Egregor
Egregor is a ransomware family active in 2020-2021 and used in double-extortion intrusions. The provided content links it to attacks against organizations including game developer Crytek, and notes that Egregor actors claimed to have leaked files stolen from Ubisoft's network in 2020, though Ubisoft did not confirm that claim. Egregor was also used by the Lockean ransomware affiliate group in attacks against at least some French companies between June 2020 and March 2021, and Microsoft reporting cited DEV-0216 as an affiliate that operated with Egregor as well as Maze, LockBit, REvil, and Conti. The content also associates Egregor operations with Twisted Spider/Maze & Egregor activity and notes collaboration involving TA551 and Qbot/QakBot-infected devices to deliver Egregor payloads.
Behaviorally, the malware is described as encrypting victim data and using intimidation tactics associated with ransomware, including internal defacement such as changing wallpapers, altering ESXi login messages, and sending ransom notes or threatening messages to connected printers ("print bombing"). For execution and lateral movement, Egregor used an encoded PowerShell command via a service created by Cobalt Strike. It also used regsvr32.exe to execute malicious DLLs, could inject its payload into iexplore.exe, and checked for the LogMeIn event log in an attempt to encrypt files on remote machines. Defense evasion capabilities explicitly mentioned in the content include disabling Windows Defender and using multiple anti-analysis and anti-sandbox techniques to hinder automated analysis.
The content further notes that Maze and Egregor ransomware campaigns exploited CVE-2020-0787. High-confidence indicators and artifacts directly mentioned include use of iexplore.exe for payload injection, regsvr32.exe for DLL execution, encoded PowerShell launched through a Cobalt Strike-created service, Windows Defender disablement, and LogMeIn event log checks related to remote encryption activity.
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Vulnerabilities exploited
3 CVEs Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each row links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.
The Windows Background Intelligent Transfer Service (BITS) is vulnerable to a privilege elevation vulnerability... Actors exploiting this vulnerability commonly used the proof of concept code released by the security researcher... The exploit was used in Maze and Egregor ransomware campaigns. | The exploit was used in Maze and Egregor ransomware campaigns.
Researchers noticed a recent trend in which Prophet Spider uses CVE-2020-14882 and CVE-2020-14750 to get a foothold into target environments. Both CVEs relate to path traversal vulnerabilities that enable an attacker to access the WebLogic administrative console, which then allows for unauthenticated remote code execution.
Researchers noticed a recent trend in which Prophet Spider uses CVE-2020-14882 and CVE-2020-14750 to get a foothold into target environments. Both CVEs relate to path traversal vulnerabilities that enable an attacker to access the WebLogic administrative console, which then allows for unauthenticated remote code execution.
Groups observed using it
9 distinct threat actors attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
DEV-0216 ... has operated as an affiliate for Egregor, Maze, Lockbit, REvil, and Conti in numerous high-impact incidents.
Between June 2020 and March 2021, Lockean attacked at least seven more companies with various ransomware families: Maze, Egregor, ProLock, REvil.
Between June 2020 and March 2021, Lockean attacked at least seven more companies with various ransomware families: Maze, Egregor, ProLock, REvil.
"...TWISTED SPIDER achieved at least 26 infections at healthcare sector victims with their Maze and Egregor ransomware families..."
At the close of 2020, we noticed a shift in a subset of these groups that have started to deploy EGREGOR ransomware in favor of MAZE ransomware following access acquired from ICEDID infections.
Prophet Spider functioned as an access broker and likely granted access to Egregor and MountLocker ransomware operators in exchange for payment.
"...FIN7... known to collaborate with the Conti, REvil, Maze, Egregor, and BlackBasta ransomware gangs..."
"...TA551 IcedID implants were associated with Maze and Egregor ransomware events in 2020."
At the close of 2020, we noticed a shift in a subset of these groups that have started to deploy EGREGOR ransomware in favor of MAZE ransomware following access acquired from ICEDID infections.
Techniques & procedures
25 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Initial Access
2 techniques"After the hacker gained access to a Windows domain administrator account..."
"Prophet Spider has also been seen using older Oracle CVEs such as CVE-2016-0545, as well as gaining initial access via SQL injection." | "attackers exploit Oracle WebLogic server flaws to access target environments" ... "uses CVE-2020-14882 and CVE-2020-14750 to get a foothold" ... "path traversal vulnerabilities that enable an attacker to access the WebLogic administrative console, which then allows for unauthenticated remote code execution."
Execution
4 techniquesThe content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware using PowerShell scripts/commands for execution, download, staging, reconnaissance, persistence, credential access, lateral movement, and defense evasion; e.g., "Sandworm Team used PowerShell scripts to run a credential harvesting tool in memory to evade defenses."
The content repeatedly mentions '.bat', '.cmd', and 'batch scripts' used to automate execution, persistence, cleanup, deployment, disabling security tools, and ransomware operations. Examples: 'APT1 has used ... batch scripting to automate execution', 'Blue Mockingbird has used batch script files to automate execution and deployment of payloads', and 'Cinnamon Tempest has executed ransomware using batch scripts deployed via GPO.' | The content repeatedly describes use of cmd.exe, cmd /c, Windows command shell, and xp_cmdshell to execute commands, run payloads, launch binaries, perform reconnaissance, persistence, cleanup, and ransomware actions. Examples include: 'Sandworm Team used the xp_cmdshell command in MS-SQL', 'APT41 used cmd.exe /c to execute commands on remote machines', and many malware families 'can use cmd.exe to execute commands on a compromised host.'
Citrix ADC maintains a vulnerable Perl script (newbm.pl) that, when accessed via HTTP POST request ... allows local operating system (OS) commands to execute. Attackers can use this functionality to upload/execute command and control (C2) software ... and gain unauthorized access to the OS.
Persistence
1 techniquePrivilege Escalation
3 techniquesThe content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors injecting shellcode, DLLs, or payloads into legitimate processes such as svchost.exe, explorer.exe, iexplore.exe, cmd.exe, lsass.exe, and browser processes.
The Windows Background Intelligent Transfer Service (BITS) is vulnerable to a privilege elevation vulnerability ... An actor can exploit this vulnerability to execute arbitrary code with system-level privileges.
Stealth
6 techniques"Sandworm Team used UPX to pack a copy of Mimikatz"; "APT38 has used several code packing methods such as Themida, Enigma, VMProtect, and Obsidium"; "Lazarus Group packed malicious .db files with Themida to evade detection."
The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors injecting shellcode, DLLs, or payloads into legitimate processes such as svchost.exe, explorer.exe, iexplore.exe, cmd.exe, lsass.exe, and browser processes.
"After the hacker gained access to a Windows domain administrator account..."
The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors decoding, decrypting, or deobfuscating payloads, strings, configuration data, commands, and C2 traffic prior to execution or use, e.g., 'APT28 macro uses the command certutil -decode to decode contents of a .txt file storing the base64 encoded payload' and 'Action RAT can use Base64 to decode actor-controlled C2 server communications.'
AppleSeed can call regsvr32.exe for execution. APT19 used Regsvr32 to bypass application control techniques. APT32 created a Scheduled Task/Job that used regsvr32.exe to execute a COM scriptlet that dynamically downloaded a backdoor and injected it into memory. ... Raspberry Robin uses regsvr32.exe execution without any command line parameters for command and control requests to IP addresses associated with Tor nodes.
Agent Tesla has the ability to perform anti-sandboxing and anti-virtualization checks. Bisonal can check to determine if the compromised system is running on VMware. Bumblebee has the ability to perform anti-virtualization checks. CozyCar will check to ensure it is not being executed inside a virtual machine or a known malware analysis sandbox environment. Metamorfo has embedded a "vmdetect.exe" executable to identify virtual machines at the beginning of execution. RTM can detect if it is running within a sandbox or other virtualized analysis environment. Saint Bear contains several anti-analysis and anti-virtualization checks.
Discovery
7 techniquesThe content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors collecting usernames, identifying logged-in users, running whoami/query user/quser, checking admin status, and enumerating user sessions.
Multiple tools/actors are described using Active Directory/domain group enumeration, e.g., “AdFind can enumerate domain groups”, “net group "domain admins" /domain to enumerate domain groups”, “BloodHound can collect information about domain groups and members”, and “AD Explorer tool to enumerate groups on a victim's network.”
The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors collecting host details such as OS version, hostname, architecture, CPU, memory, BIOS, domain, language, and other configuration data; e.g., "APT41 uses multiple built-in commands such as systeminfo and net config Workstation to enumerate victim system basic configuration information."
Multiple malware and threat groups are described as collecting/deriving local system time, date, timestamp, tick count, or time zone (e.g., "used time /t and net time \ip/hostname for system time discovery"; "collects the timestamp from the victim’s machine"; "can collect the time zone information from the system").
Agent Tesla has the ability to perform anti-sandboxing and anti-virtualization checks. Bisonal can check to determine if the compromised system is running on VMware. Bumblebee has the ability to perform anti-virtualization checks. CozyCar will check to ensure it is not being executed inside a virtual machine or a known malware analysis sandbox environment. Metamorfo has embedded a "vmdetect.exe" executable to identify virtual machines at the beginning of execution. RTM can detect if it is running within a sandbox or other virtualized analysis environment. Saint Bear contains several anti-analysis and anti-virtualization checks.
Examples include: “Bazar … check if the Russian language is installed … and terminate if it is found.”; “DropBook … checked for the presence of Arabic language …”; “Maze … checked the language … GetUserDefaultUILanguage”; “SynAck … checks installed keyboard layouts to estimate … countries.”
Examples include "Bazar can also check if the Russian language is installed on the infected machine and terminate if it is found," "DropBook has checked for the presence of Arabic language," and "Maze has checked the language of the infected system using the GetUSerDefaultUILanguage function."
Lateral Movement
1 technique"During the 2022 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team utilized a PowerShell utility called TANKTRAP to spread and launch a wiper using Windows Group Policy," and "Cuba has been dropped onto systems and used for lateral movement via obfuscated PowerShell scripts."
Collection
1 technique“APT28 has collected files from network shared drives… BADNEWS crawls the victim's mapped drives and collects documents… BRONZE BUTLER has exfiltrated files stolen from file shares… menuPass has collected data from remote systems by mounting network shares with net use and using Robocopy to transfer data… Ramsay can collect data from network drives and stage it for exfiltration… Sowbug extracted Word documents from a file server on a victim network.”
Command and Control
1 techniqueThe content repeatedly describes threat actors, malware, and campaigns using HTTP and/or HTTPS for command and control, including examples such as BlackEnergy communicating with C2 over HTTP POST requests and many other families using HTTP/S for C2.
Impact
2 techniquesAdversaries may encrypt data on target systems or on large numbers of systems in a network to interrupt availability to system and network resources. They can attempt to render stored data inaccessible by encrypting files or data on local and remote drives and withholding access to a decryption key.
Encryption malware may also leverage Internal Defacement, such as changing victim wallpapers or ESXi server login messages, or otherwise intimidate victims by sending ransom notes or other messages to connected printers (known as "print bombing").
Other
2 techniquesThe content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware disabling, stopping, uninstalling, or modifying antivirus, EDR, Windows Defender, AMSI, logging, and other security controls.
Examples include 'Aquatic Panda has attempted to stop endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools', 'BlackByte disabled security tools such as Windows Defender', 'Scattered Spider has uninstalled and disabled security tools', and many malware families terminating AV/EDR processes or services.
Recent activity
59 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Ransomware payload dropped by Lockean affiliates on systems infected via Qbot/QakBot with TA551 collaboration.
Ransomware family referenced as a group FIN7 previously collaborated with (contextual association, not necessarily tied to the specific Veeam CVEs in this article).
Ransomware referenced as using intimidation and internal defacement techniques such as ransom notes and print bombing during encryption operations.
Ransomware family referenced as part of FIN7’s known collaboration set; no direct technical linkage to the Veeam CVEs is described in the provided content.
The version that knows your environment.
Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.