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TajMahal is a malware family with extensive espionage-oriented collection and exfiltration capabilities on Windows systems. Based on the provided content, it can identify installed defensive products including anti-virus, firewall, and anti-spyware software, identify the Internet Explorer version, determine local time, and identify connected Apple devices. It supports process injection by injecting a LoadLibrary call template DLL into running processes. TajMahal can collect and stage data by indexing and compressing files into a send queue for exfiltration and can send collected files over its command-and-control channel. Its collection capabilities include stealing clipboard data, stealing web session cookies from Internet Explorer, Netscape Navigator, Firefox, and RealNetworks applications, taking screenshots including content from instant messaging application windows, capturing webcam video, and capturing VoiceIP application audio. It also targets removable media and peripheral-related data: it can steal written CD images and files of interest from previously connected removable drives when they become available again, and it can modify the Windows Registry at SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Print\Printers by setting the KeepPrintedJobs attribute to enable document stealing from configured printers. High-confidence indicators and artifacts mentioned in the content include the printer-related registry path SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Print\Printers and the use of KeepPrintedJobs for print-document theft.
Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.
23 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
...uses the LoadLibraryExW() function to load additional modules... execute additional plugins by loading the respective DLLs... loaded and executed DLLs in memory during runtime... loads a dynamic library (.dylib file) using dlopen() and obtains a function pointer... using dlopen() and dlsym()... calls LoadLibrary then executes exports from a DLL.
During the 2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team modified in-registry Internet settings to lower internet security before launching rundll32.exe ... AADInternals can modify registry keys ... ADVSTORESHELL is capable of setting and deleting Registry values ... [many additional examples].
The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors using obfuscated code, encrypted strings, Base64/XOR/RC4/AES encoding, VMProtect/ConfuserEx/SmartAssembly, stack strings, control-flow flattening, opaque predicates, and hidden payloads to evade analysis and detection.
TajMahal has the ability to inject the LoadLibrary call template DLL into running processes.
...uses the LoadLibraryExW() function to load additional modules... execute additional plugins by loading the respective DLLs... loaded and executed DLLs in memory during runtime... loads a dynamic library (.dylib file) using dlopen() and obtains a function pointer... using dlopen() and dlsym()... calls LoadLibrary then executes exports from a DLL.
During the 2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team modified in-registry Internet settings to lower internet security before launching rundll32.exe ... AADInternals can modify registry keys ... ADVSTORESHELL is capable of setting and deleting Registry values ... [many additional examples].
The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors using commands and APIs such as ipconfig /all, ifconfig, arp -a, route print, nbtstat, netsh, GetAdaptersInfo, and GetIpNetTable to gather IP addresses, MAC addresses, DNS, DHCP, gateways, routing tables, ARP cache, proxy settings, domains, and network adapter/interface details.
The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors obtaining lists of running processes, using utilities such as tasklist, ps, WMI, Get-Process, CreateToolhelp32Snapshot, EnumProcesses, and similar APIs/commands to enumerate active processes on victim systems.
The content is a long ATT&CK-style listing of malware and threat actors that collect host details such as OS version, hostname, architecture, CPU, memory, BIOS, language, and other basic system characteristics; examples include use of commands like systeminfo, ver, uname, sw_vers, and WMI queries.
The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors listing files and directories, enumerating drives, searching for files by extension/name/path, retrieving file metadata, and browsing file systems (for example: "APT28 has used Forfiles to locate PDF, Excel, and Word documents during collection" and "cmd can be used to find files and directories with native functionality such as dir commands").
ADVSTORESHELL can list connected devices. APT28 uses a module to receive a notification every time a USB mass storage device is inserted into a victim. APT37 has a Bluetooth device harvester, which uses Windows Bluetooth APIs to find information on connected Bluetooth devices.
Multiple malware and threat groups are described as collecting/deriving local system time, date, timestamp, tick count, or time zone (e.g., "used time /t and net time \ip/hostname for system time discovery"; "collects the timestamp from the victim’s machine"; "can collect the time zone information from the system").
"Bundlore has the ability to enumerate what browser is being used as well as version information"; "Orz can gather the victim's Internet Explorer version"; "SUGARDUMP can identify ... browsers, including version number"; "SideCopy has collected browser information"
"Bazar can query the Registry for installed applications." / "BRONZE BUTLER has used tools to enumerate software installed on an infected host." / "LightSpy ... enumerate the Applications folder to collect the bundle name, bundle identifier, and version information..." / "Volt Typhoon has queried the Registry on compromised systems for information on installed software."
Confucius has used a file stealer to steal documents and images... Patchwork developed a file stealer to search C:\ and collect files with certain extensions... Winter Vivern delivered a PowerShell script capable of recursively scanning victim machines looking for various file types before exfiltrating identified files via HTTP.
AppleSeed can find and collect data from removable media devices. APT28 backdoor may collect the entire contents of an inserted USB device. Aria-body has the ability to collect data from USB devices. BADNEWS copies files with certain extensions from USB devices to a predefined directory.
"TajMahal can set the KeepPrintedJobs attribute for configured printers ... to enable document stealing."
"Agent Tesla can capture screenshots of the victim’s desktop"; "AppleSeed can take screenshots on a compromised host"; "APT28 has used tools to take screenshots from victims"; "Cobalt Strike's Beacon payload is capable of capturing screenshots"; "PowerSploit's Get-TimedScreenshot Exfiltration module can take screenshots at regular intervals"; "Hydraq includes a component based on the code of VNC that can stream a live feed of the desktop"
Agent Tesla can steal data from the victim’s clipboard. APT38 used a Trojan called KEYLIME to collect data from the clipboard. APT39 has used tools capable of stealing contents of the clipboard.
Agrius used a custom tool, sql.net4.exe, to query SQL databases and then identify and extract personally identifiable information... AppleSeed has automatically collected data from USB drives, keystrokes, and screen images before exfiltration... Ember Bear engages in mass collection from compromised systems during intrusions.
ADVSTORESHELL exfiltrates data over the same channel used for C2... Agrius exfiltrated staged data using tools such as Putty and WinSCP, communicating with command and control servers... numerous malware and groups sent victim data, files, credentials, or host information over existing C2 channels.
43 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
...instrumental in our investigations into the LightSpy, TajMahal, Dtrack, ShadowHammer and ShadowPad campaigns.
A highly sophisticated, modular spyware/APT framework with up to 80 malicious modules, capable of espionage, data theft, and surveillance, including audio, video, and document exfiltration.
Spyware framework capable of capturing VoIP application audio on infected hosts.
Advanced spyware framework capable of identifying connected Apple devices.
Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.