Skip to main content
Mallory
Malware2 associated actors

DRAGSTARE

Tracked since Nov 25, 2025 · Updated 1 month ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors2Associated
ATT&CK12Techniques
IOCs2Tracked
Type
Infostealer
Capabilities
Credential theftSession hijackingExfiltrationPersistencePost exploitationDefense evasionReconnaissanceScanning
Delivery
PhishingSpearphishingLure
Platforms
Windows

DRAGSTARE, also known as NordDragonScan, is a C#/.NET information stealer for Windows used by UAC-0099, a Russia-aligned cyberespionage threat actor also tracked as Earth Sirrush. It has been deployed in campaigns targeting Ukrainian government agencies, military organizations, and defense-industrial enterprises, alongside the MATCHBOIL loader and MATCHWOK backdoor.

DRAGSTARE steals saved passwords, cookies, and browser decryption keys from Google Chrome and Mozilla Firefox, including credential extraction using Windows DPAPI. It gathers system and network information, performs subnet scanning, captures screenshots, and collects files matching selected extensions from common user folders, including the desktop, documents, and downloads. Collected files are staged and archived before exfiltration to a destination supplied by its command-and-control server. The malware also supports execution of attacker-supplied PowerShell commands.

Its evasion features include virtual-machine detection and XOR-based string obfuscation. Registry-based persistence maintains execution on compromised systems. Infection chains use targeted phishing emails, including court-summons-themed lures, that direct recipients to legitimate file-sharing services hosting nested malicious archives. An HTML Application launches obfuscated scripting that deploys MATCHBOIL, which subsequently installs DRAGSTARE and other tools. These capabilities support credential compromise, surveillance, and intelligence collection.

Is this in your environment?See whether this family's indicators match your telemetry and which of your assets are exposed to the CVEs associated with it.
Check your exposure
Threat actors

Associated threat actors

2 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

View more details →
UAC-0099

DRAGSTARE ... targets both Chrome and Firefox, and includes anti-VM checks and subnet scanning.

via trendai documentscdn.sanity.io
Earth Sirrush

DRAGSTARE ... targets both Chrome and Firefox, and includes anti-VM checks and subnet scanning.

via trendai documentscdn.sanity.io
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

12 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

2 techniques
T1566PhishingEvidence2

CERT-UA published a new advisory attributing a phishing campaign to UAC-0099... The attack starts with a phishing email carrying an image attachment.

T1566.002Spearphishing LinkEvidence1

The latest infection chain involves using email lures related to court summons to entice recipients into clicking on links that are shortened using URL shortening services like Cuttly.

Execution

1 technique
T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence1

...point to a double archive file containing an HTML Application...

Stealth

2 techniques
T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence1

ASHVEIN, MATCHBOIL, and DRAGSTARE use an identical byte-swap XOR string encryption algorithm with per-variant seed constants.

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

Checks whether the operating system was installed within the previous 10 days (DAYS_LIMIT=10) to identify and avoid potential sandbox environments.

Credential Access

3 techniques
T1539Steal Web Session CookieEvidence1

Dragstare, a stealer that extracts browser data such as passwords, cookies, and desktop files.

T1555Credentials from Password StoresEvidence1

Dragstare, a stealer that extracts browser data such as passwords, cookies, and desktop files.

T1555.003Credentials from Web BrowsersEvidence1

DPAPI-based credential theft from both Chrome and Firefox browsers.

Discovery

2 techniques
T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence1

Both CINDERBLOT and ASHVEIN implement system fingerprinting through five WMI queries that are textually identical.

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

Checks whether the operating system was installed within the previous 10 days (DAYS_LIMIT=10) to identify and avoid potential sandbox environments.

Collection

3 techniques
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence1

Dragstare, a stealer that extracts browser data such as passwords, cookies, and desktop files.

T1113Screen CaptureEvidence1

Screen Capture — T1113 — ASHVEIN, DRAGSTARE (GDI BitBlt).

T1560Archive Collected DataEvidence1

These links... point to a double archive file containing an HTML Application...

Indicators of compromise

Observables

2 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

View all in app →
Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Activity feed

Recent activity

21 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

View more in app →
+17 more in the timeline. Sign up to see them
Is this in your environment?See whether this family's indicators match your telemetry and which of your assets are exposed to the CVEs associated with it.
Check your exposure
Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching2Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors2Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping12Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.