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Malware2 associated actors5 associated CVEs

LINE VIPER

Tracked since Nov 25, 2025 · Updated 2 days ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns5Associated
Actors2Associated
ATT&CK33Techniques
IOCs0Tracked
Type
Loader
Capabilities
Post exploitationDefense evasion
Platforms
Network device

LINE VIPER is a malware family deployed against Cisco Adaptive Security Appliance (ASA) network-security devices by state-sponsored threat actors. Its deployment has been associated with zero-day exploitation of CVE-2025-20333 in campaigns that also deployed the RayInitiator malware family.

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Associated CVEs

Associated vulnerabilities

5 CVEs Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

CVE-2025-20333via verizon businessExploited in the wildAuthenticated Root Code Execution in Cisco ASA and FTD VPN Web ServerState-sponsored actors exploited Cisco ASA zero-days (CVE-2025-20333) to deploy the LINE VIPER and RayInitiator malware families.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2025-20363via mnemonic blogExploited in the wildRoot-Level RCE in Cisco ASA, FTD, IOS, IOS XE, and IOS XR Web ServicesOn September 25, Cisco published two critical advisories regarding CVE-2025-20333 (CVSS 9.9) and CVE-2025-20363 (CVSS 9.0). The vulnerabilities allow remote attackers to execute arbitrary code as root due to improper validation of user-supplied input in HTTP(S) requests. The vulnerabilities affect Cisco Adaptive Security Appliance (ASA), Firewall Threat Defense (FTD), and IOS. A successful exploitation may lead to complete compromise of the affected device. Active exploitation of these vulnerabilities in targeted attacks has been confirmed. | The UK National Cyber Security centre (NCSC-UK) has published a new analysis of the malware components, dubbed RayInitiator and LINE VIPER, to assist with detection and mitigation.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2025-20362via esentire product advisoriesExploited in the wildAuthentication Bypass in Cisco ASA and FTD VPN Web ServerThe disclosure confirmed that the vulnerabilities are being actively exploited in the wild; CVE-2025-20362 enables remote attackers to access restricted URL endpoints without authentication. | This bootkit facilitates the deployment of LINE VIPER, a user-mode shellcode loader, on Cisco ASA 5500-X Series lacking secure boot.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2025-30333via the record mediaRCE in Cisco Adaptive Security Appliance (ASA) with VPN credentialsCISA added that the hackers deployed another strain of malware called Line Viper that established illegitimate virtual private network (VPN) sessions that bypassed all VPN authentication policies.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2025-20334via cloudatg insightsCommand Injection in Cisco IOS XE HTTP API SubsystemCisco ASA Firewall Zero-Day Exploits Deploy RayInitiator and LINE VIPER MalwareView vulnerability →Source ↗
Threat actors

Associated threat actors

2 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

View more details →
ArcaneDoor

This bootkit facilitates the deployment of LINE VIPER, a user-mode shellcode loader, on Cisco ASA 5500-X Series lacking secure boot.

via esentire product advisoriesesentire.com
UAT-4356

The attack chain begins with exploitation of known vulnerabilities (CVE-2025–20333, CVE-2025–20362) to gain initial access, followed by the deployment of LINE VIPER and FIRESTARTER to take control of the network device itself.

via osint team blogosintteam.blog
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

33 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

3 techniques
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence3

This activity was associated with user accounts that existed but were no longer active within the agency [T1078].

T1133External Remote ServicesEvidence4

CISA identified that APT actors first deployed LINE VIPER to establish illegitimate virtual private network (VPN) sessions [T1133] that bypassed all VPN authentication policies.

T1190Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationEvidence16

The attackers successfully exploited these vulnerable devices to deploy malware, execute remote commands, and potentially exfiltrate data.

Execution

5 techniques
T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence4

The attackers successfully exploited these vulnerable devices to deploy malware, execute remote commands, and potentially exfiltrate data.

T1059.004Unix ShellEvidence2

The hackers ... initially deployed a shellcode loader tracked by the U.K. National Cyber Security Center as Line Viper

T1203Exploitation for Client ExecutionEvidence1

The vulnerabilities allow remote attackers to execute arbitrary code as root due to improper validation of user-supplied input in HTTP(S) requests.

T1204User ExecutionEvidence1

An attacker possessing valid VPN user credentials could exploit CVE-2025-20333 by sending specially crafted HTTP requests to a vulnerable device

T1574Hijack Execution FlowEvidence2

Cisco's investigation uncovered a sophisticated attack that employed advanced evasion techniques, including disabling logging, intercepting CLI commands, and deliberately crashing devices to thwart diagnostic analysis.

Persistence

6 techniques
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence3

This activity was associated with user accounts that existed but were no longer active within the agency [T1078].

T1133External Remote ServicesEvidence4

CISA identified that APT actors first deployed LINE VIPER to establish illegitimate virtual private network (VPN) sessions [T1133] that bypassed all VPN authentication policies.

T1136Create AccountEvidence1

Line Viper malware ... created illegitimate VPN sessions

T1542.003BootkitEvidence1

RayInitiator is a persistent multi-stage bootkit which facilitates the deployment of LINE VIPER to Cisco ASA (Adaptive Security Appliance) 5500-X series devices without secure boot... RayInitiator is a persistent GRand Unified Bootloader (GRUB) bootkit discovered flashed to victim devices. It survives reboots and firmware upgrades

T1547Boot or Logon Autostart ExecutionEvidence1

These vulnerabilities allow attackers to execute arbitrary code, exfiltrate data and implant persistent malware to maintain access even after a device is rebooted.

T1556Modify Authentication ProcessEvidence1

LINE VIPER ... dokáže ... obchádzať VPN AAA...

Privilege Escalation

3 techniques
T1068Exploitation for Privilege EscalationEvidence2

CVE-2025–20333 (CVSS 9.9) affects the same WebVPN component and allows an authenticated remote attacker with valid VPN credentials to execute arbitrary code with root privileges.

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence3

This activity was associated with user accounts that existed but were no longer active within the agency [T1078].

T1547Boot or Logon Autostart ExecutionEvidence1

These vulnerabilities allow attackers to execute arbitrary code, exfiltrate data and implant persistent malware to maintain access even after a device is rebooted.

Stealth

8 techniques
T1014RootkitEvidence1

LINE VIPER patches system integrity checks and returns results as if the device wasn’t compromised. It also collects CLI commands which would enable monitoring of user activity.

T1070Indicator RemovalEvidence3

Cisco's investigation uncovered a sophisticated attack that employed advanced evasion techniques, including disabling logging, intercepting CLI commands, and deliberately crashing devices to thwart diagnostic analysis.

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence3

This activity was associated with user accounts that existed but were no longer active within the agency [T1078].

T1202Indirect Command ExecutionEvidence1

LINE VIPER has the ability to grant itself level 15 privilege and execute CLI commands, for example: • show vpn-sessiondb anyconnect

T1480.001Environmental KeyingEvidence1

LINE VIPER and RayInitiator utilise victim specific tokens... To check for a LINE VIPER request, the <group-select> element is verified to ensure it starts with a hard-coded, victim specific, 8-byte ASCII string... LINE VIPER tasking payloads sent to victim devices are checked for multiple victim-specific tokens before they are run.

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

za účelom prevencie diagnostiky spôsobuje úmyselné reštarty zariadenia.

T1542.003BootkitEvidence1

RayInitiator is a persistent multi-stage bootkit which facilitates the deployment of LINE VIPER to Cisco ASA (Adaptive Security Appliance) 5500-X series devices without secure boot... RayInitiator is a persistent GRand Unified Bootloader (GRUB) bootkit discovered flashed to victim devices. It survives reboots and firmware upgrades

T1574Hijack Execution FlowEvidence2

Cisco's investigation uncovered a sophisticated attack that employed advanced evasion techniques, including disabling logging, intercepting CLI commands, and deliberately crashing devices to thwart diagnostic analysis.

Defense Impairment

2 techniques
T1556Modify Authentication ProcessEvidence1

LINE VIPER ... dokáže ... obchádzať VPN AAA...

T1685Disable or Modify ToolsEvidence5

Cisco's investigation uncovered a sophisticated attack that employed advanced evasion techniques, including disabling logging, intercepting CLI commands, and deliberately crashing devices to thwart diagnostic analysis.

Credential Access

4 techniques
T1040Network SniffingEvidence5

LINE VIPER ... dokáže ... zachytávať pakety...

T1555Credentials from Password StoresEvidence2

CVE-2025–20362... enabling session validation bypass, credential harvesting, or reconnaissance... LINE VIPER toolkit enables packet capture, VPN authentication bypass, syslog suppression, and credential harvesting

T1556Modify Authentication ProcessEvidence1

LINE VIPER ... dokáže ... obchádzať VPN AAA...

T1649Steal or Forge Authentication CertificatesEvidence3

Line Viper is used to establish VPN sessions and access all configuration details, including administrative credentials, certificates, and private keys on compromised Firepower devices.

Discovery

4 techniques
T1040Network SniffingEvidence5

LINE VIPER ... dokáže ... zachytávať pakety...

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence2

LINE VIPER enabled APT actors access to all configuration elements of the victim Firepower device, including administrative credentials, certificates, and private keys [T1082].

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence1

Line Viper malware ... facilitated universal access to the device's files

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

za účelom prevencie diagnostiky spôsobuje úmyselné reštarty zariadenia.

Collection

1 technique
T1602.001SNMP (MIB Dump)Evidence1

In the federal agency incident analyzed by CISA, the attackers first deployed a separate implant, called Line Viper, to gain access to device configurations, credentials, and encryption keys.

Command and Control

7 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

LINE VIPER is loaded into memory by RayInitiator and it receives command and control instructions over WebVPN client authentication sessions over HTTPS or via ICMP with responses over raw TCP.

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence2

LINE VIPER is loaded into memory by RayInitiator and it receives command and control instructions over WebVPN client authentication sessions over HTTPS

T1095Non-Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

A second tasking method, via ICMP, has been observed. Responses to tasking, i.e. exfiltration, via this method are sent in raw TCP packets... LINE VIPER can receive tasking via ICMP.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

Upon successful verification, the next stage of the malware is loaded by copying it into LINA’s memory and invoking mprotect to enable execution of the newly injected code.

T1571Non-Standard PortEvidence1

LINE VIPER responds to ICMP tasking via raw TCP using high-ephemeral ports... Observed destination ports used are random high ports, >60000.

T1573.001Symmetric CryptographyEvidence1

After this challenge the rest of the data is decrypted using AES-CBC-256 with the corresponding decryption IV and key... LINE VIPER receives tasking encrypted with a per-request AES key.

T1573.002Asymmetric CryptographyEvidence1

LINE VIPER uses per-victim RSA keys for securing tasking and exfiltration via the WebVPN client authentication method... LINE VIPER uses an RSA public key to perform a symmetric key exchange.

Impact

1 technique
T1529System Shutdown/RebootEvidence2

Cisco's investigation uncovered a sophisticated attack that employed advanced evasion techniques, including disabling logging, intercepting CLI commands, and deliberately crashing devices to thwart diagnostic analysis.

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Associated threat actors2Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilities5CVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping33Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.