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Mallory
MalwareRansomware

MegaCortex

MegaCortex is a ransomware family. The provided content describes it as being used to kill endpoint security processes, enable SeDebugPrivilege and adjust token privileges, and terminate processes via Win32 APIs including TerminateProcess() and CreateRemoteThread after privilege escalation. It loads injecthelper.dll into a newly created rundll32.exe process and uses rundll32.exe to load a DLL for file encryption. For encryption, the malware has used the open-source Mbed Crypto library and generated AES keys. It also deletes Volume Shadow Copies using vssadmin.exe and can wipe deleted data from all drives using cipher.exe, indicating efforts to inhibit recovery and destroy residual data. The malware has added Registry entries containing ransom contact information. The content also links MegaCortex to process kill lists observed alongside multiple ransomware families in research on financially motivated actors and OT-related tradecraft. Separately, U.S. Department of Justice charging documents cited in the content identify Ukrainian national Volodymyr Viktorovich Tymoshchuk as an administrator of the LockerGoga, MegaCortex, and Nefilim ransomware operations, and state that from 2019 to 2021 he and accomplices breached more than 250 companies worldwide, stealing millions and disrupting critical services. The content further notes that MegaCortex was advertised as a ransomware-as-a-service strain, and that some security vendors have suggested an association between LockBit and the now-defunct Gogalocker and MegaCortex, though no stronger attribution detail is provided here.

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MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

20 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Resource Development

1 technique
T1588.003Code Signing CertificatesEvidence1

Execution

2 techniques
T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence3

APT1 has used the Windows command shell to execute commands, and batch scripting to automate execution. Blue Mockingbird has used batch script files to automate execution and deployment of payloads. During HomeLand Justice, threat actors used Windows batch files for persistence and execution.

T1106Native APIEvidence1

Persistence

1 technique
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence5

The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware modifying, creating, deleting, or storing data in Windows Registry keys and values for persistence, configuration storage, defense evasion, credential access, privilege escalation, and execution.

Privilege Escalation

3 techniques
T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

"APT37 leverages the Windows API calls: VirtualAlloc(), WriteProcessMemory(), and CreateRemoteThread() for process injection"; "IcedID has called ZwWriteVirtualMemory... ZwQueueApcThread... to inject itself into a remote process"; "Havoc can use NtAllocateVirtualMemory and NtCreateThreadEx to aid process injection"

T1055.001Dynamic-link Library InjectionEvidence1
T1134Access Token ManipulationEvidence1

Stealth

6 techniques
T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

"APT37 leverages the Windows API calls: VirtualAlloc(), WriteProcessMemory(), and CreateRemoteThread() for process injection"; "IcedID has called ZwWriteVirtualMemory... ZwQueueApcThread... to inject itself into a remote process"; "Havoc can use NtAllocateVirtualMemory and NtCreateThreadEx to aid process injection"

T1055.001Dynamic-link Library InjectionEvidence1
T1134Access Token ManipulationEvidence1
T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence5

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors decoding, decrypting, deobfuscating, or unpacking payloads, strings, configuration data, commands, and C2 responses prior to execution or use.

T1218.011Rundll32Evidence1
T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

Defense Impairment

1 technique
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence5

The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware modifying, creating, deleting, or storing data in Windows Registry keys and values for persistence, configuration storage, defense evasion, credential access, privilege escalation, and execution.

Discovery

3 techniques
T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence1

FireEye Mandiant originally explored the link between financially motivated actors and OT in July 2020, when researchers found process kill lists deployed alongside seven different ransomware families... The second kill list was deployed alongside Clop ransomware.

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence4

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors listing files and directories, enumerating drives, searching for files by extension/name/path, retrieving file metadata, and browsing file systems (for example: "APT28 has used Forfiles to locate PDF, Excel, and Word documents during collection" and "cmd can be used to find files and directories with native functionality such as dir commands").

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

Impact

6 techniques
T1486Data Encrypted for ImpactEvidence4

Numerous ransomware/wiper examples enumerate files before encryption, such as "BlackCat can enumerate files for encryption", "NotPetya searches for files ending with dozens of different file extensions prior to encryption", and "WastedLocker can enumerate files and directories just prior to encryption."

T1489Service StopEvidence1
T1490Inhibit System RecoveryEvidence4

Akira will delete system volume shadow copies via PowerShell commands. Avaddon deletes backups and shadow copies using native system tools. Babuk has the ability to delete shadow volumes using vssadmin.exe delete shadows /all /quiet. BlackCat can delete shadow copies using vssadmin.exe delete shadows /all /quiet and wmic.exe Shadowcopy Delete; it can also modify the boot loader using bcdedit /set {default} recoveryenabled No.

T1529System Shutdown/RebootEvidence1

The process kill lists were designed to amplify the effects of known ransomware strains.

T1531Account Access RemovalEvidence1
T1561.001Disk Content WipeEvidence1

Other

2 techniques
T1562Impair DefensesEvidence2

The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware disabling, stopping, uninstalling, or modifying antivirus, EDR, Windows Defender, AMSI, logging, and other security controls.

T1562.001Disable or Modify ToolsEvidence2

Examples include 'Aquatic Panda has attempted to stop endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools', 'BlackByte disabled security tools such as Windows Defender', 'Scattered Spider has uninstalled and disabled security tools', and many malware families terminating AV/EDR processes or services.

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Threat actor attribution

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping20

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.