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Hook is an Android banking trojan derived from the ERMAC codebase and associated with the threat actor DukeEugene. It targets banking applications, cryptocurrency wallets, and other financial services across multiple regions. Hook combines credential-harvesting overlays and keylogging with Android Accessibility Services abuse to support full device takeover and fraudulent transaction execution. Its remote-control functionality, often marketed as VNC, can simulate user interface actions, capture screenshots, enter text, unlock devices, and otherwise operate victim devices interactively. Hook can also steal SMS messages, contacts, files, geolocation data, cryptocurrency-wallet recovery phrases, and authentication-related data, and includes functions for call forwarding, USSD execution, and WhatsApp interaction. It communicates with command-and-control infrastructure using HTTP and WebSocket-based channels, enabling real-time operator control, file management, and remote fraud operations. Hook has been offered as a botnet rental service and represents a mature malware-as-a-service-oriented Android financial-fraud threat.
Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.
2 distinct threat actors attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
Based on the malware’s panel, we named this malware variant Hook. ... Hook now joins the very dangerous ranks of malware which is able to perform a full attack chain from infection to fraudulent transaction.
The mobile threat landscape has been shaped over the years by well-established banking Trojan families such as Anatsa, Octo, Hook...
11 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
the malware either sends back to the server the full list of the files available on the device, or downloads a specific file from the file system
One modification that was done with this new malware variant, was the introduction of WebSocket communication in addition to the HTTP traffic used in the previous Ermac variants.
131 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.
IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.
File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.
Other indicator types observed in public reporting.
16 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Mobile banking malware family among the three families collectively targeting 60% of global financial applications.
Referenced as an Android banking trojan with 107 commands and a similar playbook involving fake-app droppers, Accessibility abuse, and HTML overlays.
An Android banking trojan observed on the same multi-RAT host, used for banking fraud within the operator's diversified malware portfolio.
Android banking trojan with overlay injection, VNC-based remote control, keylogging, SMS interception, call control, screenshot capture, file management, phishing via smart injections, credential theft, and cryptocurrency/seed phrase theft.
Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.