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Malware2 associated actors4 associated CVEs

RayInitiator

Tracked since Nov 25, 2025 · Updated 2 days ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns4Associated
Actors2Associated
ATT&CK13Techniques
IOCs0Tracked
Type
Bootkit
Capabilities
Persistence
Platforms
Network device

RayInitiator is a malware family deployed by state-sponsored threat actors against Cisco Adaptive Security Appliance (ASA) network security devices. Its deployment has been associated with zero-day exploitation of CVE-2025-20333 in activity also involving the LINE VIPER malware family.

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Associated CVEs

Associated vulnerabilities

4 CVEs Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

CVE-2025-20333via verizon businessExploited in the wildAuthenticated Root Code Execution in Cisco ASA and FTD VPN Web ServerState-sponsored actors exploited Cisco ASA zero-days (CVE-2025-20333) to deploy the LINE VIPER and RayInitiator malware families.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2025-20363via mnemonic blogExploited in the wildRoot-Level RCE in Cisco ASA, FTD, IOS, IOS XE, and IOS XR Web ServicesOn September 25, Cisco published two critical advisories regarding CVE-2025-20333 (CVSS 9.9) and CVE-2025-20363 (CVSS 9.0). The vulnerabilities allow remote attackers to execute arbitrary code as root due to improper validation of user-supplied input in HTTP(S) requests. The vulnerabilities affect Cisco Adaptive Security Appliance (ASA), Firewall Threat Defense (FTD), and IOS. A successful exploitation may lead to complete compromise of the affected device. Active exploitation of these vulnerabilities in targeted attacks has been confirmed. | The UK National Cyber Security centre (NCSC-UK) has published a new analysis of the malware components, dubbed RayInitiator and LINE VIPER, to assist with detection and mitigation.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2025-20362via esentire product advisoriesExploited in the wildAuthentication Bypass in Cisco ASA and FTD VPN Web ServerThe disclosure confirmed that the vulnerabilities are being actively exploited in the wild; CVE-2025-20362 enables remote attackers to access restricted URL endpoints without authentication. | On September 25th, 2025, the UK's NCSC published a malware analysis report that provided detailed insights into RayInitiator, a persistent, multi-stage bootkit. This bootkit facilitates the deployment of LINE VIPER, a user-mode shellcode loader, on Cisco ASA 5500-X Series lacking secure boot.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2025-20334via cloudatg insightsCommand Injection in Cisco IOS XE HTTP API SubsystemCisco ASA Firewall Zero-Day Exploits Deploy RayInitiator and LINE VIPER MalwareView vulnerability →Source ↗
Threat actors

Associated threat actors

2 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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ArcaneDoor

The UK National Cyber Security centre (NCSC-UK) has published a new analysis of the malware components, dubbed RayInitiator and LINE VIPER, to assist with detection and mitigation.

via mnemonic blogmnemonic.io
UAT-4356

Cisco Talos noted that Firestarter shares significant technical similarities with a previously documented implant called RayInitiator, suggesting the tools share a common origin or development history within UAT-4356’s arsenal.

via cyberscoopcyberscoop.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

13 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

1 technique
T1190Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationEvidence5

Active exploitation of these vulnerabilities in targeted attacks has been confirmed.

Execution

4 techniques
T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence2

The attackers successfully exploited these vulnerable devices to deploy malware, execute remote commands, and potentially exfiltrate data.

T1203Exploitation for Client ExecutionEvidence1

The vulnerabilities allow remote attackers to execute arbitrary code as root due to improper validation of user-supplied input in HTTP(S) requests.

T1204User ExecutionEvidence1

An attacker possessing valid VPN user credentials could exploit CVE-2025-20333 by sending specially crafted HTTP requests to a vulnerable device

T1574Hijack Execution FlowEvidence2

Cisco's investigation uncovered a sophisticated attack that employed advanced evasion techniques, including disabling logging, intercepting CLI commands, and deliberately crashing devices to thwart diagnostic analysis.

Persistence

2 techniques
T1542.003BootkitEvidence5

The threat actor was observed modifying the ROMMON to maintain persistence through reboots and software upgrades on Cisco ASA 5500-X Series devices that do not have secure boot capabilities.

T1547Boot or Logon Autostart ExecutionEvidence1

These vulnerabilities allow attackers to execute arbitrary code, exfiltrate data and implant persistent malware to maintain access even after a device is rebooted.

Privilege Escalation

1 technique
T1547Boot or Logon Autostart ExecutionEvidence1

These vulnerabilities allow attackers to execute arbitrary code, exfiltrate data and implant persistent malware to maintain access even after a device is rebooted.

Stealth

5 techniques
T1014RootkitEvidence1

On September 25th, 2025, the UK's NCSC published a malware analysis report that provided detailed insights into RayInitiator, a persistent, multi-stage bootkit.

T1070Indicator RemovalEvidence1

Cisco's investigation uncovered a sophisticated attack that employed advanced evasion techniques, including disabling logging, intercepting CLI commands, and deliberately crashing devices to thwart diagnostic analysis.

T1480.001Environmental KeyingEvidence1

LINE VIPER and RayInitiator utilise victim specific tokens... To check for a LINE VIPER request, the <group-select> element is verified to ensure it starts with a hard-coded, victim specific, 8-byte ASCII string... LINE VIPER tasking payloads sent to victim devices are checked for multiple victim-specific tokens before they are run.

T1542.003BootkitEvidence5

The threat actor was observed modifying the ROMMON to maintain persistence through reboots and software upgrades on Cisco ASA 5500-X Series devices that do not have secure boot capabilities.

T1574Hijack Execution FlowEvidence2

Cisco's investigation uncovered a sophisticated attack that employed advanced evasion techniques, including disabling logging, intercepting CLI commands, and deliberately crashing devices to thwart diagnostic analysis.

Defense Impairment

1 technique
T1685Disable or Modify ToolsEvidence1

Cisco's investigation uncovered a sophisticated attack that employed advanced evasion techniques, including disabling logging, intercepting CLI commands, and deliberately crashing devices to thwart diagnostic analysis.

Command and Control

1 technique
T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence1

LINE VIPER can be tasked via two methods: WebVPN client authentication sessions over HTTPS... LINE VIPER is deployed and tasked via HTTPS WebVPN requests.

Impact

1 technique
T1529System Shutdown/RebootEvidence1

Cisco's investigation uncovered a sophisticated attack that employed advanced evasion techniques, including disabling logging, intercepting CLI commands, and deliberately crashing devices to thwart diagnostic analysis.

Mallory platform

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IOC matchingMatch every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors2Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilities4CVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping13Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.