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Mallory
Malware3 associated actors2 associated CVEs

SPAWNCHIMERA

Tracked since Nov 25, 2025 · Updated 1 month ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns2Associated
Actors3Associated
ATT&CK30Techniques
IOCs4Tracked
Type
Backdoor
Capabilities
PersistencePost exploitationDefense evasionProcess injectionReconnaissance
Platforms
LinuxNetwork device

SPAWNCHIMERA is a persistent SPAWN-family backdoor toolkit targeting Linux-based Ivanti Connect Secure VPN appliances. It consolidates updated functionality from the SPAWNANT installer, SPAWNMOLE SOCKS5 tunneler, and SPAWNSNAIL SSH backdoor into a single implant, and drops the SPAWNSLOTH log-tampering component. It provides covert SSH-based command-and-control, traffic tunneling, and access that survives appliance reboots. Deployment has been observed following exploitation of CVE-2025-0282, including incidents in Japan beginning in late December 2024. It has also appeared in campaigns exploiting CVE-2025-22457.

SPAWNCHIMERA injects itself into multiple appliance processes and routes malicious traffic between injected instances using UNIX domain sockets rather than localhost TCP connections, reducing visibility in network information collected by appliance integrity checks. It encodes its embedded SSH private key and decodes it in memory without writing the key to disk. Additional evasion measures include modifying the Ivanti Integrity Checker Tool, manipulating file timestamps, generating RSA keys to sign manifests for modified files, and removing debugging messages. Its associated SPAWNSLOTH component suppresses local logging and remote syslog forwarding. The implant also checks whether SELinux is enabled.

Within the compromised web process, SPAWNCHIMERA hooks the strncpy function and limits copy lengths to dynamically mitigate CVE-2025-0282. This can obstruct subsequent exploitation by competing attackers and vulnerability scanners without removing the existing compromise. SPAWNCHIMERA has been associated with China-nexus espionage activity tracked as UNC5337 and the broader UNC5221 cluster. Campaigns using the toolkit have affected organizations across multiple countries and sectors, including government, telecommunications, financial institutions, automotive, and chemical industries. Related SPAWN-family variants include SPAWNWAVE and RESURGE, which share overlapping functionality.

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Associated CVEs

Associated vulnerabilities

2 CVEs Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

CVE-2025-0282via jpcert jp product advisoriesExploited in the wildUnauthenticated Remote Code Execution in Ivanti Secure Gateways遠隔の攻撃者が認証不要で任意のコードを実行する可能性がある脆弱性(CVE-2025-0282)。JPCERT/CCでは、本脆弱性公開前の2024年12月下旬から本脆弱性が悪用された被害を国内で複数確認しています。View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2025-22457via security online infoExploited in the wildUnauthenticated Remote Code Execution in Ivanti Secure Access GatewaysSimilarly, CVE-2025-22457 is also attributed to a stack-based buffer overflow weakness. This vulnerability impacts a range of Ivanti products, including Pulse Connect Secure 9.1x and Ivanti Connect Secure 22.7R2.5 and earlier... Ivanti released a patch for this vulnerability on February 11, 2025.View vulnerability →Source ↗
Threat actors

Associated threat actors

3 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

View more details →
Kimsuky

----[ 2.7 Spawn Chimera and The Hankyoreh Drop Location: mnt/hgfs/Desktop/New folder/203.234.192.200_client.zip The client accesses the SpawnChimera backdoor via port knocking.

via phrackphrack.org
UNC5221

Mandiant ... reported that attackers began leveraging this vulnerability as early as mid-December, deploying the custom Spawn malware toolkit... TeamT5 reports that the threat actor used SPAWNCHIMERA, a malware toolkit developed specifically for Ivanti VPN appliances.

via security online infosecurityonline.info
UNC5337

Mandiant ... reported that attackers began leveraging this vulnerability as early as mid-December, deploying the custom Spawn malware toolkit... TeamT5 reports that the threat actor used SPAWNCHIMERA, a malware toolkit developed specifically for Ivanti VPN appliances.

via security online infosecurityonline.info
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

30 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

1 technique
T1190Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationEvidence2

"...threat actors exploited Ivanti CVE-2025-0282 for initial access."

Execution

5 techniques
T1059.006PythonEvidence2

[SPAWNCHIMERA](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9024) has searched the contents of two Python files scanner.py and scanner_legacy.py by searching for specific lines and replacing them with values that reduce their ability to track mismatches or new files.(Citation: CISA SPAWNCHIMERA RESURGE February 2026)

T1203Exploitation for Client ExecutionEvidence2

CVE-2025-0282 možno zneužiť na vzdialené vykonanie kódu... Kritická zraniteľnosť spočíva v pretečení zásobníka a vzdialený neautentifikovaný útočník by ju mohol zneužiť na vzdialené vykonanie kódu.

T1559Inter-Process CommunicationEvidence2

[SPAWNCHIMERA](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9024) has leveraged IPC using a UNIX domain socket between the dsmdm process and the web process.(Citation: Google UNC5221 BRICKSTORM SPAWNCHIMERA April 2024)(Citation: JPCERT SPAWNCHIMERA Ivanti February 2025)

T1574Hijack Execution FlowEvidence2

[SPAWNCHIMERA](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9024) can persist across system upgrades by hijacking the execution flow of dspkginstall, a binary used during the system upgrade process.(Citation: Google UNC5221 Ivanti January 2025)(Citation: Google UNC5221 BRICKSTORM SPAWNCHIMERA April 2024)

T1574.006Dynamic Linker HijackingEvidence2

[SPAWNCHIMERA](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9024) has been compiled as a Position Independent Executable (PIE) to use a third-party library for injection.(Citation: Google UNC5221 BRICKSTORM SPAWNCHIMERA April 2024)

Persistence

4 techniques
T1037Boot or Logon Initialization ScriptsEvidence2

[SPAWNCHIMERA](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9024) has modified the boot process files within `/tmp/coreboot_fs/bin/init` to establish persistence.(Citation: CISA SPAWNCHIMERA RESURGE February 2026)

T1205.001Port KnockingEvidence2

The client accesses the SpawnChimera backdoor via port knocking.

T1505.003Web ShellEvidence3

[SPAWNCHIMERA](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9024) has created web shells that facilitate actions on the victim host.(Citation: CISA SPAWNCHIMERA RESURGE February 2026)

T1542.003BootkitEvidence1

“Copy the web shell to the Ivanti running boot disk and manipulate the running coreboot image.”

Privilege Escalation

2 techniques
T1037Boot or Logon Initialization ScriptsEvidence2

[SPAWNCHIMERA](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9024) has modified the boot process files within `/tmp/coreboot_fs/bin/init` to establish persistence.(Citation: CISA SPAWNCHIMERA RESURGE February 2026)

T1055.002Portable Executable InjectionEvidence2

[SPAWNCHIMERA](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9024) has executed only in memory and hooked itself into existing processes on the victim device to include the web process.(Citation: CISA SPAWNCHIMERA RESURGE February 2026)(Citation: Google UNC5221 BRICKSTORM SPAWNCHIMERA April 2024)(Citation: JPCERT SPAWNCHIMERA Ivanti February 2025)

Stealth

12 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

The content repeatedly describes adversaries using Base64, XOR, RC4, AES, hexadecimal encoding, string encryption, code flattening, custom crypters, and other obfuscation methods to hide payloads, strings, configuration data, URLs, and scripts.

T1027.013Encrypted/Encoded FileEvidence2

[SPAWNCHIMERA](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9024) has encoded a private key with XOR.(Citation: JPCERT SPAWNCHIMERA Ivanti February 2025) [SPAWNCHIMERA](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9024) has also encrypted data to be extracted using AES encryption.(Citation: Google UNC5221 Ivanti April 2025)(Citation: Picus Security UNC5221 Ivanti May 2025)

T1055.002Portable Executable InjectionEvidence2

[SPAWNCHIMERA](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9024) has executed only in memory and hooked itself into existing processes on the victim device to include the web process.(Citation: CISA SPAWNCHIMERA RESURGE February 2026)(Citation: Google UNC5221 BRICKSTORM SPAWNCHIMERA April 2024)(Citation: JPCERT SPAWNCHIMERA Ivanti February 2025)

T1070.004File DeletionEvidence3

[SPAWNCHIMERA](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9024) has deleted generated files and folders from victim devices.(Citation: CISA SPAWNCHIMERA RESURGE February 2026)

T1070.006TimestompEvidence3

[SPAWNCHIMERA](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9024) has updated the timestamp using the `touch` command.(Citation: CISA SPAWNCHIMERA RESURGE February 2026)

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence2

[SPAWNCHIMERA](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9024) has decoded a XOR encoded private key.(Citation: JPCERT SPAWNCHIMERA Ivanti February 2025)

T1205.001Port KnockingEvidence2

The client accesses the SpawnChimera backdoor via port knocking.

T1480.002Mutual ExclusionEvidence2

[SPAWNCHIMERA](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9024) has fixed a buffer overflow vulnerability (CVE-2025-0282) by hooking the strncpy function and limiting the size to 256 to prevent other actors from leveraging the exploit.(Citation: JPCERT SPAWNCHIMERA Ivanti February 2025) [SPAWNCHIMERA](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9024) has converted its process name to hexadecimal and verifies an added value which is triggered when the first byte of the source copied to the fixed strncpy function matches `0x04050203`.(Citation: JPCERT SPAWNCHIMERA Ivanti February 2025)

T1542.003BootkitEvidence1

“Copy the web shell to the Ivanti running boot disk and manipulate the running coreboot image.”

T1574Hijack Execution FlowEvidence2

[SPAWNCHIMERA](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9024) can persist across system upgrades by hijacking the execution flow of dspkginstall, a binary used during the system upgrade process.(Citation: Google UNC5221 Ivanti January 2025)(Citation: Google UNC5221 BRICKSTORM SPAWNCHIMERA April 2024)

T1574.006Dynamic Linker HijackingEvidence2

[SPAWNCHIMERA](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9024) has been compiled as a Position Independent Executable (PIE) to use a third-party library for injection.(Citation: Google UNC5221 BRICKSTORM SPAWNCHIMERA April 2024)

T1678Delay ExecutionEvidence2

[SPAWNCHIMERA](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9024) has used delayed execution to pause for a defined interval before performing environment discovery, repeatedly checking for specific processes, such as the `dslogserver` process, prior to continuing execution. (Citation: CISA SPAWNCHIMERA RESURGE February 2026)

Defense Impairment

4 techniques
T1553.002Code SigningEvidence3

[SPAWNCHIMERA](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9024) has generated RSA keys against modified files to sign the manifest file, so they appear legitimate.(Citation: CISA SPAWNCHIMERA RESURGE February 2026)(Citation: Google UNC5221 Ivanti January 2025)

T1601Modify System ImageEvidence1

PHASEJAM 'has modified Ivanti Connect Secure appliances and blocks the system upgrades by altering the DSUpgrade.pm file'; SPAWNCHIMERA 'has modified the Ivanti Integrity Checker Tool to evade detection.'

T1685Disable or Modify ToolsEvidence3

[SPAWNCHIMERA](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9024) has modified the Ivanti Integrity Checker Tool to evade detection.(Citation: CISA SPAWNCHIMERA RESURGE February 2026)(Citation: Picus Security UNC5221 Ivanti May 2025)

T1690Prevent Command History LoggingEvidence2

[SPAWNCHIMERA](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9024) has disabled logging and log forwarding on Ivanti devices targeting the `dslogserver` process.(Citation: CISA SPAWNCHIMERA RESURGE February 2026)(Citation: Google UNC5221 Ivanti April 2025)(Citation: Google UNC5221 BRICKSTORM SPAWNCHIMERA April 2024)(Citation: Picus Security UNC5221 Ivanti May 2025)

Credential Access

1 technique
T1040Network SniffingEvidence2

[SPAWNCHIMERA](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9024) has monitored and filtered network traffic on compromised edge devices, allowing legitimate traffic to pass while redirecting attacker-controlled traffic to infrastructure under adversary control. (Citation: Google UNC5221 Ivanti January 2025)(Citation: Google UNC5221 BRICKSTORM SPAWNCHIMERA April 2024)

Discovery

4 techniques
T1040Network SniffingEvidence2

[SPAWNCHIMERA](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9024) has monitored and filtered network traffic on compromised edge devices, allowing legitimate traffic to pass while redirecting attacker-controlled traffic to infrastructure under adversary control. (Citation: Google UNC5221 Ivanti January 2025)(Citation: Google UNC5221 BRICKSTORM SPAWNCHIMERA April 2024)

T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence2

[SPAWNCHIMERA](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9024) has searched for running processes to include web or dsmdm.(Citation: CISA SPAWNCHIMERA RESURGE February 2026)(Citation: Google UNC5221 BRICKSTORM SPAWNCHIMERA April 2024)

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence2

[SPAWNCHIMERA](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9024) has obtained system information such as release, uptime, and current time.(Citation: Google UNC5221 BRICKSTORM SPAWNCHIMERA April 2024)

T1518.001Security Software DiscoveryEvidence3

[SPAWNCHIMERA](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9024) has checked where SELinux is enabled on the targeted host.(Citation: Google UNC5221 BRICKSTORM SPAWNCHIMERA April 2024)

Collection

1 technique
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence3

[SPAWNCHIMERA](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9024) has extracted the device’s Linux kernel image (vmlinux).(Citation: CISA SPAWNCHIMERA RESURGE February 2026)(Citation: Google UNC5221 Ivanti April 2025)(Citation: Picus Security UNC5221 Ivanti May 2025)

Command and Control

4 techniques
T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

CVE-2025-0282 je v súčasnosti aktívne zneužívaná na kompromitáciu Ivanti Connect Secure a následnú inštaláciu malvéru.

T1205.001Port KnockingEvidence2

The client accesses the SpawnChimera backdoor via port knocking.

T1571Non-Standard PortEvidence2

[SPAWNCHIMERA](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9024) has the ability to bind on a localhost and listen on port 8300.(Citation: Google UNC5221 BRICKSTORM SPAWNCHIMERA April 2024)(Citation: JPCERT SPAWNCHIMERA Ivanti February 2025)

T1572Protocol TunnelingEvidence3

[SPAWNCHIMERA](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9024) has created SSH tunnels to facilitate C2 communications.(Citation: CISA SPAWNCHIMERA RESURGE February 2026)(Citation: Google UNC5221 Ivanti January 2025)(Citation: Google UNC5221 BRICKSTORM SPAWNCHIMERA April 2024)

Indicators of compromise

Observables

4 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

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IOC matching4Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors3Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilities2CVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping30Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.