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Malware2 associated actors

HXLibrary

Tracked since Nov 25, 2025 · Updated 3 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors2Associated
ATT&CK8Techniques
IOCs5Tracked
Type
Backdoor
Capabilities
PersistencePost exploitationDefense evasion
Platforms
Windows

HXLibrary is a malicious .NET Internet Information Services (IIS) module used as a backdoor for persistent access on compromised Windows web servers. It has been associated with long-duration intrusions attributed to the Iranian threat actor commonly tracked as Lemon Sandstorm, also known as Parisite, Pioneer Kitten, and Fox Kitten, including espionage and strategic prepositioning activity against critical infrastructure in the Middle East. In observed operations, HXLibrary was installed on external-facing IIS servers as a rogue module, enabling the operator to maintain covert access and exert deep control over the host. The malware retrieves configuration data from cloud-hosted text resources to obtain command-and-control information and then communicates with attacker-controlled infrastructure through web requests. Its use alongside other custom implants such as HanifNet and NeoExpressRAT indicates a broader malware ecosystem designed for durable access, post-compromise operations, and long-term persistence inside strategically important networks. HXLibrary targets Windows systems running IIS and has been observed in campaigns affecting energy and infrastructure environments.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

2 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Fox Kitten

C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL\System.Management.Automation\v4.0_3.0.0.0__31bf3856ad364e35\Microsoft.WSMan.Management.Activities.dll ... HXLibrary

via fortinetfortinet.com
Smoke Sandstorm

On 10 October 2023, the adversary registered a malicious IIS module on the previously uncompromised external facing IIS webserver, WEB-5... This module is a type of backdoor malware FortiGuard tracks as HXLibrary.

via fortinetfortinet.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

8 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

2 techniques
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

beginning with VPN credential theft and progressively deepening access

T1133External Remote ServicesEvidence1

“beginning with VPN credential theft”

Execution

2 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

“Persistence was maintained through web shells and scheduled tasks …” / command lines show “schtasks /create …” and “Register-ScheduledTask …”

T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence1

HanifNet, HXLibrary, and NeoExpressRAT, enabling command execution, file operations, and system discovery.

Persistence

5 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

“Persistence was maintained through web shells and scheduled tasks …” / command lines show “schtasks /create …” and “Register-ScheduledTask …”

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

beginning with VPN credential theft and progressively deepening access

T1133External Remote ServicesEvidence1

“beginning with VPN credential theft”

T1505.003Web ShellEvidence1

“Persistence was maintained through web shells…” and “IIS-based malware designed to blend seamlessly into legitimate network traffic.”

T1505.004IIS ComponentsEvidence1

HXLibrary – Malicious IIS module enabling deep system control

Privilege Escalation

2 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

“Persistence was maintained through web shells and scheduled tasks …” / command lines show “schtasks /create …” and “Register-ScheduledTask …”

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

beginning with VPN credential theft and progressively deepening access

Stealth

1 technique
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

beginning with VPN credential theft and progressively deepening access

Discovery

2 techniques
T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence1

enabling command execution, file operations, and system discovery

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence1

the adversary successfully browsed and accessed a significant number of sensitive documents stored on numerous file shares and local files throughout the victim’s network.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

5 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching5Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors2Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping8Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.