SPAWNCHIMERA
- Type
- Backdoor
- Capabilities
- PersistencePost exploitationDefense evasionProcess injectionReconnaissance
- Platforms
- LinuxNetwork device
SPAWNCHIMERA is a persistent SPAWN-family backdoor toolkit targeting Linux-based Ivanti Connect Secure VPN appliances. It consolidates updated functionality from the SPAWNANT installer, SPAWNMOLE SOCKS5 tunneler, and SPAWNSNAIL SSH backdoor into a single implant, and drops the SPAWNSLOTH log-tampering component. It provides covert SSH-based command-and-control, traffic tunneling, and access that survives appliance reboots. Deployment has been observed following exploitation of CVE-2025-0282, including incidents in Japan beginning in late December 2024. It has also appeared in campaigns exploiting CVE-2025-22457.
SPAWNCHIMERA injects itself into multiple appliance processes and routes malicious traffic between injected instances using UNIX domain sockets rather than localhost TCP connections, reducing visibility in network information collected by appliance integrity checks. It encodes its embedded SSH private key and decodes it in memory without writing the key to disk. Additional evasion measures include modifying the Ivanti Integrity Checker Tool, manipulating file timestamps, generating RSA keys to sign manifests for modified files, and removing debugging messages. Its associated SPAWNSLOTH component suppresses local logging and remote syslog forwarding. The implant also checks whether SELinux is enabled.
Within the compromised web process, SPAWNCHIMERA hooks the strncpy function and limits copy lengths to dynamically mitigate CVE-2025-0282. This can obstruct subsequent exploitation by competing attackers and vulnerability scanners without removing the existing compromise. SPAWNCHIMERA has been associated with China-nexus espionage activity tracked as UNC5337 and the broader UNC5221 cluster. Campaigns using the toolkit have affected organizations across multiple countries and sectors, including government, telecommunications, financial institutions, automotive, and chemical industries. Related SPAWN-family variants include SPAWNWAVE and RESURGE, which share overlapping functionality.
Associated vulnerabilities
2 CVEs Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.
Associated threat actors
3 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
----[ 2.7 Spawn Chimera and The Hankyoreh Drop Location: mnt/hgfs/Desktop/New folder/203.234.192.200_client.zip The client accesses the SpawnChimera backdoor via port knocking.
Mandiant ... reported that attackers began leveraging this vulnerability as early as mid-December, deploying the custom Spawn malware toolkit... TeamT5 reports that the threat actor used SPAWNCHIMERA, a malware toolkit developed specifically for Ivanti VPN appliances.
Mandiant ... reported that attackers began leveraging this vulnerability as early as mid-December, deploying the custom Spawn malware toolkit... TeamT5 reports that the threat actor used SPAWNCHIMERA, a malware toolkit developed specifically for Ivanti VPN appliances.
Techniques & procedures
30 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Initial Access
1 technique
Initial Access
"...threat actors exploited Ivanti CVE-2025-0282 for initial access."
Execution
5 techniques
Execution
[SPAWNCHIMERA](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9024) has searched the contents of two Python files scanner.py and scanner_legacy.py by searching for specific lines and replacing them with values that reduce their ability to track mismatches or new files.(Citation: CISA SPAWNCHIMERA RESURGE February 2026)
CVE-2025-0282 možno zneužiť na vzdialené vykonanie kódu... Kritická zraniteľnosť spočíva v pretečení zásobníka a vzdialený neautentifikovaný útočník by ju mohol zneužiť na vzdialené vykonanie kódu.
[SPAWNCHIMERA](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9024) has leveraged IPC using a UNIX domain socket between the dsmdm process and the web process.(Citation: Google UNC5221 BRICKSTORM SPAWNCHIMERA April 2024)(Citation: JPCERT SPAWNCHIMERA Ivanti February 2025)
[SPAWNCHIMERA](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9024) can persist across system upgrades by hijacking the execution flow of dspkginstall, a binary used during the system upgrade process.(Citation: Google UNC5221 Ivanti January 2025)(Citation: Google UNC5221 BRICKSTORM SPAWNCHIMERA April 2024)
[SPAWNCHIMERA](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9024) has been compiled as a Position Independent Executable (PIE) to use a third-party library for injection.(Citation: Google UNC5221 BRICKSTORM SPAWNCHIMERA April 2024)
Persistence
4 techniques
Persistence
[SPAWNCHIMERA](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9024) has modified the boot process files within `/tmp/coreboot_fs/bin/init` to establish persistence.(Citation: CISA SPAWNCHIMERA RESURGE February 2026)
The client accesses the SpawnChimera backdoor via port knocking.
[SPAWNCHIMERA](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9024) has created web shells that facilitate actions on the victim host.(Citation: CISA SPAWNCHIMERA RESURGE February 2026)
“Copy the web shell to the Ivanti running boot disk and manipulate the running coreboot image.”
Privilege Escalation
2 techniques
Privilege Escalation
[SPAWNCHIMERA](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9024) has modified the boot process files within `/tmp/coreboot_fs/bin/init` to establish persistence.(Citation: CISA SPAWNCHIMERA RESURGE February 2026)
[SPAWNCHIMERA](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9024) has executed only in memory and hooked itself into existing processes on the victim device to include the web process.(Citation: CISA SPAWNCHIMERA RESURGE February 2026)(Citation: Google UNC5221 BRICKSTORM SPAWNCHIMERA April 2024)(Citation: JPCERT SPAWNCHIMERA Ivanti February 2025)
Stealth
12 techniques
Stealth
The content repeatedly describes adversaries using Base64, XOR, RC4, AES, hexadecimal encoding, string encryption, code flattening, custom crypters, and other obfuscation methods to hide payloads, strings, configuration data, URLs, and scripts.
[SPAWNCHIMERA](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9024) has encoded a private key with XOR.(Citation: JPCERT SPAWNCHIMERA Ivanti February 2025) [SPAWNCHIMERA](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9024) has also encrypted data to be extracted using AES encryption.(Citation: Google UNC5221 Ivanti April 2025)(Citation: Picus Security UNC5221 Ivanti May 2025)
[SPAWNCHIMERA](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9024) has executed only in memory and hooked itself into existing processes on the victim device to include the web process.(Citation: CISA SPAWNCHIMERA RESURGE February 2026)(Citation: Google UNC5221 BRICKSTORM SPAWNCHIMERA April 2024)(Citation: JPCERT SPAWNCHIMERA Ivanti February 2025)
[SPAWNCHIMERA](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9024) has deleted generated files and folders from victim devices.(Citation: CISA SPAWNCHIMERA RESURGE February 2026)
[SPAWNCHIMERA](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9024) has updated the timestamp using the `touch` command.(Citation: CISA SPAWNCHIMERA RESURGE February 2026)
[SPAWNCHIMERA](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9024) has decoded a XOR encoded private key.(Citation: JPCERT SPAWNCHIMERA Ivanti February 2025)
The client accesses the SpawnChimera backdoor via port knocking.
[SPAWNCHIMERA](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9024) has fixed a buffer overflow vulnerability (CVE-2025-0282) by hooking the strncpy function and limiting the size to 256 to prevent other actors from leveraging the exploit.(Citation: JPCERT SPAWNCHIMERA Ivanti February 2025) [SPAWNCHIMERA](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9024) has converted its process name to hexadecimal and verifies an added value which is triggered when the first byte of the source copied to the fixed strncpy function matches `0x04050203`.(Citation: JPCERT SPAWNCHIMERA Ivanti February 2025)
“Copy the web shell to the Ivanti running boot disk and manipulate the running coreboot image.”
[SPAWNCHIMERA](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9024) can persist across system upgrades by hijacking the execution flow of dspkginstall, a binary used during the system upgrade process.(Citation: Google UNC5221 Ivanti January 2025)(Citation: Google UNC5221 BRICKSTORM SPAWNCHIMERA April 2024)
[SPAWNCHIMERA](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9024) has been compiled as a Position Independent Executable (PIE) to use a third-party library for injection.(Citation: Google UNC5221 BRICKSTORM SPAWNCHIMERA April 2024)
[SPAWNCHIMERA](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9024) has used delayed execution to pause for a defined interval before performing environment discovery, repeatedly checking for specific processes, such as the `dslogserver` process, prior to continuing execution. (Citation: CISA SPAWNCHIMERA RESURGE February 2026)
Defense Impairment
4 techniques
Defense Impairment
[SPAWNCHIMERA](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9024) has generated RSA keys against modified files to sign the manifest file, so they appear legitimate.(Citation: CISA SPAWNCHIMERA RESURGE February 2026)(Citation: Google UNC5221 Ivanti January 2025)
PHASEJAM 'has modified Ivanti Connect Secure appliances and blocks the system upgrades by altering the DSUpgrade.pm file'; SPAWNCHIMERA 'has modified the Ivanti Integrity Checker Tool to evade detection.'
[SPAWNCHIMERA](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9024) has modified the Ivanti Integrity Checker Tool to evade detection.(Citation: CISA SPAWNCHIMERA RESURGE February 2026)(Citation: Picus Security UNC5221 Ivanti May 2025)
[SPAWNCHIMERA](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9024) has disabled logging and log forwarding on Ivanti devices targeting the `dslogserver` process.(Citation: CISA SPAWNCHIMERA RESURGE February 2026)(Citation: Google UNC5221 Ivanti April 2025)(Citation: Google UNC5221 BRICKSTORM SPAWNCHIMERA April 2024)(Citation: Picus Security UNC5221 Ivanti May 2025)
Credential Access
1 technique
Credential Access
[SPAWNCHIMERA](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9024) has monitored and filtered network traffic on compromised edge devices, allowing legitimate traffic to pass while redirecting attacker-controlled traffic to infrastructure under adversary control. (Citation: Google UNC5221 Ivanti January 2025)(Citation: Google UNC5221 BRICKSTORM SPAWNCHIMERA April 2024)
Discovery
4 techniques
Discovery
[SPAWNCHIMERA](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9024) has monitored and filtered network traffic on compromised edge devices, allowing legitimate traffic to pass while redirecting attacker-controlled traffic to infrastructure under adversary control. (Citation: Google UNC5221 Ivanti January 2025)(Citation: Google UNC5221 BRICKSTORM SPAWNCHIMERA April 2024)
[SPAWNCHIMERA](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9024) has searched for running processes to include web or dsmdm.(Citation: CISA SPAWNCHIMERA RESURGE February 2026)(Citation: Google UNC5221 BRICKSTORM SPAWNCHIMERA April 2024)
[SPAWNCHIMERA](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9024) has obtained system information such as release, uptime, and current time.(Citation: Google UNC5221 BRICKSTORM SPAWNCHIMERA April 2024)
[SPAWNCHIMERA](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9024) has checked where SELinux is enabled on the targeted host.(Citation: Google UNC5221 BRICKSTORM SPAWNCHIMERA April 2024)
Collection
1 technique
Collection
[SPAWNCHIMERA](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9024) has extracted the device’s Linux kernel image (vmlinux).(Citation: CISA SPAWNCHIMERA RESURGE February 2026)(Citation: Google UNC5221 Ivanti April 2025)(Citation: Picus Security UNC5221 Ivanti May 2025)
Command and Control
4 techniques
Command and Control
CVE-2025-0282 je v súčasnosti aktívne zneužívaná na kompromitáciu Ivanti Connect Secure a následnú inštaláciu malvéru.
The client accesses the SpawnChimera backdoor via port knocking.
[SPAWNCHIMERA](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9024) has the ability to bind on a localhost and listen on port 8300.(Citation: Google UNC5221 BRICKSTORM SPAWNCHIMERA April 2024)(Citation: JPCERT SPAWNCHIMERA Ivanti February 2025)
[SPAWNCHIMERA](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9024) has created SSH tunnels to facilitate C2 communications.(Citation: CISA SPAWNCHIMERA RESURGE February 2026)(Citation: Google UNC5221 Ivanti January 2025)(Citation: Google UNC5221 BRICKSTORM SPAWNCHIMERA April 2024)
Observables
4 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.
Recent activity
18 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.