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MalwareUsed by 1 actor

CAKETAP

CAKETAP is a kernel module rootkit associated with the financially motivated threat cluster UNC2891. It has been described on Oracle Solaris and Solaris/Linux server infrastructure, including intended deployment on ATM switching servers. Its core stealth capabilities include hiding network connections, processes, and files. Mandiant reported that on Solaris it removes itself from the loaded modules list during initialization, updates last_module_id to conceal its presence, hooks ipcl_get_next_conn and multiple ip-module functions to filter connections for actor-configured IPs or ports, and hooks mkdirat and getdents64 to receive commands and hide files or directories containing secret signal strings. Observed CAKETAP signal strings include .caahGss187 for the mkdirat hook and .zaahGss187 for the getdents64 hook. A CAKETAP variant observed on an ATM switch server was designed to intercept and spoof card and PIN verification messages sent to a payment hardware security module (HSM), manipulate HSM responses, and spoof authorization messages to enable unauthorized transactions and fraudulent ATM cash withdrawals using fraudulent bank cards. Group-IB reported UNC2891’s objective in a 2024 bank intrusion in Indonesia was to deploy CAKETAP on the ATM switching server after gaining access via a physically implanted Raspberry Pi with a 4G modem and TINYSHELL backdoor; defenders disrupted the intrusion before that final objective was achieved.

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THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

1 distinct threat actor attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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UNC2891

Central to the operation was a kernel module rootkit dubbed CAKETAP that's designed to hide network connections, processes, and files, as well as intercept and spoof card and PIN verification messages from hardware security modules (HSMs) to enable financial fraud.

via the hacker newsthehackernews.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

9 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

1 technique
T1200Hardware AdditionsEvidence1

"leveraging their physical access to install the Raspberry Pi device ... connected directly to the same network switch as the ATM"

Execution

1 technique
T1059.004Unix ShellEvidence1
TacticExecution

"...common shell utilities" and "simple Perl wrapper scripts..." plus MITRE list: "T1059.004:Unix Shell"

Persistence

1 technique
T1547.006Kernel Modules and ExtensionsEvidence1

"CAKETAP is a kernel module rootkit..." and "Mandiant observed UNC2891 load CAKETAP with the module name ipstat..."

T1547.006Kernel Modules and ExtensionsEvidence1

"CAKETAP is a kernel module rootkit..." and "Mandiant observed UNC2891 load CAKETAP with the module name ipstat..."

Stealth

3 techniques
T1014RootkitEvidence6
TacticStealth

Group-IB’s investigation determined UNC2891’s objective was to deploy the CAKETAP rootkit in order to manipulate hardware security module (HSM) responses and spoof authorization methods

T1564.001Hidden Files and DirectoriesEvidence1
TacticStealth

Central to the operation was a kernel module rootkit dubbed CAKETAP that's designed to hide network connections, processes, and files...

T1564.009Resource ForkingEvidence1
TacticStealth

Central to the operation was a kernel module rootkit dubbed CAKETAP that's designed to hide network connections, processes, and files...

Discovery

2 techniques
T1049System Network Connections DiscoveryEvidence1
TacticDiscovery

MITRE list: "Discovery: T1049:System Network Connections Discovery" and CAKETAP hiding/filtering of connections.

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence1
TacticDiscovery

MITRE list: "Discovery: T1083:File and Directory Discovery" and CAKETAP getdents64 hook to hide files/dirs.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

MITRE list: "T1105:Ingress Tool Transfer" and description of deploying multiple utilities/toolkit components.

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Threat actor attribution1

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping9

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.