GootKit
GootKit is a banking Trojan that also functions as an information stealer and remote access Trojan (RAT). The provided content describes it as highly evasive and capable of establishing a persistent foothold on victim systems, enabling follow-on exploitation including deployment of Cobalt Strike, ransomware, and other tooling. It has also been referenced as an e-banking Trojan and associated with HVNC-style fraud activity in broader banking-malware tradecraft.
The malware is closely associated with GootLoader delivery chains. Multiple sources in the content state that GootLoader historically loaded GootKit, and recent investigations describe first-stage obfuscated JavaScript downloaded via SEO poisoning and trojanized search-engine results, often from compromised websites, leading to second-stage JavaScript associated with GootKit. In one 2024 case, a malicious ZIP downloaded from a compromised site contained a JavaScript payload that dropped a larger script under AppData\Roaming\Notepad++, created scheduled-task persistence, executed via WScript/CScript, and spawned PowerShell. Network behavior included HTTP requests to multiple domains at /xmlrpc.php with Base64-encoded host enumeration data, including USERNAME and USERDOMAIN values. Sophos classified related artifacts as JS/Drop-DIJ and JS/Gootkit-AW. Example observed artifacts included the URL hxxps://ledabel[.]be/en/are-bengal-cats-legal-in-australia-understanding-the-laws-and-regulations/, redirect to hxxps://www[.]chanderbhushan[.]com/doc[.]php, ZIP file Are_bengal_cats_legal_in_australia_33924.zip, dropped script paths under C:\Users<Username>\AppData\Roaming\Notepad++, and scheduled task names such as Business Aviation and Destination Branding.
The content also ties GootKit to criminal distribution ecosystems. Storm-0324 has distributed GootKit as a first-stage payload since at least 2016 alongside other malware families, using phishing and exploit-kit-based delivery chains. Microsoft notes detections including Trojan:Win32/Gootkit. Other content states criminal operators have used the Cutwail spambot and the RIG and Nebula exploit kits to distribute GootKit, and that developers/operators updated configuration files to improve targeting and expanded target lists for video-capture capability in 2017. Emotet has also been observed delivering GootKit as a third-party payload.
High-confidence behaviors and characteristics directly mentioned in the content include: banking credential theft/e-banking fraud functionality; info-stealing and RAT capability; persistence establishment; use in multi-stage JavaScript and PowerShell infection chains; scheduled-task persistence; host enumeration and outbound C2/call-home traffic; and use as a precursor or enabler for later ransomware activity. Targeting in the provided material is opportunistic rather than sector-specific, though GootLoader-linked campaigns delivering GootKit have affected sectors including legal, healthcare, financial, technology, manufacturing, education, and government, with activity observed globally and specifically in North America, Europe, and Australia.
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Groups observed using it
1 distinct threat actor attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
Storm-0324 has distributed a range of first-stage payloads since at least 2016, including: ... Gootkit, a banking trojan
Techniques & procedures
10 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Resource Development
2 techniquesGootkit relies on trojanized search engine optimization (SEO) social engineering techniques, similar to Yellow Cockatoo.
GootLoader is known for using search engine optimization (SEO) poisoning for its initial access... the new variant was found to be using SEO poisoning... to deliver the new, JavaScript-based Gootloader package.
Initial Access
2 techniquesStorm-0324 manages a malware distribution chain and has used exploit kit and email-based vectors to deliver malware payloads.
Storm-0324’s delivery chain begins with phishing emails referencing invoices or payments and containing a link to a SharePoint site that hosts a ZIP archive.
Execution
2 techniquesWe additionally observed the creation of a scheduled task named “Business Aviation”... This was suspected to be a persistence method... Persistence was obtained via CScript.exe executing the file SMALLU~1.js via a scheduled task named Destination Branding.
Upon review of the running processes, we were able to determine that a small JavaScript file was dropping a large JavaScript file... We additionally observed the creation of a scheduled task named “Business Aviation” with the command line “wscript REHABI~1.JS”.
Persistence
1 techniquePrivilege Escalation
1 techniqueStealth
1 techniqueWith the obfuscated Javascript and VB Script samples... The JS Stage includes a few unused variables, entangled functions and scrambled strings.
Discovery
1 techniqueThe requests contained Base64-encoded cookies which, when decoded, showed enumeration information regarding device directories and host information... the process would read USERNAME and USER DOMAIN information and send the data to the URIs.
Command and Control
1 techniqueSpamhaus researchers issued listings for over 7,000 botnet Command & Control ("C&C") servers... These C&C servers enabled and controlled online crime such as credential theft, e-banking fraud, spam and DDoS attacks. They were also used for the retrieval of stolen data.
Exfiltration
1 techniqueFakeNet showed various domain names being reached out to with GET /xmlrpc.php HTTP/1.1 requests via Powershell.exe. The requests contained Base64-encoded cookies... showing enumeration information regarding device directories and host information.
IOCs tracked for this family
7 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.
IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.
Other indicator types observed in public reporting.
Recent activity
10 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Secondary payload referenced as being delivered by GootLoader; also referenced as the group frequently associated with GootLoader operations.
A highly evasive information stealer and remote access trojan that provides persistence, steals information, and enables deployment of post-exploitation tools and ransomware.
Banking trojan referenced to distinguish it from GootLoader; historically was loaded by GootLoader but treated as a separate family.
A banking trojan historically distributed by Storm-0324.
The version that knows your environment.
Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.