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Mallory
Malware3 associated actors

HIUPAN

Tracked since Nov 25, 2025 · Updated 24 days ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors3Associated
ATT&CK11Techniques
IOCs2Tracked
Type
Worm
Capabilities
PersistenceLateral movementDefense evasionDLL sideloading
Delivery
USBLure
Platforms
Windows
Also known asu2diskwatch

HIUPAN, also known as U2DiskWatch, is a Windows USB worm used by the China-aligned threat actor Mustang Panda, also tracked as Earth Preta, to distribute malware and move laterally through removable media. It has been used to propagate PUBLOAD and associated delivery components in cyberespionage operations against Asia-Pacific government organizations and Taiwanese manufacturing companies, including environments with air-gapped networks.

HIUPAN relies on users launching a legitimate executable from an infected removable drive, which side-loads its malicious DLL. It installs itself and companion payloads locally and establishes persistence through a registry Run entry. The worm monitors removable and hot-pluggable drives, copies a configurable set of malicious components onto them, and relocates existing drive contents into concealed directories, leaving an executable visible to entice user execution. It also modifies Windows Explorer settings to hide files, protected operating-system files, and file extensions. An external configuration controls propagation contents and monitoring intervals. Observed variants additionally monitor the process hosting PUBLOAD and restart it when it is no longer running.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

3 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Mustang Panda

(Citation: 2025_IBM_PUBLOAD_TONESHELL_HIUPAN_CLAIMLOADER_MUSTANG PANDA)(Citation: Trend Micro MUSTANG PANDA PUBLOAD HIUPAN SEPTEMBER 2024)

via mitre attack structuredgithub.com
CL-STA-1048

Attackers deployed numerous malware families, including HIUPAN, PUBLOAD, EggStremeFuel, MASOL RAT, PoshRAT, TrackBak Stealer, Hypnosis Loader, and FluffyGh0st.

via scworldscworld.com
CL-STA-1049

Attackers deployed numerous malware families, including HIUPAN, PUBLOAD, EggStremeFuel, MASOL RAT, PoshRAT, TrackBak Stealer, Hypnosis Loader, and FluffyGh0st.

via scworldscworld.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

11 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

1 technique
T1091Replication Through Removable MediaEvidence11

[HIUPAN](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1230) has periodically checked for removable and hot-plugged drives connected to the infected machine, should one be found [HIUPAN](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1230) will propagate to the removeable drives by copying itself and accompanying malware components to a directory to the new drive in a hidden subdirectory `<Drive_Letter>:\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\` and hides any other existing files to ensure UsbConfig.exe is the only visible file on the device.(Citation: 2025_IBM_PUBLOAD_TONESHELL_HIUPAN_CLAIMLOADER_MUSTANG PANDA)(Citation: Trend Micro MUSTANG PANDA PUBLOAD HIUPAN SEPTEMBER 2024)

Execution

3 techniques
T1204User ExecutionEvidence1

The content repeatedly describes victims being lured into opening malicious attachments, enabling macros, launching installers, clicking embedded files/links, or otherwise directly executing malicious content.

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence4

[HIUPAN](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1230) has lured victims into executing malicious files from USBs including the use of files such as USBconfig.exe.(Citation: 2025_IBM_PUBLOAD_TONESHELL_HIUPAN_CLAIMLOADER_MUSTANG PANDA)(Citation: Trend Micro MUSTANG PANDA PUBLOAD HIUPAN SEPTEMBER 2024)

T1574.001DLLEvidence3

[HIUPAN](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1230) has abused legitimate executables to side-load malicious DLLs to include the legitimate exe UsbConfig.exe.(Citation: 2025_IBM_PUBLOAD_TONESHELL_HIUPAN_CLAIMLOADER_MUSTANG PANDA)(Citation: Trend Micro MUSTANG PANDA PUBLOAD HIUPAN SEPTEMBER 2024)

Persistence

2 techniques
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence6

[HIUPAN](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1230) has modified registry keys to ensure hidden files and extensions are not visible through the modification of `HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Advanced`.(Citation: 2025_IBM_PUBLOAD_TONESHELL_HIUPAN_CLAIMLOADER_MUSTANG PANDA)(Citation: Trend Micro MUSTANG PANDA PUBLOAD HIUPAN SEPTEMBER 2024)

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence8

[HIUPAN](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1230) has added Registry Run keys to achieve persistence using `HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run`.(Citation: 2025_IBM_PUBLOAD_TONESHELL_HIUPAN_CLAIMLOADER_MUSTANG PANDA)(Citation: Trend Micro MUSTANG PANDA PUBLOAD HIUPAN SEPTEMBER 2024)

Privilege Escalation

1 technique
T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence8

[HIUPAN](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1230) has added Registry Run keys to achieve persistence using `HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run`.(Citation: 2025_IBM_PUBLOAD_TONESHELL_HIUPAN_CLAIMLOADER_MUSTANG PANDA)(Citation: Trend Micro MUSTANG PANDA PUBLOAD HIUPAN SEPTEMBER 2024)

Stealth

3 techniques
T1564.001Hidden Files and DirectoriesEvidence5

[HIUPAN](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1230) has modified registry keys to ensure hidden files and extensions are not visible through the modification of `HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Advanced`.(Citation: 2025_IBM_PUBLOAD_TONESHELL_HIUPAN_CLAIMLOADER_MUSTANG PANDA)(Citation: Trend Micro MUSTANG PANDA PUBLOAD HIUPAN SEPTEMBER 2024)

T1574.001DLLEvidence3

[HIUPAN](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1230) has abused legitimate executables to side-load malicious DLLs to include the legitimate exe UsbConfig.exe.(Citation: 2025_IBM_PUBLOAD_TONESHELL_HIUPAN_CLAIMLOADER_MUSTANG PANDA)(Citation: Trend Micro MUSTANG PANDA PUBLOAD HIUPAN SEPTEMBER 2024)

T1678Delay ExecutionEvidence3

[HIUPAN](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1230) has used a config file “$.ini” to store a sleep multiplier to execute at a set interval value prior to initiating a watcher function that checks for a specific running process, that checks for removable drives and installs itself and supporting files if one is available.(Citation: 2025_IBM_PUBLOAD_TONESHELL_HIUPAN_CLAIMLOADER_MUSTANG PANDA)(Citation: Trend Micro MUSTANG PANDA PUBLOAD HIUPAN SEPTEMBER 2024)

Defense Impairment

1 technique
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence6

[HIUPAN](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1230) has modified registry keys to ensure hidden files and extensions are not visible through the modification of `HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Advanced`.(Citation: 2025_IBM_PUBLOAD_TONESHELL_HIUPAN_CLAIMLOADER_MUSTANG PANDA)(Citation: Trend Micro MUSTANG PANDA PUBLOAD HIUPAN SEPTEMBER 2024)

Discovery

2 techniques
T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence4

[HIUPAN](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1230) has conducted process discovery to identify the [PUBLOAD](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1228) malware under the process WCBrowserWatcher.exe and will launch it from an install directory if it is not found.(Citation: Trend Micro MUSTANG PANDA PUBLOAD HIUPAN SEPTEMBER 2024)

T1120Peripheral Device DiscoveryEvidence3

[HIUPAN](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1230) has checked periodically for removable drives and installs itself when a drive is detected.(Citation: 2025_IBM_PUBLOAD_TONESHELL_HIUPAN_CLAIMLOADER_MUSTANG PANDA)(Citation: Trend Micro MUSTANG PANDA PUBLOAD HIUPAN SEPTEMBER 2024)

Lateral Movement

2 techniques
T1091Replication Through Removable MediaEvidence11

[HIUPAN](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1230) has periodically checked for removable and hot-plugged drives connected to the infected machine, should one be found [HIUPAN](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1230) will propagate to the removeable drives by copying itself and accompanying malware components to a directory to the new drive in a hidden subdirectory `<Drive_Letter>:\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\` and hides any other existing files to ensure UsbConfig.exe is the only visible file on the device.(Citation: 2025_IBM_PUBLOAD_TONESHELL_HIUPAN_CLAIMLOADER_MUSTANG PANDA)(Citation: Trend Micro MUSTANG PANDA PUBLOAD HIUPAN SEPTEMBER 2024)

T1570Lateral Tool TransferEvidence1

USBfect is a worm that spreads via removable media, often used to propagate PUBLOAD for lateral movement.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

2 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

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This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching2Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors3Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping11Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.