely used password-cracking techniques to obtain the plaintext password.

T1110.003Password SprayingEvidence9

Among the new tools are additions focused on credential testing, including legba and the re-added hydra-gtk. Their inclusion reflects how identity-based attacks—including password spraying, credential reuse, and authentication testing—continue to play a central role in modern security assessments.

T1110.004Credential StuffingEvidence2

These tools act as a wake-up call: if you aren't enforcing MFA, disabling legacy authentication, and proactively monitoring for password-spraying attempts, your infrastructure is likely the low-hanging fruit in a credential-stuffing campaign.

T1539Steal Web Session CookieEvidence2

Around June 2022 we found new samples introducing this new feature used to steal cookies from sessions after the victims log in to their accounts... after the victim successfully logs in to his account, the cookies of the loaded website in the WebView are forwarded to the C2 server.

T1555Credentials from Password StoresEvidence2

dpl4hydra Generates a (d)efault (p)assword (l)ist as input for THC hydra

Discovery

5 techniques
T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence1

Hydra implements features to steal other information from the infected device... such as... a list of installed applications...

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence1

Filesystem access ... Very easy to do using VFS functions. ... Ability to read and write anywhere.

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

As you can see there are functions : getSimCountryISO , getNetworkCountryIso , getCountry and one suspicious string : tr . Without running we can assume code will check if these function’s return values are equals to tr . I know this app targets Turkish people so this is reasonable to avoid sandbox and even manual analyze.

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence2

First, it checks the time and if the condition holds, the app will load the native library and call fyndmmn(Hdvhepuwy.j());

T1518Software DiscoveryEvidence1

This behavior is in line with Anatsa moving from region to region, constantly updating its list of targeted financial institutions.

Lateral Movement

2 techniques
T1021Remote ServicesEvidence1

--hydra 自动化爆破支持协议:ssh,rdp,ftp,smb,mysql,mssql,oracle,postgresql,mongodb,redis

T1021.004SSHEvidence1

Launching Hydra against SSH ... Result: [22] [ssh] host: 10.48 . 176.143 login: marco password: Security2024! ... ssh marco @10 .48.176.143

Collection

5 techniques
T1056Input CaptureEvidence2

Hydra is another android bankbot variant. It uses overlay to steal information like Anubis.

T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence2

Keylogging: Hydra abuses the Accessibility permissions to set up an Accessibility service that receives every Accessibility event happening on the infected device. This way the malware receives change events for TextFields (to steal usernames and passwords) and button clicks.

T1056.003Web Portal CaptureEvidence2

Overlays/Injections: At the beginning of the infection, it sends a few requests to the C2 server, and receives a list of targeted applications and a URL that points to a ZIP file which contains the corresponding injections... Hydra saves these injections locally and shows them as soon as it detects a user opening a banking application.

T1185Browser Session HijackingEvidence1

webinjects can alter what the user sees on his/her browser, as opposed to what's in fact being sent by the server... the webinject will interpret an identical design of legitimate pages from popular services.

T1213Data from Information RepositoriesEvidence1

The malware collect the contacts stored in the victim’s device and send it to C2 server. And smishing the stolen numbers.

Command and Control

10 techniques
T1008Fallback ChannelsEvidence1

When we download mirrors file from http://lalabanda.com/api/mirrors , we will find encoded domains. I guess when the main C2 server is down, the malware will communicate with the mirrors or domains that we downloaded.

T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence3

Dropper apps extract dex file from png file with kinda stenography and downloads malicious app from command and control server with dropped dex.

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence2

Hydra creates a POST request to send credentials or cookies to the C2 server.

T1090ProxyEvidence3

Hydra invece permette di monitorare la navigazione online, individuando le applicazioni usate, i siti web visitati, e se si fa uso di VPN o del Tor Browser

T1090.003Multi-hop ProxyEvidence1

Using Tor: This variant includes a Tor (.onion) URL to the endpoint ‘/api/mirrors’. As response, it will receive a Base64-encoded JSON with the list of C2 servers to use. This variant includes code to download Tor native libraries in order to connect to this ‘backup C2’ using the Tor network.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence4

In this moment, Anatsa payload is downloaded from the C2 server(s), and installed on the device of the unsuspecting victim.

T1219Remote Access ToolsEvidence1

Hydra includes a screencast component that sends screenshots to the C2 server and receives commands used to simulate Accessibility events (click buttons, enter text in TextFields, etc.). This way the TAs can manipulate the target application on the victim’s device to monetize the account associated with that application.

T1568Dynamic ResolutionEvidence1

Using Tor: This variant includes a Tor (.onion) URL to the endpoint ‘/api/mirrors’. As response, it will receive a Base64-encoded JSON with the list of C2 servers to use... Using GitHub: This variant includes a GitHub repository file containing a Base64-encoded JSON object with the list of C2 servers... Hardcoded C2 server: This variant includes the C2 server in the binary itself and eventually sends a request to the path ‘/api/mirrors’ in order to get a new list of C2 servers.

T1571Non-Standard PortEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK® Techniques... Command and Control T1571 Non-Standard Port

T1573Encrypted ChannelEvidence1

The below code has been used to create a TOR connection that will receive the C&C URL.

Impact

1 technique
T1486Data Encrypted for ImpactEvidence1

Этот крипто-вымогатель шифрует данные пользователей с помощью AES (режим GCM или похожий) + RSA-2048... К зашифрованным файлам добавляется расширение: .Void

Indicators of compromise

Observables

88 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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IOC matching88Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors3Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping45Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.