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Malware2 associated actors

HOOK

Tracked since Nov 25, 2025 · Updated 19 days ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 days1 mention · peak 1 in a dayToday
Vulns0Associated
Actors2Associated
ATT&CK11Techniques
IOCs135Tracked
Type
Banking trojan
Capabilities
Credential theftSession hijackingKeyloggingExfiltrationReconnaissanceCrypto theft
Delivery
Landing page
Platforms
Android

Hook is an Android banking trojan derived from ERMAC and developed and marketed by the threat actor DukeEugene. Advertised since January 2023 and offered through a malware-as-a-service model, it targets banking, financial-service, and cryptocurrency applications worldwide. Hook combines credential-stealing overlays with extensive remote-control capabilities, enabling operators to take over infected devices and execute fraudulent transactions within legitimate applications.

Hook abuses Android Accessibility Services to provide VNC-style screen viewing and remote interaction, including taps, swipes, text entry, unlocking, and screenshot capture. Its data-theft functions include keylogging, SMS and contact theft, Google login cookie theft, cryptocurrency wallet recovery-seed theft, and file retrieval. Operators can enumerate installed applications and stored images, collect device location when permissions permit, control calls, execute USSD requests, and interact with WhatsApp to read and send messages. These capabilities support financial fraud, account takeover, and surveillance.

Hook retains substantial ERMAC code while expanding its command set and device-control functionality. It retrieves application-targeting information from command-and-control infrastructure and supports HTTP and Socket.IO-based WebSocket communications for real-time operations. Command-and-control traffic uses AES-256-CBC encryption and Base64 encoding. Its combination of overlays, authentication-data theft, and direct device control allows criminals to carry out the fraud chain through transaction execution without relying on a separate remote-access tool.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

2 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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DukeEugene

Based on the malware’s panel, we named this malware variant Hook. ... Hook now joins the very dangerous ranks of malware which is able to perform a full attack chain from infection to fraudulent transaction.

via threatfabric blogthreatfabric.com
sybra

The mobile threat landscape has been shaped over the years by well-established banking Trojan families such as Anatsa, Octo, Hook...

via threatfabricthreatfabric.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

11 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

1 technique
T1566PhishingEvidence1

This technique could be used by actors to spread the malware to other victims, via a channel that is regarded as less threatening by users.

Persistence

1 technique
T1546.008Accessibility FeaturesEvidence2

In the case of Hook, this is implemented using the Accessibility Services to interact with the different UI elements required to perform a wide array of operations.

Privilege Escalation

1 technique
T1546.008Accessibility FeaturesEvidence2

In the case of Hook, this is implemented using the Accessibility Services to interact with the different UI elements required to perform a wide array of operations.

Credential Access

2 techniques
T1056Input CaptureEvidence2

startInject Triggers the overlay attack against the specified application | The malware is capable of performing a wide array of operations on the device, from simulating clicks, to filling text boxes, and performing gestures.

T1539Steal Web Session CookieEvidence1

"stealing of cookies related to Google login sessions"

Discovery

1 technique
T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence1

Based on the parameter received, the malware either sends back to the server the full list of the files available on the device

Collection

3 techniques
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence1

the malware either sends back to the server the full list of the files available on the device, or downloads a specific file from the file system

T1056Input CaptureEvidence2

startInject Triggers the overlay attack against the specified application | The malware is capable of performing a wide array of operations on the device, from simulating clicks, to filling text boxes, and performing gestures.

T1113Screen CaptureEvidence1

takescreenshot takes a screenshot

Command and Control

3 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence2

One modification that was done with this new malware variant, was the introduction of WebSocket communication in addition to the HTTP traffic used in the previous Ermac variants.

T1219Remote Access ToolsEvidence1

The most important addition in terms of capabilities comes in the form of what criminals call VNC... In the case of Hook, this is implemented using the Accessibility Services to interact with the different UI elements required to perform a wide array of operations.

T1572Protocol TunnelingEvidence1

The operator hides behind LocaltoNet tunneling to rotate C2 endpoints without moving servers ... LocaltoNet is a legitimate port-forwarding service similar to ngrok.

Impact

1 technique
T1657Financial TheftEvidence1

“Modern banking malware focuses on initiating fraudulent transactions directly from a user’s device” and “76% provide transaction takeover capabilities.”

Indicators of compromise

Observables

135 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Activity feed

Recent activity

17 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching135Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors2Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping11Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.