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Mallory
Malware

Kongtuke

Tracked since Nov 25, 2025 · Updated 2 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors0Associated
ATT&CK13Techniques
IOCs223Tracked
Type
Loader
Capabilities
Initial accessPersistenceDefense evasion
Delivery
Landing pageLureClickfix
Platforms
Windows

KongTuke is a traffic distribution system (TDS), also tracked as TAG-124 and js.LandUpdate808, that compromises WordPress websites and injects JavaScript to route visitors into staged malware-delivery workflows. First observed in 2024, it commonly presents fake CAPTCHA or browser-verification lures that use ClickFix or FileFix social engineering to induce victims to paste and execute attacker-supplied commands. These commands retrieve and execute subsequent payloads, making KongTuke a delivery framework rather than a single fixed final-stage payload.

KongTuke operations have delivered a range of malware, including loaders, Node.js backdoors and RATs, and ransomware-associated payloads. Observed Windows-focused chains have abused DLL sideloading with legitimate signed Firefox binaries and Rust-based DLLs masquerading as Firefox components. These components include loader, persistence, and command-and-control functions. KongTuke infrastructure has used HTTPS beaconing and domain-generation techniques to rotate command-and-control destinations. Some campaigns have also used blockchain-based configuration retrieval to make infrastructure rotation and static detection more difficult.

KongTuke is primarily associated with compromised websites, especially WordPress installations, and targets their visitors through convincing verification-themed landing pages. No specific threat actor attribution is established with high confidence.

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MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

13 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Resource Development

1 technique
T1583.001DomainsEvidence1

Domains including sceuppe[.]com, windlrr[.]com, and nitzschi[.]com were used to stage and deliver the ClickFix chain.

Initial Access

1 technique
T1189Drive-by CompromiseEvidence1

Compromised WordPress sites served attacker-controlled JavaScript to visiting users as part of the ClickFix chain.

Execution

4 techniques
T1059.001PowerShellEvidence1

In most scenarios, once users interact with the Fix or Verify button in the lure, the button will covertly copy an obfuscated PowerShell command to the clipboard and present the user with “verification steps.”

T1204User ExecutionEvidence2

Recent weeks have seen a rise in ClickFix social engineering campaigns delivering the KongTuke malware through DLL sideloading.

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence1

KongTuke ClickFix, a fake verification (“paste this to prove you’re human”) lure that runs a hidden conhost --headless cmd one liner.

T1204.004Malicious Copy and PasteEvidence1

The ClickFix command is then retrieved from hXXps://windlrr[.]com/c?tk=<token> ... The command is automatically copied to the clipboard.

Persistence

1 technique
T1505Server Software ComponentEvidence1

The threat actor issued the same command 217 times, deploying a malicious WordPress plugin z.php to all compromised sites.

Stealth

1 technique
T1036MasqueradingEvidence2

The malicious DLLs are written in Rust and disguised as legitimate Firefox components.

Collection

1 technique
T1115Clipboard DataEvidence1

the button will covertly copy an obfuscated PowerShell command to the clipboard and present the user with “verification steps.”

Command and Control

4 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

The malware communicates with its C2 servers over HTTPS, beaconing approximately every 30 seconds

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence1

HTTP/S was used for panel APIs, JS staging, challenge/response traffic, and ClickFix command retrieval.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

By following the “verification steps,” the user inadvertently runs the command and additional commands will reach out and download malware or tools.

T1568Dynamic ResolutionEvidence1

KongTuke uses a domain generation algorithm (DGA) to create C2 domains using infrastructure- and security-related words, numbers, and .com, .net, and .lol TLDs.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

223 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Activity feed

Recent activity

15 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching223Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actorsGroups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping13Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.