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Mallory
Malware1 associated actor

HanifNet

Tracked since Nov 25, 2025 · Updated 3 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK8Techniques
IOCs8Tracked
Type
Backdoor
Capabilities
PersistencePost exploitationReconnaissance
Platforms
Windows

HanifNet is a custom unsigned .NET backdoor used by the Iranian state-aligned threat actor commonly tracked as Lemon Sandstorm, also known as Parisite, Pioneer Kitten, Fox Kitten, Rubidium, and UNC757. It was deployed during a long-running intrusion against Middle Eastern critical infrastructure as part of a broader malware ecosystem that also included HXLibrary, NeoExpressRAT, Havoc, and multiple web shells.

HanifNet is designed to maintain persistent remote access by contacting command-and-control infrastructure, retrieving tasking, and executing commands on compromised systems. Reported functionality includes remote command execution through PowerShell, file operations, and system discovery, making it suitable for post-compromise control and operator-driven espionage activity. In the observed campaign, it was launched via masqueraded scheduled tasks to blend with legitimate administrative activity and support long-term access.

The malware was used after the adversary had already obtained access to the victim environment through stolen VPN credentials and subsequent internal compromise. Its deployment formed part of a sustained, multi-phase operation focused on persistence, credential access, lateral movement, and strategic prepositioning inside critical infrastructure networks. The broader campaign targeted Middle Eastern energy and infrastructure organizations and showed strong interest in restricted and operational-technology-adjacent environments, although no confirmed disruptive OT impact was established. HanifNet is best characterized as a bespoke backdoor supporting long-dwell espionage and infrastructure prepositioning by an Iranian threat actor.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Fox Kitten

Once inside, they installed multiple web shells on public-facing web servers and deployed three backdoors—Havoc, HanifNet, and HXLibrary—to maintain long-term access. | Scheduled task runs ‘masf.exe’ with ‘ml’ as sole command line argument. FortiGuard tracks this malware as HanifNet.

via fortinetfortinet.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

8 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

2 techniques
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

beginning with VPN credential theft and progressively deepening access

T1133External Remote ServicesEvidence1

“beginning with VPN credential theft”

Execution

4 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

“Persistence was maintained through web shells and scheduled tasks …” / command lines show “schtasks /create …” and “Register-ScheduledTask …”

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

Table 11. Scheduled tasks created by the adversary throughout the reported intrusion... The heavy use of scheduled tasks to execute malware aligns with previous Lemon Sandstorm activity. | These backdoors were run using scheduled tasks.

T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence1

HanifNet, HXLibrary, and NeoExpressRAT, enabling command execution, file operations, and system discovery.

T1059.001PowerShellEvidence1

The adversary heavily used PowerShell to execute malicious commands on the compromised systems.

Persistence

5 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

“Persistence was maintained through web shells and scheduled tasks …” / command lines show “schtasks /create …” and “Register-ScheduledTask …”

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

Table 11. Scheduled tasks created by the adversary throughout the reported intrusion... The heavy use of scheduled tasks to execute malware aligns with previous Lemon Sandstorm activity. | These backdoors were run using scheduled tasks.

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

beginning with VPN credential theft and progressively deepening access

T1133External Remote ServicesEvidence1

“beginning with VPN credential theft”

T1505.003Web ShellEvidence1

“Persistence was maintained through web shells…” and “IIS-based malware designed to blend seamlessly into legitimate network traffic.”

Privilege Escalation

3 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

“Persistence was maintained through web shells and scheduled tasks …” / command lines show “schtasks /create …” and “Register-ScheduledTask …”

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

Table 11. Scheduled tasks created by the adversary throughout the reported intrusion... The heavy use of scheduled tasks to execute malware aligns with previous Lemon Sandstorm activity. | These backdoors were run using scheduled tasks.

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

beginning with VPN credential theft and progressively deepening access

Stealth

1 technique
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

beginning with VPN credential theft and progressively deepening access

Discovery

1 technique
T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence1

enabling command execution, file operations, and system discovery

Indicators of compromise

Observables

8 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching8Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping8Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.