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Malware3 associated actors

PUBLOAD

Tracked since Nov 25, 2025 · Updated 19 days ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors3Associated
ATT&CK59Techniques
IOCs14Tracked
Type
Downloader
Capabilities
PersistenceDefense evasionReconnaissanceDLL sideloadingPost exploitationExfiltrationSpoofing
Delivery
SpearphishingLureUSB
Platforms
Windows
Also known asnofive

PUBLOAD is a Windows downloader and shellcode stager associated with the China-aligned cyberespionage group Mustang Panda, also tracked as Earth Preta and Stately Taurus. Publicly disclosed in May 2022, it has been used against government and related organizations in the Asia-Pacific region, particularly Southeast Asia. It retrieves and executes additional payloads from command-and-control servers and has delivered PlugX, FDMTP, and other tools. In some operations, PUBLOAD also serves as the primary control tool for reconnaissance, document collection, and exfiltration.

PUBLOAD is distributed through spear-phishing campaigns using geopolitical decoys and malicious archives. Delivery chains have included Google Drive links embedded in decoy documents and password-protected archives. HIUPAN worm variants also distribute PUBLOAD through removable drives. Execution commonly relies on legitimate executables loading malicious DLLs through DLL sideloading. PUBLOAD establishes persistence through registry autorun entries and scheduled tasks.

The malware decrypts and executes shellcode in memory, including through Windows callback APIs. Variants use AES, RC4, or XOR protection at different stages. Command-and-control implementations include raw TCP traffic imitating TLS and HTTP POST requests, with spoofed headers and Windows Update-like traffic used to conceal communications. Initial beacons convey encrypted host and user information.

As a control tool, PUBLOAD invokes Windows utilities to enumerate host configuration, users, processes, network connections, startup entries, disks, and installed security products. It executes RAR to collect selected documents into archives and cURL to transfer them to attacker-controlled FTP infrastructure. Some deployments supplement these functions with FDMTP for secondary control and PTSOCKET for alternative file transfer.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

3 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Mustang Panda

Since October 2022, researchers observed a PUBLOAD variant using spoofed HTTP headers to conceal its communications.

via trendai security blogtrendaisecurity.com
ITG27

Associated malware families such as Toneshell, Pubload and Claimloader undergo frequent updates that enhance ITG27’s adaptability within their target environments.

via ibmibm.com
UNK_SteadySplit

UNK_SteadySplit is a user of the custom TONESHELL and PUBLOAD malware families, alongside multiple other first-stage malware families delivered in phishing campaigns.

via proofpoint threat insight blogproofpoint.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

59 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Resource Development

2 techniques
T1587.001MalwareEvidence2

They developed customized toolsets designed to collect confidential documents in the exfiltration stage.

T1608.001Upload MalwareEvidence1

The user's repositories host various malware, including the latest versions of TONEINS, TONESHELL, and a new tool, QMAGENT.

Initial Access

5 techniques
T1091Replication Through Removable MediaEvidence6

Earth Preta employed a variant of the worm HIUPAN to propagate PUBLOAD into their targets' networks via removable drives.

T1566PhishingEvidence4

Mustang Panda, also called Camaro Dragon, Earth Preta, and Stately Taurus, is believed to have targeted entities in Myanmar, the Philippines, Japan and Singapore, targeting them with phishing emails designed to deliver two malware packages.

T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence3

Throughout mid-2025, X-Force observed several weaponized archives uploaded to VirusTotal from Singapore and Thailand... The archive "CallNotes.zip" discovered in September was downloaded from Box Cloud Storage through a link in a PDF lure impersonating the Myanmar Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

T1566.002Spearphishing LinkEvidence2

The Google Drive link has now been embedded in a lure document.

T1566.003Spearphishing via ServiceEvidence1

"Pubload Backdoor Delivered via Phishing Lures"

Execution

10 techniques
T1047Windows Management InstrumentationEvidence3

[PUBLOAD](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1228) has used `wmic` to gather information from the victim device.(Citation: Trend Micro MUSTANG PANDA PUBLOAD HIUPAN SEPTEMBER 2024)

T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

“Sandworm Team leveraged Scheduled Tasks through a Group Policy Object (GPO) to execute CaddyWiper at a predetermined time.” / “APT29 used scheduler and schtasks to create new tasks on remote host as part of their lateral movement… updating an existing legitimate task to execute their tools and then returned the scheduled task to its original configuration.”

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence7

[PUBLOAD](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1228) has created scheduled tasks to maintain persistence with the command `schtasks.exe /F /Create /TN Microsoft_Licensing /sc minute /MO 1 /TR C:\\Users\\Public\\Libraries\...`(Citation: Cisco Talos MUSTANG PANDA PLUGX PUBLOAD MAY 2022)(Citation: Lab52 MUSTANG PANDA PUBLOAD MAY 2023)(Citation: 2022 November_TrendMicro_Earth Preta_Toneshell_Pubload)

T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence1

facilitate two active reverse shells in parallel... Yokai, a backdoor that sets up a reverse shell to execute arbitrary commands.

T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence6

[PUBLOAD](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1228) has used several commands executed in sequence via `cmd`. (Citation: Trend Micro MUSTANG PANDA PUBLOAD HIUPAN SEPTEMBER 2024)

T1106Native APIEvidence4

[PUBLOAD](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1228) has used various Windows API calls during execution, when establishing persistence and defense evasion.(Citation: Lab52 MUSTANG PANDA PUBLOAD MAY 2023)(Citation: 2025_IBM_PUBLOAD_TONESHELL_HIUPAN_CLAIMLOADER_MUSTANG PANDA) [PUBLOAD](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1228) stager leveraged Windows API functions with callback including `GrayStringW`, `EnumDateFormatsA`, and `LineDDA` to bypass anti-virus monitoring. (Citation: 2022 November_TrendMicro_Earth Preta_Toneshell_Pubload) [PUBLOAD](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1228) has also utilized other native windows API functions with callback functions such as `EnumChildWindows` and `EnumSystemLanguageGroupsA`. (Citation: Palo Alto Networks, Unit 42)

T1204User ExecutionEvidence1

"...a malicious archive with a document-spoofing executable, which launches the Claimloader DLL..."

T1204.001Malicious LinkEvidence2

The document lures users into downloading a malicious password-protected archive with the embedded link.

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence2

The files can then be extracted inside via the password provided in the document.

T1574.001DLLEvidence4

[PUBLOAD](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1228) has abused legitimate executables to side-load malicious DLLs.(Citation: Cisco Talos MUSTANG PANDA PLUGX PUBLOAD MAY 2022)(Citation: CSIRT CTI MUSTANG PANDA PUBLOAD TONESHELL JAN 2024)(Citation: Lab52 MUSTANG PANDA PUBLOAD MAY 2023)(Citation: 2025_IBM_PUBLOAD_TONESHELL_HIUPAN_CLAIMLOADER_MUSTANG PANDA)(Citation: 2022 November_TrendMicro_Earth Preta_Toneshell_Pubload)(Citation: Palo Alto Networks, Unit 42)(Citation: PaloAlto MUSTANG PANDA PUBLOAD MARCH 2024)

Persistence

4 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

“Sandworm Team leveraged Scheduled Tasks through a Group Policy Object (GPO) to execute CaddyWiper at a predetermined time.” / “APT29 used scheduler and schtasks to create new tasks on remote host as part of their lateral movement… updating an existing legitimate task to execute their tools and then returned the scheduled task to its original configuration.”

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence7

[PUBLOAD](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1228) has created scheduled tasks to maintain persistence with the command `schtasks.exe /F /Create /TN Microsoft_Licensing /sc minute /MO 1 /TR C:\\Users\\Public\\Libraries\...`(Citation: Cisco Talos MUSTANG PANDA PLUGX PUBLOAD MAY 2022)(Citation: Lab52 MUSTANG PANDA PUBLOAD MAY 2023)(Citation: 2022 November_TrendMicro_Earth Preta_Toneshell_Pubload)

T1205Traffic SignalingEvidence3

[PUBLOAD](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1228) has utilized a magic value in C2 communications and only executes in memory when response packets match specific values of 17 03 03.(Citation: CSIRT CTI MUSTANG PANDA PUBLOAD TONESHELL JAN 2024)(Citation: IBM MUSTANG PANDA PUBLOAD CLAIMLOADER JUNE 2025)(Citation: 2025_IBM_PUBLOAD_TONESHELL_HIUPAN_CLAIMLOADER_MUSTANG PANDA)(Citation: 2022 November_TrendMicro_Earth Preta_Toneshell_Pubload)(Citation: PaloAlto MUSTANG PANDA PUBLOAD MARCH 2024) [PUBLOAD](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1228) has also used magic bytes consisting of 46 77 4d.(Citation: CSIRT CTI MUSTANG PANDA PUBLOAD TONESHELL JAN 2024)

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence7

[PUBLOAD](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1228) has added Registry Run keys to achieve persistence using `HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run`. (Citation: Cisco Talos MUSTANG PANDA PLUGX PUBLOAD MAY 2022)(Citation: CSIRT CTI MUSTANG PANDA PUBLOAD TONESHELL JAN 2024)(Citation: Lab52 MUSTANG PANDA PUBLOAD MAY 2023)(Citation: Trend Micro MUSTANG PANDA PUBLOAD HIUPAN SEPTEMBER 2024)(Citation: 2022 November_TrendMicro_Earth Preta_Toneshell_Pubload)

Privilege Escalation

3 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

“Sandworm Team leveraged Scheduled Tasks through a Group Policy Object (GPO) to execute CaddyWiper at a predetermined time.” / “APT29 used scheduler and schtasks to create new tasks on remote host as part of their lateral movement… updating an existing legitimate task to execute their tools and then returned the scheduled task to its original configuration.”

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence7

[PUBLOAD](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1228) has created scheduled tasks to maintain persistence with the command `schtasks.exe /F /Create /TN Microsoft_Licensing /sc minute /MO 1 /TR C:\\Users\\Public\\Libraries\...`(Citation: Cisco Talos MUSTANG PANDA PLUGX PUBLOAD MAY 2022)(Citation: Lab52 MUSTANG PANDA PUBLOAD MAY 2023)(Citation: 2022 November_TrendMicro_Earth Preta_Toneshell_Pubload)

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence7

[PUBLOAD](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1228) has added Registry Run keys to achieve persistence using `HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run`. (Citation: Cisco Talos MUSTANG PANDA PLUGX PUBLOAD MAY 2022)(Citation: CSIRT CTI MUSTANG PANDA PUBLOAD TONESHELL JAN 2024)(Citation: Lab52 MUSTANG PANDA PUBLOAD MAY 2023)(Citation: Trend Micro MUSTANG PANDA PUBLOAD HIUPAN SEPTEMBER 2024)(Citation: 2022 November_TrendMicro_Earth Preta_Toneshell_Pubload)

Stealth

11 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence5

[PUBLOAD](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1228) has obfuscated DLL names using the ror13AddHash32 algorithm.(Citation: Cisco Talos MUSTANG PANDA PLUGX PUBLOAD MAY 2022)

T1027.015CompressionEvidence3

[PUBLOAD](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1228) has been delivered as compressed files within ZIP files to victims.(Citation: Lab52 MUSTANG PANDA PUBLOAD MAY 2023)(Citation: Palo Alto Networks, Unit 42)

T1036MasqueradingEvidence4

The HTTP request includes www.asia.microsoft.com within the host field as an attempt to masquerade as a legitimate request associated with the Windows operating system. Also, the URL pattern seen in these HTTP requests appears to be an attempt to mimic legitimate URLs accessed by Windows update.

T1036.005Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationEvidence4

[PUBLOAD](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1228) has renamed malicious files to mimic legitimate file names such as adobe_wf.exe.(Citation: 2022 November_TrendMicro_Earth Preta_Toneshell_Pubload)

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence7

[PUBLOAD](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1228) has decoded its payload prior to execution.(Citation: Cisco Talos MUSTANG PANDA PLUGX PUBLOAD MAY 2022)(Citation: Lab52 MUSTANG PANDA PUBLOAD MAY 2023)(Citation: 2025_IBM_PUBLOAD_TONESHELL_HIUPAN_CLAIMLOADER_MUSTANG PANDA)(Citation: 2022 November_TrendMicro_Earth Preta_Toneshell_Pubload)(Citation: Palo Alto Networks, Unit 42)

T1205Traffic SignalingEvidence3

[PUBLOAD](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1228) has utilized a magic value in C2 communications and only executes in memory when response packets match specific values of 17 03 03.(Citation: CSIRT CTI MUSTANG PANDA PUBLOAD TONESHELL JAN 2024)(Citation: IBM MUSTANG PANDA PUBLOAD CLAIMLOADER JUNE 2025)(Citation: 2025_IBM_PUBLOAD_TONESHELL_HIUPAN_CLAIMLOADER_MUSTANG PANDA)(Citation: 2022 November_TrendMicro_Earth Preta_Toneshell_Pubload)(Citation: PaloAlto MUSTANG PANDA PUBLOAD MARCH 2024) [PUBLOAD](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1228) has also used magic bytes consisting of 46 77 4d.(Citation: CSIRT CTI MUSTANG PANDA PUBLOAD TONESHELL JAN 2024)

T1218System Binary Proxy ExecutionEvidence1

The malware copies its components to a working directory... These components include: A legitimate parent process ClaimLoader itself

T1480.001Environmental KeyingEvidence3

[PUBLOAD](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1228) has utilized environmental keying in the payload to include the victim volume serial number, computer name, username, and machine’s tick count.(Citation: 2025_IBM_PUBLOAD_TONESHELL_HIUPAN_CLAIMLOADER_MUSTANG PANDA)

T1574.001DLLEvidence4

[PUBLOAD](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1228) has abused legitimate executables to side-load malicious DLLs.(Citation: Cisco Talos MUSTANG PANDA PLUGX PUBLOAD MAY 2022)(Citation: CSIRT CTI MUSTANG PANDA PUBLOAD TONESHELL JAN 2024)(Citation: Lab52 MUSTANG PANDA PUBLOAD MAY 2023)(Citation: 2025_IBM_PUBLOAD_TONESHELL_HIUPAN_CLAIMLOADER_MUSTANG PANDA)(Citation: 2022 November_TrendMicro_Earth Preta_Toneshell_Pubload)(Citation: Palo Alto Networks, Unit 42)(Citation: PaloAlto MUSTANG PANDA PUBLOAD MARCH 2024)

T1620Reflective Code LoadingEvidence1

Hive0154 was observed using a new loader to reflectively inject either Pubload or Toneshell7, as well as directly deploying the more obfuscated Toneshell8 variant.

T1622Debugger EvasionEvidence3

[PUBLOAD](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1228) has embedded debug strings with messages to distract analysts.(Citation: Cisco Talos MUSTANG PANDA PLUGX PUBLOAD MAY 2022)(Citation: 2022 November_TrendMicro_Earth Preta_Toneshell_Pubload) [PUBLOAD](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1228) has leveraged `OutputDebugStringW` and `OutputDebugStringA` functions.(Citation: 2022 November_TrendMicro_Earth Preta_Toneshell_Pubload)

Defense Impairment

1 technique
T1553.002Code SigningEvidence4

[PUBLOAD](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1228) has used valid legitimate digital signatures and certificates to evade detection.(Citation: CSIRT CTI MUSTANG PANDA PUBLOAD TONESHELL JAN 2024)

Discovery

15 techniques
T1007System Service DiscoveryEvidence4

[PUBLOAD](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1228) has leveraged `tasklist` to gather running services on victim host.(Citation: Trend Micro MUSTANG PANDA PUBLOAD HIUPAN SEPTEMBER 2024)

T1012Query RegistryEvidence3

[PUBLOAD](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1228) has queried Registry values to identify software using `reg query`.(Citation: Trend Micro MUSTANG PANDA PUBLOAD HIUPAN SEPTEMBER 2024)

T1016System Network Configuration DiscoveryEvidence5

[PUBLOAD](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1228) has obtained information about local networks through the `ipconfig /all` command.(Citation: Trend Micro MUSTANG PANDA PUBLOAD HIUPAN SEPTEMBER 2024)

T1016.001Internet Connection DiscoveryEvidence3

[PUBLOAD](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1228) has identified internet connectivity details through commands such as `tracert -h 5 -4 google.com` and `curl http://myip.ipip.net`.(Citation: Trend Micro MUSTANG PANDA PUBLOAD HIUPAN SEPTEMBER 2024)

T1016.002Wi-Fi DiscoveryEvidence3

[PUBLOAD](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1228) has collected information on Wi-Fi networks from victim hosts leveraging `netsh wlan show profiles`, `netsh wlan show interface`, and `netsh wlan show`. (Citation: Trend Micro MUSTANG PANDA PUBLOAD HIUPAN SEPTEMBER 2024)

T1033System Owner/User DiscoveryEvidence3

[PUBLOAD](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1228) has obtained the username from an infected host.(Citation: Cisco Talos MUSTANG PANDA PLUGX PUBLOAD MAY 2022)(Citation: CSIRT CTI MUSTANG PANDA PUBLOAD TONESHELL JAN 2024)(Citation: 2025_IBM_PUBLOAD_TONESHELL_HIUPAN_CLAIMLOADER_MUSTANG PANDA)(Citation: 2022 November_TrendMicro_Earth Preta_Toneshell_Pubload)

T1049System Network Connections DiscoveryEvidence5

[PUBLOAD](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1228) has used several commands executed in sequence via `cmd` in a short interval to gather information on network connections.(Citation: Trend Micro MUSTANG PANDA PUBLOAD HIUPAN SEPTEMBER 2024)

T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence4

[PUBLOAD](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1228) has used `tasklist` to gather running processes on victim host.(Citation: Trend Micro MUSTANG PANDA PUBLOAD HIUPAN SEPTEMBER 2024) [PUBLOAD](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1228) has also leveraged the `OpenEventA` Windows API function to check whether the same process was already running.(Citation: 2022 November_TrendMicro_Earth Preta_Toneshell_Pubload)

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence8

[PUBLOAD](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1228) has collected and sent system information including volume serial number, computer name, and system uptime to designated C2.(Citation: Cisco Talos MUSTANG PANDA PLUGX PUBLOAD MAY 2022)(Citation: 2025_IBM_PUBLOAD_TONESHELL_HIUPAN_CLAIMLOADER_MUSTANG PANDA) [PUBLOAD](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1228) has also used several commands executed in sequence via `cmd` in a short interval to gather system information about the infected host including `systeminfo`.(Citation: Trend Micro MUSTANG PANDA PUBLOAD HIUPAN SEPTEMBER 2024) [PUBLOAD](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1228) has decrypted shellcode that collects the computer name.(Citation: 2022 November_TrendMicro_Earth Preta_Toneshell_Pubload)

T1124System Time DiscoveryEvidence3

[PUBLOAD](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1228) has collected the machine’s tick count through the use of `GetTickCount`.(Citation: 2025_IBM_PUBLOAD_TONESHELL_HIUPAN_CLAIMLOADER_MUSTANG PANDA)

T1518Software DiscoveryEvidence4

[PUBLOAD](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1228) has used several commands executed in sequence via `cmd` in a short interval to gather software versions including querying Registry keys.(Citation: Trend Micro MUSTANG PANDA PUBLOAD HIUPAN SEPTEMBER 2024)

T1518.001Security Software DiscoveryEvidence6

[PUBLOAD](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1228) has identified AV products on an infected host using the following command: `WMIC /Node:localhost /Namespace:\\root\SecurityCenter2 Path AntiVirusProduct Get displayName /Format:List`.(Citation: Trend Micro MUSTANG PANDA PUBLOAD HIUPAN SEPTEMBER 2024)

T1614.001System Language DiscoveryEvidence4

[PUBLOAD](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1228) has checked supported languages on the compromised system.(Citation: CSIRT CTI MUSTANG PANDA PUBLOAD TONESHELL JAN 2024)

T1622Debugger EvasionEvidence3

[PUBLOAD](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1228) has embedded debug strings with messages to distract analysts.(Citation: Cisco Talos MUSTANG PANDA PLUGX PUBLOAD MAY 2022)(Citation: 2022 November_TrendMicro_Earth Preta_Toneshell_Pubload) [PUBLOAD](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1228) has leveraged `OutputDebugStringW` and `OutputDebugStringA` functions.(Citation: 2022 November_TrendMicro_Earth Preta_Toneshell_Pubload)

T1680Local Storage DiscoveryEvidence3

PUBLOAD has leveraged `wmic logicaldisk get` to map local network drives.(Citation: Trend Micro MUSTANG PANDA PUBLOAD HIUPAN SEPTEMBER 2024)

Lateral Movement

2 techniques
T1091Replication Through Removable MediaEvidence6

Earth Preta employed a variant of the worm HIUPAN to propagate PUBLOAD into their targets' networks via removable drives.

T1570Lateral Tool TransferEvidence1

USBfect is a worm that spreads via removable media, often used to propagate PUBLOAD for lateral movement.

Collection

3 techniques
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence3

FILESAC is used to search for specific file types of interest within the system.

T1560Archive Collected DataEvidence2

The captured information is compressed into an RAR archive and exfiltrated to an attacker-controlled FTP site via cURL.

T1560.001Archive via UtilityEvidence5

[PUBLOAD](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1228) has used utilities such as `WinRAR` to archive data prior to exfiltration.(Citation: Trend Micro MUSTANG PANDA PUBLOAD HIUPAN SEPTEMBER 2024)

Command and Control

9 techniques
T1001.003Protocol or Service ImpersonationEvidence3

[PUBLOAD](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1228) has modified HTTP POST requests to resemble legitimate communications.(Citation: Lab52 MUSTANG PANDA PUBLOAD MAY 2023)(Citation: Palo Alto Networks, Unit 42) PUBLOAD used FakeTLS headers in network packets to impersonate various versions of TLS protocols to blend in with legitimate network traffic. [PUBLOAD](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1228) has utilized FakeTLS headers with the bytes 17 03 03.(Citation: 2025_IBM_PUBLOAD_TONESHELL_HIUPAN_CLAIMLOADER_MUSTANG PANDA)

T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence2

The most recent Pubload variant has undergone minor changes and now supports decoy C2 servers and downloading shellcode payloads via HTTP POST in addition to raw TCP imitating TLS traffic.

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence10

[PUBLOAD](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1228) has communicated via `curl` over HTTP to identify device IP data.(Citation: Trend Micro MUSTANG PANDA PUBLOAD HIUPAN SEPTEMBER 2024) [PUBLOAD](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1228) has also utilized HTTP for a command-and-control protocol through HTTP POST.(Citation: CSIRT CTI MUSTANG PANDA PUBLOAD TONESHELL JAN 2024)(Citation: Lab52 MUSTANG PANDA PUBLOAD MAY 2023)(Citation: Palo Alto Networks, Unit 42) [PUBLOAD](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1228) has also leveraged HTTPS for C2.(Citation: 2025_IBM_PUBLOAD_TONESHELL_HIUPAN_CLAIMLOADER_MUSTANG PANDA)

T1071.002File Transfer ProtocolsEvidence3

[PUBLOAD](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1228) has used `curl` for data exfiltration over FTP.(Citation: Trend Micro MUSTANG PANDA PUBLOAD HIUPAN SEPTEMBER 2024)

T1095Non-Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

The most recent Pubload variant has undergone minor changes and now supports decoy C2 servers and downloading shellcode payloads via HTTP POST in addition to raw TCP imitating TLS traffic.

T1104Multi-Stage ChannelsEvidence2

Command and Control T1104 Multi-Stage Channels

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence5

[PUBLOAD](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1228) has acted as a stager that can download the next-stage payload from its C2 server.(Citation: Lab52 MUSTANG PANDA PUBLOAD MAY 2023)(Citation: IBM MUSTANG PANDA PUBLOAD CLAIMLOADER JUNE 2025)(Citation: 2025_IBM_PUBLOAD_TONESHELL_HIUPAN_CLAIMLOADER_MUSTANG PANDA)(Citation: 2022 November_TrendMicro_Earth Preta_Toneshell_Pubload)(Citation: Palo Alto Networks, Unit 42) [PUBLOAD](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1228) has also delivered FDMTP as a secondary control tool and PTSOCKET for exfiltration to some infected systems.(Citation: Trend Micro MUSTANG PANDA PUBLOAD HIUPAN SEPTEMBER 2024)

T1205Traffic SignalingEvidence3

[PUBLOAD](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1228) has utilized a magic value in C2 communications and only executes in memory when response packets match specific values of 17 03 03.(Citation: CSIRT CTI MUSTANG PANDA PUBLOAD TONESHELL JAN 2024)(Citation: IBM MUSTANG PANDA PUBLOAD CLAIMLOADER JUNE 2025)(Citation: 2025_IBM_PUBLOAD_TONESHELL_HIUPAN_CLAIMLOADER_MUSTANG PANDA)(Citation: 2022 November_TrendMicro_Earth Preta_Toneshell_Pubload)(Citation: PaloAlto MUSTANG PANDA PUBLOAD MARCH 2024) [PUBLOAD](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1228) has also used magic bytes consisting of 46 77 4d.(Citation: CSIRT CTI MUSTANG PANDA PUBLOAD TONESHELL JAN 2024)

T1573.001Symmetric CryptographyEvidence5

[PUBLOAD](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1228) has used RC4 encryption in C2 communications.(Citation: Cisco Talos MUSTANG PANDA PLUGX PUBLOAD MAY 2022)(Citation: CSIRT CTI MUSTANG PANDA PUBLOAD TONESHELL JAN 2024)(Citation: 2022 November_TrendMicro_Earth Preta_Toneshell_Pubload)

Exfiltration

4 techniques
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence1

PUBLOAD collected and exfiltrated critical system information... over TCP with obfuscated TLS-like headers

T1048Exfiltration Over Alternative ProtocolEvidence4

The most common one is using cURL to upload the archived files to an attacker-owned FTP site.

T1048.001Exfiltration Over Symmetric Encrypted Non-C2 ProtocolEvidence1

Thrip has used WinSCP to exfiltrate data from a targeted organization over FTP.

T1048.003Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 ProtocolEvidence3

[PUBLOAD](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1228) has leveraged `curl` for data exfiltration over FTP by uploading RAR archives containing targeted files (.doc, .docx, .xls, .xlsx, .pdf, .ppt, .pptx) to an adversary-owned FTP site.(Citation: Trend Micro MUSTANG PANDA PUBLOAD HIUPAN SEPTEMBER 2024)

Indicators of compromise

Observables

14 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
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IOC matching14Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors3Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping59Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.