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Malware3 associated actors3 associated CVEs

Gunra

Tracked since Nov 25, 2025 · Updated 1 day ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 days9 mentions · peak 3 in a dayToday
Vulns3Associated
Actors3Associated
ATT&CK79Techniques
IOCs60Tracked
Type
Ransomware
Capabilities
Initial accessExfiltrationExtortionDefense evasionReconnaissanceLateral movementPersistenceSession hijacking
Delivery
Watering holeSpearphishing
Platforms
WindowsLinux
Also known asGunra ransomware

Gunra is a financially motivated ransomware family first observed in April 2025. Initially targeting Windows and built using leaked Conti v2 source code, it subsequently expanded to Linux. Its operators adopted a ransomware-as-a-service model in January 2026, supplying affiliates with a management panel, payload builder, ransomware payloads, and documentation. Gunra operations use double extortion: attackers steal sensitive information before encrypting systems and threaten publication or sale unless victims pay. Targets span government, critical infrastructure, healthcare, financial services, manufacturing, transportation, IT, and other industries worldwide.

Gunra actors obtain access through vulnerable internet-facing firewall and VPN appliances, including exploitation of FortiOS and FortiProxy authentication-bypass vulnerabilities CVE-2024-55591 and CVE-2025-24472, and abuse default VPN administrator credentials. Intrusions have involved Impacket tools for SMB-based lateral movement, RDP access, SSH tunneling for continued access, and stolen session information. Before encryption, attackers delete Windows volume shadow copies through Windows Management Instrumentation and remove backup and archived data. Defense-evasion measures include debugger checks, deletion of system and network access logs, and clearing command histories. Ransom negotiations use a Tor-based portal, with publication threats commonly imposing deadlines of five to seven days.

The Linux variant combines ChaCha20 file encryption with RSA protection of cryptographic material. It supports configurable partial encryption, extension-based targeting, recursive directory traversal, up to 100 concurrent encryption threads, optional block-device encryption, and separate storage of encrypted recovery material. The Windows variant enumerates processes, system information, files, and directories and terminates processes during execution.

Gunra attacks against South Korean organizations have exhibited substantial technical overlap with Lazarus espionage activity, including shared infrastructure, tools, execution details, and an SSH key fingerprint. Associated campaigns used watering-hole attacks and spearphishing involving vulnerable Korean financial security software. These overlaps do not establish common operators or state sponsorship of Gunra operations.

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Associated CVEs

Associated vulnerabilities

3 CVEs Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

CVE-2024-55591via cisa advisoriesExploited in the wildSuper-admin authentication bypass in FortiOS and FortiProxyGunra actors gain initial access by exploiting common vulnerabilities and exposures (CVEs) CVE-2024-55591 and CVE-2025-24472 in internet-facing devices.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2025-24472via cisa advisoriesExploited in the wildFortiOS and FortiProxy Security Fabric Authentication BypassGunra actors gain initial access by exploiting common vulnerabilities and exposures (CVEs) CVE-2024-55591 and CVE-2025-24472 in internet-facing devices.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2024-5559via the hacker newsExploited in the wildReset-token cryptographic weakness in Schneider Electric PowerLogic P5Attacks deploying the ransomware have leveraged security flaws in internet-facing Schneider Electric PowerLogic P5 (CVE-2024-5559) and Fortinet FortiOS and FortiProxy (CVE-2025-24472) appliances to obtain initial access. | Cybersecurity and intelligence agencies from South Korea and the U.S. warned of Gunra ransomware attacks targeting critical infrastructure sectors and organizations across the world.View vulnerability →Source ↗
Threat actors

Associated threat actors

3 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Lazarus

Gunra emerged in April 2025, built on leaked Conti source code, and launched a RaaS affiliate program in January 2026.

via dragos blogdragos.com
Gunra

“The group built its ransomware on leaked Conti v2 source code before transitioning to a ransomware-as-a-service model in January of this year.”

via the record mediatherecord.media
Gunra ransomware group

Gunra ransomware targets various industries globally, including real estate, pharmaceuticals, and manufacturing. It employs a double-extortion technique by threatening to leak stolen data.

via cyfirma blogcyfirma.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

79 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Reconnaissance

1 technique
T1598Phishing for InformationEvidence1

The FBI observed Gunra actors attempting to communicate directly with management staff at victim companies via email to solicit ransom payments with limited success.

Resource Development

2 techniques
T1583Acquire InfrastructureEvidence1

the group was seen on cybercriminals forums actively recruiting new members... recruiting hackers to serve as initial access brokers.

T1585.001Social Media AccountsEvidence1

The FBI observed Gunra actors attempting to communicate directly with management staff at victim companies via email to solicit ransom payments

Initial Access

8 techniques
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence5

The attackers used the stolen cookies for session hijacking and also leveraged the VDI access to beat the target organization's multifactor authentication protection.

T1078.001Default AccountsEvidence1

Gaining access to an administrator account for an SSL-VPN appliance by exploiting default credentials

T1133External Remote ServicesEvidence4

The actors favor VPN gateways, RDP-exposed infrastructure, and unpatched edge devices for initial access.

T1189Drive-by CompromiseEvidence2

공격자는 워터링 홀 또는 스피어 피싱 등 다양한 방식으로 공격 대상의 악성 URL 접속을 유도한 후, 취약점을 익스플로잇하여 최종적으로 백도어 악성코드를 설치하였다.

T1190Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationEvidence10

Gunra exploits company VPNs and firewalls that are supposed to keep hackers out. In many cases, Gunra's affiliates find companies that have not properly patched against vulnerabilities, and exploit the flaw to let themselves in as if they had a legitimate password.

T1195Supply Chain CompromiseEvidence1

Others are hit as a stepping stone toward bigger, better-defended targets further down the chain, such as hospitals that depend on them for records, equipment, or connected systems.

T1566PhishingEvidence1

The group uses phishing as a main attack vector to deliver malicious pieces to their targets.

T1566.003Spearphishing via ServiceEvidence1

According to the FBI, in order to increase pressure upon the organization that has been hit by the ransomware, hackers have been known to email management staff within the company directly, apparently with limited success.

Execution

8 techniques
T1047Windows Management InstrumentationEvidence2

Deletes available shadow copies using the Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) utility.

T1053.003CronEvidence1

Behavioral Profile: What It Does on a Live System ... Creates/modifies cron jobs ... MITRE ATT&CK Mapping ... Persistence Scheduled Task/Job: Cron T1053.003

T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence1

The group also has a blossoming track record in living of the land (LOTL) techniques, having been observed sneaking under the radar, deleting system and network access logs, and clearing command histories.

T1059.004Unix ShellEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping Tactic Technique ID Execution Unix Shell T1059.004

T1106Native APIEvidence1

The binary uses the FindFirstFileW / FindNextFileW API calls [T1106] to enumerate files and directories on all accessible drive letters (A through Z), enabling comprehensive traversal of the file system prior to encryption of victim data.

T1129Shared ModulesEvidence1

Execution (TA0002) T1047: Windows Management Instrumentation T1129: Shared Modules

T1203Exploitation for Client ExecutionEvidence2

공격자는 워터링 홀 또는 스피어 피싱 등 다양한 방식으로 공격 대상의 악성 URL 접속을 유도한 후, 취약점을 익스플로잇하여 최종적으로 백도어 악성코드를 설치하였다.

T1574Hijack Execution FlowEvidence2

T1574: Hijack Execution Flow

Persistence

11 techniques
T1037Boot or Logon Initialization ScriptsEvidence1

Behavioral Profile: What It Does on a Live System ... Modifies init.d / rc scripts ... Modifies Bash startup scripts ... MITRE ATT&CK Mapping ... Persistence Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts T1037

T1053.003CronEvidence1

Behavioral Profile: What It Does on a Live System ... Creates/modifies cron jobs ... MITRE ATT&CK Mapping ... Persistence Scheduled Task/Job: Cron T1053.003

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence5

The attackers used the stolen cookies for session hijacking and also leveraged the VDI access to beat the target organization's multifactor authentication protection.

T1078.001Default AccountsEvidence1

Gaining access to an administrator account for an SSL-VPN appliance by exploiting default credentials

T1133External Remote ServicesEvidence4

The actors favor VPN gateways, RDP-exposed infrastructure, and unpatched edge devices for initial access.

T1136Create AccountEvidence1

Initial access exploits FortiOS authentication bypasses CVE-2024-55591 and CVE-2025-24472 to create persistent superuser accounts.

T1176Software ExtensionsEvidence1

Persistence (TA0003) T1176: Software Extensions

T1542Pre-OS BootEvidence1

T1542: Pre-OS Boot

T1542.003BootkitEvidence1

T1542.003: Bootkit

T1556Modify Authentication ProcessEvidence2

Gunra actors modified authentication processing files on the corporate VDI authentication portal server to allow successful authentication when a specific, Gunra-designated one time password (OTP) value was entered, thereby enabling the continuous bypass of multi-factor authentication (MFA).

T1556.003Pluggable Authentication ModulesEvidence1

Behavioral Profile: What It Does on a Live System ... Modifies PAM framework ... MITRE ATT&CK Mapping ... Defense Evasion Modify Authentication Process: PAM T1556.003

Privilege Escalation

6 techniques
T1037Boot or Logon Initialization ScriptsEvidence1

Behavioral Profile: What It Does on a Live System ... Modifies init.d / rc scripts ... Modifies Bash startup scripts ... MITRE ATT&CK Mapping ... Persistence Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts T1037

T1053.003CronEvidence1

Behavioral Profile: What It Does on a Live System ... Creates/modifies cron jobs ... MITRE ATT&CK Mapping ... Persistence Scheduled Task/Job: Cron T1053.003

T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

Attackers use this function to ... inject malicious code into other processes and anti-malware tools.

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence5

The attackers used the stolen cookies for session hijacking and also leveraged the VDI access to beat the target organization's multifactor authentication protection.

T1078.001Default AccountsEvidence1

Gaining access to an administrator account for an SSL-VPN appliance by exploiting default credentials

T1548Abuse Elevation Control MechanismEvidence2

T1548: Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism

Stealth

19 techniques
T1014RootkitEvidence1

Defense Evasion (TA0005) T1014: Rootkit

T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence3

Its evasion capabilities include obfuscation of malicious activity, avoidance of rule-based detection systems.

T1027.002Software PackingEvidence1

T1027.002: Software Packing

T1027.005Indicator Removal from ToolsEvidence1

T1027.005: Indicator Removal from Tools

T1036MasqueradingEvidence1

T1036: Masquerading

T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

Attackers use this function to ... inject malicious code into other processes and anti-malware tools.

T1070Indicator RemovalEvidence2

The group also has a blossoming track record in living of the land (LOTL) techniques, having been observed sneaking under the radar, deleting system and network access logs, and clearing command histories.

T1070.003Clear Command HistoryEvidence1

“Gunra actors typically attempt to mask their presence by ... clearing command history.”

T1070.004File DeletionEvidence1

Deleting shadow copies via Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI)

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence5

The attackers used the stolen cookies for session hijacking and also leveraged the VDI access to beat the target organization's multifactor authentication protection.

T1078.001Default AccountsEvidence1

Gaining access to an administrator account for an SSL-VPN appliance by exploiting default credentials

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

KNPA identified a victim case in which Gunra actors connected to the VDI environments of IT personnel and collected sensitive documents containing system and network configuration information.

T1542Pre-OS BootEvidence1

T1542: Pre-OS Boot

T1542.003BootkitEvidence1

T1542.003: Bootkit

T1564Hide ArtifactsEvidence1

T1564: Hide Artifacts

T1564.001Hidden Files and DirectoriesEvidence1

T1564.001: Hidden Files and Directories

T1574Hijack Execution FlowEvidence2

T1574: Hijack Execution Flow

T1622Debugger EvasionEvidence2

The Windows binary includes the IsDebuggerPresent API [T1622], which defends against reverse engineering by detecting if the application is being run in a debugger.

T1679Selective ExclusionEvidence1

the binary includes filtering logic to exclude common system directories ... For files that pass the initial filter, the binary checks against a second set of filter rules that exclude file extensions related to system-critical files

Defense Impairment

5 techniques
T1556Modify Authentication ProcessEvidence2

Gunra actors modified authentication processing files on the corporate VDI authentication portal server to allow successful authentication when a specific, Gunra-designated one time password (OTP) value was entered, thereby enabling the continuous bypass of multi-factor authentication (MFA).

T1556.003Pluggable Authentication ModulesEvidence1

Behavioral Profile: What It Does on a Live System ... Modifies PAM framework ... MITRE ATT&CK Mapping ... Defense Evasion Modify Authentication Process: PAM T1556.003

T1685Disable or Modify ToolsEvidence1

According to the report, Gunra ransomware “employs advanced evasion and anti-analysis techniques used to infect Windows Operating systems while minimizing the risk of detection.”

T1685.005Clear Windows Event LogsEvidence3

“Gunra actors typically attempt to mask their presence by deleting system/network access logs...”

T1685.006Clear Linux or Mac System LogsEvidence1

Behavioral Profile: What It Does on a Live System ... Deletes journal logs ... Deletes log files ... MITRE ATT&CK Mapping ... Defense Evasion Indicator Removal: Clear Linux or Mac System Logs T1070.002

Credential Access

10 techniques
T1003OS Credential DumpingEvidence2

Credential Access (TA0006) T1003: OS Credential Dumping

T1111Multi-Factor Authentication InterceptionEvidence1

used the traffic control functionality to collect credentials and session information for employees authenticating to a corporate virtual desktop infrastructure (VDI) portal.

T1539Steal Web Session CookieEvidence2

T1539: Steal Web Session Cookie

T1552Unsecured CredentialsEvidence1

T1552: Unsecured Credentials

T1555Credentials from Password StoresEvidence1

T1555: Credentials from Password Stores

T1555.003Credentials from Web BrowsersEvidence1

T1555.003: Credentials from Web Browsers

T1556Modify Authentication ProcessEvidence2

Gunra actors modified authentication processing files on the corporate VDI authentication portal server to allow successful authentication when a specific, Gunra-designated one time password (OTP) value was entered, thereby enabling the continuous bypass of multi-factor authentication (MFA).

T1556.003Pluggable Authentication ModulesEvidence1

Behavioral Profile: What It Does on a Live System ... Modifies PAM framework ... MITRE ATT&CK Mapping ... Defense Evasion Modify Authentication Process: PAM T1556.003

T1557Adversary-in-the-MiddleEvidence1

the attackers have been spotted manipulating the network traffic control functionality of an SSL-VPN appliance to intercept credentials and session information transmitted by users authenticating to a corporate VDI authentication portal.

T1649Steal or Forge Authentication CertificatesEvidence2

compromising a Hiware access control server, stealing the encryption key, and decrypting passwords stored in the database.

Discovery

6 techniques
T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence2

It begins by enumerating system processes and files and collecting system information through reconnaissance.

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence3

The malware exhibits several malicious behaviours such as ... retrieving system information.

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence6

FindNextFileExW is used to search the files in the directory to enumerate targets with specific extensions such as .docx, .pdf, .xls, .jpg etc.

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

KNPA identified a victim case in which Gunra actors connected to the VDI environments of IT personnel and collected sensitive documents containing system and network configuration information.

T1518Software DiscoveryEvidence1

T1518: Software Discovery

T1622Debugger EvasionEvidence2

The Windows binary includes the IsDebuggerPresent API [T1622], which defends against reverse engineering by detecting if the application is being run in a debugger.

Lateral Movement

4 techniques
T1021Remote ServicesEvidence2

The threat group then regularly exploits Impacket libraries psexec.py and smbclient.py to move laterally across victim networks using the Server Message Block (SMB) protocol.

T1021.002SMB/Windows Admin SharesEvidence1

The threat group then regularly exploits Impacket libraries psexec.py and smbclient.py to move laterally across victim networks using the Server Message Block (SMB) protocol.

T1021.004SSHEvidence1

Accessing a Hiware system access control server via SSH from a compromised virtual desktop

T1570Lateral Tool TransferEvidence1

The actors then leveraged enterprise server credentials stolen from a system access control server to deploy ransomware to encrypt key assets, including database servers and network attached storage (NAS) systems.

Collection

6 techniques
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence3

Collection (TA0009) T1005: Data from Local System

T1119Automated CollectionEvidence1

T1119: Automated Collection

T1185Browser Session HijackingEvidence1

T1185: Browsers Session Hijacking

T1530Data from Cloud StorageEvidence1

CISA's Gunra advisory documents exactly that familiar model: Tor-based negotiation, qTox discussions, dedicated leak sites, and Mega for exfiltrated data.

T1557Adversary-in-the-MiddleEvidence1

the attackers have been spotted manipulating the network traffic control functionality of an SSL-VPN appliance to intercept credentials and session information transmitted by users authenticating to a corporate VDI authentication portal.

T1560Archive Collected DataEvidence1

the threat actors have been observed creating compressed archives containing terabytes of data and exfiltrating them to the MEGA file-sharing service.

Command and Control

3 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

Command-and-control (TA0011) T1071: Applications Layer Protocol

T1090ProxyEvidence1

Command-and-control (TA0011) ... T1090: Proxy

T1090.003Multi-hop ProxyEvidence1

CISA's Gunra advisory documents exactly that familiar model: Tor-based negotiation, qTox discussions, dedicated leak sites, and Mega for exfiltrated data.

Exfiltration

5 techniques
T1020Automated ExfiltrationEvidence1

“We have dumped your sensitive business data and then encrypted your side entire data.”

T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence3

Once inside, attackers can secretly explore a network, copy sensitive data to their own servers...

T1537Transfer Data to Cloud AccountEvidence4

then exfiltrate data before encrypting systems and threaten to publish stolen files on a dedicated leak site if victims do not pay.

T1567Exfiltration Over Web ServiceEvidence5

TTP # T1567 — Exfiltration Over Web Service (Exfiltration)

T1567.002Exfiltration to Cloud StorageEvidence2

CISA's Gunra advisory documents exactly that familiar model: Tor-based negotiation, qTox discussions, dedicated leak sites, and Mega for exfiltrated data.

Impact

6 techniques
T1485Data DestructionEvidence2

The attackers also try to weaken recovery by deleting volume shadow copies. In at least one reported incident, they removed backup and archived data at both primary and disaster-recovery sites before and after ransomware deployment.

T1486Data Encrypted for ImpactEvidence32

Once Gunra ransomware infects a system, it encrypts files and appends a ‘.ENCRT’ extension to each filename.

T1490Inhibit System RecoveryEvidence3

The malware then deletes Volume Shadow Copies using WMI, effectively disabling system restore and backup capabilities.

T1491.001Internal DefacementEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping ... Impact Internal Defacement T1491.001

T1496Resource HijackingEvidence1

Impact (TA0040) ... T1496: Resource Hijacking

T1657Financial TheftEvidence5

“threaten to publish it on a leak site unless the ransom is paid”; “If negotiations stall, the group names the victim on its data leak site, posts a preview of the stolen files, and eventually releases the rest.”

Indicators of compromise

Observables

60 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Activity feed

Recent activity

62 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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IOC matching60Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors3Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilities3CVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping79Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.