Kongtuke
- Type
- Loader
- Capabilities
- Initial accessPersistenceDefense evasion
- Delivery
- Landing pageLureClickfix
- Platforms
- Windows
KongTuke is a traffic distribution system (TDS), also tracked as TAG-124 and js.LandUpdate808, that compromises WordPress websites and injects JavaScript to route visitors into staged malware-delivery workflows. First observed in 2024, it commonly presents fake CAPTCHA or browser-verification lures that use ClickFix or FileFix social engineering to induce victims to paste and execute attacker-supplied commands. These commands retrieve and execute subsequent payloads, making KongTuke a delivery framework rather than a single fixed final-stage payload.
KongTuke operations have delivered a range of malware, including loaders, Node.js backdoors and RATs, and ransomware-associated payloads. Observed Windows-focused chains have abused DLL sideloading with legitimate signed Firefox binaries and Rust-based DLLs masquerading as Firefox components. These components include loader, persistence, and command-and-control functions. KongTuke infrastructure has used HTTPS beaconing and domain-generation techniques to rotate command-and-control destinations. Some campaigns have also used blockchain-based configuration retrieval to make infrastructure rotation and static detection more difficult.
KongTuke is primarily associated with compromised websites, especially WordPress installations, and targets their visitors through convincing verification-themed landing pages. No specific threat actor attribution is established with high confidence.
Techniques & procedures
13 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Resource Development
1 technique
Resource Development
Domains including sceuppe[.]com, windlrr[.]com, and nitzschi[.]com were used to stage and deliver the ClickFix chain.
Initial Access
1 technique
Initial Access
Compromised WordPress sites served attacker-controlled JavaScript to visiting users as part of the ClickFix chain.
Execution
4 techniques
Execution
In most scenarios, once users interact with the Fix or Verify button in the lure, the button will covertly copy an obfuscated PowerShell command to the clipboard and present the user with “verification steps.”
Recent weeks have seen a rise in ClickFix social engineering campaigns delivering the KongTuke malware through DLL sideloading.
KongTuke ClickFix, a fake verification (“paste this to prove you’re human”) lure that runs a hidden conhost --headless cmd one liner.
The ClickFix command is then retrieved from hXXps://windlrr[.]com/c?tk=<token> ... The command is automatically copied to the clipboard.
Persistence
1 technique
Persistence
The threat actor issued the same command 217 times, deploying a malicious WordPress plugin z.php to all compromised sites.
Stealth
1 technique
Stealth
The malicious DLLs are written in Rust and disguised as legitimate Firefox components.
Collection
1 technique
Collection
the button will covertly copy an obfuscated PowerShell command to the clipboard and present the user with “verification steps.”
Command and Control
4 techniques
Command and Control
The malware communicates with its C2 servers over HTTPS, beaconing approximately every 30 seconds
HTTP/S was used for panel APIs, JS staging, challenge/response traffic, and ClickFix command retrieval.
By following the “verification steps,” the user inadvertently runs the command and additional commands will reach out and download malware or tools.
KongTuke uses a domain generation algorithm (DGA) to create C2 domains using infrastructure- and security-related words, numbers, and .com, .net, and .lol TLDs.
Observables
223 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.
Recent activity
15 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.