HOOK
Hook is an Android banking trojan descended from ERMAC and advertised alongside ERMAC by the threat actor DukeEugene. Multiple sources in the content describe it as one of the most capable Android banking trojans in active circulation. Hook combines traditional banking-trojan overlay injection attacks with VNC-based remote control, enabling hands-on control of infected Android devices. NCC Group concluded that Hook is based on ERMAC source code rather than being written from scratch, and reported that it adds 38 additional commands over ERMAC, including screen streaming, front-camera photo capture, Google login cookie theft, and expanded cryptocurrency wallet recovery-seed theft.
The malware’s documented capabilities include SMS theft, call control, contact theft, keylogging, Gmail data theft, screenshots, application control, location tracking, WhatsApp messaging, USSD execution, seed phrase theft, push-notification spoofing, Android AccountManager theft, VNC remote access, file management, phishing overlays, arbitrary URL opening, and self-destruct functionality. Researchers analyzing a live Hook command-and-control panel also identified frontend routes and command vocabulary associated with banks, cards, cryptocurrency, email, injections, stealer, wallet, statistics, and user management, reinforcing its role as a full-featured Android banking malware platform.
A live Hook C2 panel was analyzed at 31.57.216.126 on 2026-03-07. The infrastructure exposed an nginx-hosted React frontend on port 80, a Laravel/PHP API backend on port 8089, a Socket.IO event service on port 3434, a WebSocket service for VNC and file management on port 8000, and an internet-exposed MySQL 8.0.31 database on port 3306. The panel supported English, Turkish, Russian, and Traditional Chinese. Researchers confirmed 24 live API endpoints and observed weak operational security, including unauthenticated Socket.IO access, an API route lacking authentication middleware, fully open CORS, and direct MySQL exposure. The backend appeared impaired by a database failure at the time of analysis, likely rendering that C2 temporarily inert.
The content also places Hook in the broader Android banking-malware ecosystem. It is cited as a leading Android malware family in 2024 and 2026 reporting, and as part of a wave of Android bankers using overlay-based credential theft, Accessibility abuse, and remote-control features. Recorded Future observed thousands of malicious files with antivirus signature names such as Hydra, Hook, and Sova every quarter. ThreatFox historical data linked Hook activity to port 9679 on Oracle Cloud IP 143.47.53.106 on 2026-02-05, and another report noted a dark-web rental offering for a Hook Android botnet at $5,000 per month, advertised as compatible with the latest Android versions and offered with a free beta test.
High-confidence indicators and infrastructure mentioned in the content include the Hook C2 IP 31.57.216.126, the hardcoded Socket.IO URL http://31.57.216.126:3434/, and historical ThreatFox linkage to 143.47.53.106 on port 9679.
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Groups observed using it
2 distinct threat actors attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
The mobile threat landscape has been shaped over the years by well-established banking Trojan families such as Anatsa, Octo, Hook...
...two Android-based malware families advertised by threat actor DukeEugene, known as Hook and ERMAC.
Techniques & procedures
5 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Persistence
1 technique
Persistence
Once installed, Crocodilus requests Accessibility Service to be enabled. Once granted, the malware connects to the command-and-control (C2) server to receive instructions... Another data theft feature of Crocodilus is a keylogger. However, it is more accurate to call it an Accessibility Logger – the malware monitors all Accessibility events and captures all the elements displayed on the screen.
Privilege Escalation
1 technique
Privilege Escalation
Once installed, Crocodilus requests Accessibility Service to be enabled. Once granted, the malware connects to the command-and-control (C2) server to receive instructions... Another data theft feature of Crocodilus is a keylogger. However, it is more accurate to call it an Accessibility Logger – the malware monitors all Accessibility events and captures all the elements displayed on the screen.
Credential Access
2 techniques
Credential Access
Collection
1 technique
Collection
Command and Control
2 techniques
Command and Control
IOCs tracked for this family
5 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.
IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.
Other indicator types observed in public reporting.
Recent activity
10 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Referenced as an Android banking trojan with 107 commands and a similar playbook involving fake-app droppers, Accessibility abuse, and HTML overlays.
An Android banking trojan observed on the same multi-RAT host, used for banking fraud within the operator's diversified malware portfolio.
Android banking trojan with overlay injection, VNC-based remote control, keylogging, SMS interception, call control, screenshot capture, file management, phishing via smart injections, credential theft, and cryptocurrency/seed phrase theft.
Android banking trojan variant adding ransomware-style full-screen overlays for extortion and expanded remote command set.
The version that knows your environment.
Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.