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Malware2 associated actors1 associated CVE

MegaCortex

Tracked since Nov 25, 2025 · Updated 18 days ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 days4 mentions · peak 2 in a dayToday
Vulns1Associated
Actors2Associated
ATT&CK40Techniques
IOCs15Tracked
Type
Ransomware
Capabilities
ExtortionDefense evasionProcess injection
Delivery
Phishing
Platforms
Windows

MegaCortex is Windows ransomware first discovered in May 2019 and used in targeted attacks against enterprise networks. It encrypts files to extort payment and disrupt business operations. Deployment has involved QakBot-mediated access and attacker-controlled remote execution using PsExec. Infections have also occurred on systems already compromised by Emotet. U.S. authorities have accused Volodymyr Tymoshchuk of administering MegaCortex operations alongside LockerGoga and Nefilim operations targeting companies internationally.

MegaCortex uses the Mbed Crypto library and AES keys for file encryption. Analyzed versions decrypt an embedded DLL directly into memory and coordinate file encryption through parent and child processes using shared memory. Short-lived encryption workers process small batches of files before terminating, reducing sustained encryption activity within individual processes. The ransomware targets hundreds of security, backup, and other services and processes for termination or disabling, frequently delegating these operations to legitimate Windows utilities. It excludes selected operating-system files and directories to preserve system functionality, then deletes volume shadow copies and wipes free disk space to obstruct recovery.

Later versions introduced additional evasion and disruption techniques. Version 3 manually maps the Windows native API library to bypass user-mode API hooks. Version 4 separates file scanning and encryption into distinct DLL components and uses legitimate Windows host processes; MegaCortex has also demonstrated DLL injection into newly created processes. It can change account passwords and log users off, preventing access with their previous credentials. Although version 4 ransom demands threaten publication of stolen information, data exfiltration is not an established capability of the analyzed ransomware itself.

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Associated CVEs

Associated vulnerabilities

1 CVE Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

CVE-2019-3396via web archiveServer-side template injection and RCE in Atlassian Confluence Widget ConnectorCVE-2019-3396 — Gandcrab, Lockergoga, Megacortex.View vulnerability →Source ↗
Threat actors

Associated threat actors

2 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Volodymyr Tymoshchuk

The court found the unnamed Ukrainian man to be the lead developer of the LockerGoga, MegaCortex, and Nefilim ransomware families.

via bitdefender blogbitdefender.com
Oleksandr Ieremenko

Les attaques ont utilisé trois familles de ransomware : LockerGoga, MegaCortex, Nefilim.

via cyberveillecyberveille.ch
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

40 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Resource Development

1 technique
T1588.003Code Signing CertificatesEvidence3

[MegaCortex](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0576) has used code signing certificates issued to fake companies to bypass security controls.(Citation: IBM MegaCortex)

Initial Access

3 techniques
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence4

La section « TTPs et IOCs détectés » associe explicitement T1078 — Valid Accounts aux attaques attribuées à Oleksandr Ieremenko.

T1190Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationEvidence3

La section « TTPs et IOCs détectés » associe explicitement T1190 — Exploit Public-Facing Application aux attaques attribuées à Oleksandr Ieremenko.

T1566PhishingEvidence3

Some of these criminals were dealing with the penetration effort, using multiple mechanisms to compromise IT networks, including brute force attacks, SQL injections, stolen credentials and phishing emails with malicious attachments.

Execution

3 techniques
T1059.001PowerShellEvidence2

This tool allows the attackers to deploy "beacons" on a compromised device to "create shells, execute PowerShell scripts, perform privilege escalation, or spawn a new session to create a listener on the victim system."

T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence9

[MegaCortex](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0576) has used <code>.cmd</code> scripts on the victim's system.(Citation: IBM MegaCortex)

T1106Native APIEvidence4

After escalating privileges, [MegaCortex](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0576) calls <code>TerminateProcess()</code>, <code>CreateRemoteThread</code>, and other Win32 APIs.(Citation: IBM MegaCortex)

Persistence

3 techniques
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence4

La section « TTPs et IOCs détectés » associe explicitement T1078 — Valid Accounts aux attaques attribuées à Oleksandr Ieremenko.

T1098Account ManipulationEvidence1

Further analysis of the code by Kremez confirmed that MegaCortex is indeed changing the password for the victim's Windows account. It does this by executing the net user command when the ransomware is executed.

T1112Modify RegistryEvidence9

[MegaCortex](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0576) has added entries to the Registry for ransom contact information.(Citation: IBM MegaCortex)

Privilege Escalation

5 techniques
T1055Process InjectionEvidence4

APT37 leverages the Windows API calls: VirtualAlloc(), WriteProcessMemory(), and CreateRemoteThread() for process injection.

T1055.001Dynamic-link Library InjectionEvidence3

[MegaCortex](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0576) loads <code>injecthelper.dll</code> into a newly created <code>rundll32.exe</code> process.(Citation: IBM MegaCortex)

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence4

La section « TTPs et IOCs détectés » associe explicitement T1078 — Valid Accounts aux attaques attribuées à Oleksandr Ieremenko.

T1098Account ManipulationEvidence1

Further analysis of the code by Kremez confirmed that MegaCortex is indeed changing the password for the victim's Windows account. It does this by executing the net user command when the ransomware is executed.

T1134Access Token ManipulationEvidence3

[MegaCortex](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0576) can enable <code>SeDebugPrivilege</code> and adjust token privileges.(Citation: IBM MegaCortex)

Stealth

11 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

a particular base64 encoded string would need to be provided in order for the ransomware to extract and inject a DLL into memory.

T1055Process InjectionEvidence4

APT37 leverages the Windows API calls: VirtualAlloc(), WriteProcessMemory(), and CreateRemoteThread() for process injection.

T1055.001Dynamic-link Library InjectionEvidence3

[MegaCortex](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0576) loads <code>injecthelper.dll</code> into a newly created <code>rundll32.exe</code> process.(Citation: IBM MegaCortex)

T1070.004File DeletionEvidence2

there are references to the Windows Cipher /W: command, which is used to overwrite deleted data so that it cannot be recovered using file recovery software.

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence4

La section « TTPs et IOCs détectés » associe explicitement T1078 — Valid Accounts aux attaques attribuées à Oleksandr Ieremenko.

T1134Access Token ManipulationEvidence3

[MegaCortex](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0576) can enable <code>SeDebugPrivilege</code> and adjust token privileges.(Citation: IBM MegaCortex)

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence8

[MegaCortex](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0576) has used a Base64 key to decode its components.(Citation: IBM MegaCortex)

T1218System Binary Proxy ExecutionEvidence1

The threat actors will also use a variety of LOLBins and legitimate software such as 7-Zip, PowerShell scripts, wmic, nslookup, adfind.exe, mstds.exe, Mimikatz, Ntsdutil.exe, and massscan.exe.

T1218.011Rundll32Evidence4

[MegaCortex](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0576) has used <code>rundll32.exe</code> to load a DLL for file encryption.(Citation: IBM MegaCortex)

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

Other upgrades in version 2.0 include anti-analysis features within the main malware module

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence3

[MegaCortex](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0576) has checked the number of CPUs in the system to avoid being run in a sandbox or emulator.(Citation: IBM MegaCortex)

Defense Impairment

2 techniques
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence9

[MegaCortex](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0576) has added entries to the Registry for ransom contact information.(Citation: IBM MegaCortex)

T1685Disable or Modify ToolsEvidence8

[MegaCortex](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0576) was used to kill endpoint security processes.(Citation: IBM MegaCortex)

Credential Access

2 techniques
T1003OS Credential DumpingEvidence1

The threat actors will also use a variety of LOLBins and legitimate software such as 7-Zip, PowerShell scripts, wmic, nslookup, adfind.exe, mstds.exe, Mimikatz, Ntsdutil.exe, and massscan.exe.

T1110Brute ForceEvidence1

Some of these criminals were dealing with the penetration effort, using multiple mechanisms to compromise IT networks, including brute force attacks, SQL injections, stolen credentials and phishing emails with malicious attachments.

Discovery

7 techniques
T1016System Network Configuration DiscoveryEvidence1

The threat actors will also use a variety of LOLBins and legitimate software such as ... nslookup...

T1046Network Service DiscoveryEvidence1

The threat actors will also use a variety of LOLBins and legitimate software such as ... massscan.exe.

T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence1

FireEye Mandiant originally explored the link between financially motivated actors and OT in July 2020, when researchers found process kill lists deployed alongside seven different ransomware families... The second kill list was deployed alongside Clop ransomware.

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence8

[MegaCortex](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0576) can parse the available drives and directories to determine which files to encrypt.(Citation: IBM MegaCortex)

T1482Domain Trust DiscoveryEvidence1

The threat actors will also use a variety of LOLBins and legitimate software such as ... adfind.exe...

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

Other upgrades in version 2.0 include anti-analysis features within the main malware module

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence3

[MegaCortex](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0576) has checked the number of CPUs in the system to avoid being run in a sandbox or emulator.(Citation: IBM MegaCortex)

Lateral Movement

1 technique
T1021Remote ServicesEvidence2

Once the MegaCortex actors gain access, they then push the ransomware out to machines on the network via an active directory controller or post-exploitation kits.

Collection

1 technique
T1560Archive Collected DataEvidence1

The threat actors will also use a variety of LOLBins and legitimate software such as 7-Zip...

Command and Control

1 technique
T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence3

The response can be a simple acknowledgment or a longer set of instructions, a module or executable... In many cases the C2 server response only contains an updated version of the binary... If the victim is infected with the latest version of Emotet... the latest modules are downloaded.

Exfiltration

2 techniques
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence2

Stadler Rail : intrusion en 2020, exfiltration de données, chiffrement des systèmes

T1537Transfer Data to Cloud AccountEvidence1

...an unnamed cybercriminal group that hacked corporate networks, stole data and encrypted systems to extort victims.

Impact

8 techniques
T1486Data Encrypted for ImpactEvidence23

[MegaCortex](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0576) has used the open-source library, Mbed Crypto, and generated AES keys to carry out the file encryption process.(Citation: IBM MegaCortex)(Citation: mbed-crypto)

T1489Service StopEvidence4

[MegaCortex](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0576) can stop and disable services on the system.(Citation: IBM MegaCortex)

T1490Inhibit System RecoveryEvidence9

[MegaCortex](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0576) has deleted volume shadow copies using <code>vssadmin.exe</code>.(Citation: IBM MegaCortex)

T1529System Shutdown/RebootEvidence1

The process kill lists were designed to amplify the effects of known ransomware strains.

T1531Account Access RemovalEvidence4

[MegaCortex](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0576) has changed user account passwords and logged users off the system.(Citation: IBM MegaCortex)

T1561.001Disk Content WipeEvidence3

[MegaCortex](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0576) can wipe deleted data from all drives using <code>[cipher.exe](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1205)</code>.(Citation: IBM MegaCortex)

T1565Data ManipulationEvidence1

Les charges retenues par le Ministère public incluent : ... Détérioration grave de données

T1657Financial TheftEvidence2

rançon de 6 millions de dollars en bitcoins exigée

Indicators of compromise

Observables

15 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Activity feed

Recent activity

87 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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Mallory platform

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IOC matching15Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors2Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilities1CVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping40Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.